

# Retail Investors Perception on Corporate Governance Practices of HDFC Bank Ltd- Do Gender Matters?

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## Abstract

Corporate governance as the mixture of firm's control concentration and structure, capital structure and their interaction with product market competition. Competition and concentrated ownership can help in reducing the collective action problem present in a modern corporation. The objective of this study was to understand the perception of Retail Investors on how they think their Bank Practices Corporate Governance Disclosure Norms and how these disclosures affected their Investment Decisions. It was found in the study that most of the Investors positively perceives about the disclosure Norms that their Banks provide them. However, there was difference in Male and Female perception and Female were less careful towards Corporate Governance Disclosure Norms.

**Keywords:** Corporate Governance, Investors, Gender Perception, Scandals, Banks

## 1. Introduction

The corporate scandals that occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s attracted attention to the topic of dysfunctional corporate governance processes and the influence that these mechanisms have on the performance of firms.

Since the middle of 2007, the subprime mortgage crisis and the collapse of the financial sector in the United States have had an impact that has spread to the rest of the world. This impact has been so significant that many people have viewed the consequent slowdown in economic activity throughout the world as an indicator of recessionary conditions worldwide, something that has not been seen since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The collapse of the regulatory framework that had previously permitted financial institutions to extend their asset base to include what are now known as "toxic assets" has been identified as one of the factors that contributed to the current economic crisis. While the speculative activity in the real estate market was what led to the creation of these so-called "toxic assets," the slowdown in economic activity had an adverse effect on a great number of industrial companies. It is now also being asserted that the regulatory agencies failed to enforce accountability and good governance on the managers of many of these financial organizations. This is an argument that is becoming increasingly prevalent. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of research pertaining to corporate governance; nonetheless, the majority of this research has focused on the question of internal governance mechanisms, such as the structure and kind of business ownership. Therefore, the issue that has to be answered is whether or not insider ownership increases the wealth of shareholders. The

response to this question brings up key policy questions regarding the kind of variables that regulatory agencies should be monitoring. On the other hand, a key problem at the macro level is the impact of external governance systems on the moderating effect that insider ownership has on the wealth of shareholders. One example of such a mechanism is the presence of rivalry in the market for the firm's products and factors. This issue is of utmost significance in developing countries, many of which have just recently enacted competition laws and are in the process of putting the requisite regulatory authorities in place. This issue is particularly relevant in emerging nations.

(Armstrong et al., 2012); (Pant & Pattanayak, 2010); (Goldar & Aggarwal, 2005); (Balasubramanian et al., 2010); (Bhaumik, 2015); (Banik et al., 2016); are just some of the studies that have discussed the competitive aspect in Indian industries and related it to firm-level productivity in the post-liberalization period. However, there is conflicting data, and (Unel, 2003) indicates that the rate of increase in productivity rose when economic deregulation was implemented in 1991. In a comparable manner, (Pant and Pattanayak, 2010) discovered that after liberalization, there was a larger incidence of monopolistic components in Indian businesses. In a separate piece of research, (Goldar and Aggarwal, 2005) found evidence that the price-cost margin has expanded in the majority of industries following the implementation of liberal economic policies. (Kesavan & Shanta, 2006) show evidence that out of 14 key Indian industries, the monopoly aspect has grown in two sectors, remained the same in two others, and decreased in the other 10 industries. This is contrary to the findings of previous research. There are still some missing linkages in spite of the large amount of effort that has been done on improving the competitiveness of Indian firms and the rise of their productivity. As a result, concerns regarding corporate governance and the impact it has on the productivity of businesses have received relatively little attention. In addition, the effect that ownership has on the productivity of a company in a variety of different competitive contexts has been studied very infrequently. The vast majority of studies conducted on India's productivity have looked at a variety of firm-specific factors without taking into consideration the country's institutional framework for manufacturing. A research (Bartelsman & Doms, 2000) found four factors that are likely to impact productivity development. Of these elements, business ownership and control was shown to be the most relevant component. According to the findings of a research conducted by (Palia et al., 1999), changes in management ownership may be positively associated to changes in productivity. Their empirical research reveals that enterprises with better productivity levels are rewarded by stock markets. We have offered more evidence by relating corporate governance, product market competitiveness, and the influence that their interplay has on firm-level productivity in this study. The exercise of power, direction, and control is what we consider to be identical with governance, and we have defined it as such. Control may be exerted over a contemporary business in a number of significant ways, one of the most important of which is through the ownership of shares. It is vital to understand that ownership plays a significant part in the decisions that are made inside a company. The dominant owner is primarily responsible for making decisions on the input, the technological environment, the workforce, and the operational environment. As a result, we understand corporate governance to be the combination of a company's control concentration and structure, as well as its capital structure and the way these factors interact with the competition in the product market. The difficulty of collective action that is inherent in a contemporary business can be mitigated to some degree with the assistance of competition and concentrated ownership. (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) made the observation that a strong legal protection of investors and some type of concentrated ownership are key components of a good corporate governance system. This observation was made while the authors

were attempting to determine which mechanism for corporate governance is superior. The transaction costs that are associated with the decision-making process of massive businesses can be significantly reduced by utilizing a concentrated ownership structure. According to (Dissanaike and Szilagy, 2010), the collective action problem can be overcome by the partial concentration of ownership and control in the hands of one or a few significant investors.

There are many different kinds of shareholders, each of which has their own unique set of capabilities and motivations to supervise management. Therefore, not only the degree of ownership concentration but also the structure of it is significant for the success of the company. If there is a significant amount of competition in the market for corporate control, then insiders will behave differently. In the same way, the performance of managers or directors would be very predictable if they worked in a sector of the economy that was characterized by high levels of competition.

The firm's capital structure has significant consequences for the corporate governance that is in place. The neo-capital structure paradigm proposed the idea that a company's capital structure should be regarded as an element of the incentive program designed for management. If it shifts, the incentives for management will shift as well, which will have a knock-on effect on the return stream. A second stream is dependent on the method of signalling: if the company or its management is better educated about the return stream, then the capital structure may signal information and influence how the market perceives future returns.

## 2. Literature Review

(“Corporate Governance , the Perception of Corporate Governance and the Connection to Firm Performance ; Evidence from Romania,” 2012) Countries which are not covered by public providers of governance ratings, academic studies on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance lack almost entirely. These are usually countries with weak legal systems which neglect the subject of corporate governance and with companies and executives most likely reluctant to assist an academic endeavour which attempts to evaluate corporate governance practices and to construct governance indices. Consequently, a research attempt in this direction could prove to be a challenging task. Still, such studies are essential for the development of a global theory of corporate governance, as governance mechanisms and the institutional environment in which they are embedded are strongly influenced by forces developed at the national level, and for this reason it is difficult to extend the result of a one country study to other national setting.

(Lee & Fan, 2013) At times when news of scandals flows into the market, the perceptions of certain type of investors will lead to a change in their trading habits for non-scandal portfolios. With a comprehensive analysis of order and trade data for all investors identified by investor code, it is found that a substantial proportion of investors ceased trading altogether during the scandal period. This response was particularly discernible among small and medium individuals, despite the fact that the firms in these portfolios were not associated with the scandals. Small individual investors began to enter the market more passively, regardless of whether the firms’ ownership structure. And they consistently underperformed in both ownership-structure portfolios. However, foreign institutions and large individuals place more aggressive orders for stocks in firms with strong cash-flow rights leverage and perform particularly well in those portfolios.

(Khanna & Zyla, 2017) Corporate governance plays an important role in the decisions of emerging market investors. Some are steering clear of firms in countries where governance remains problematic,

or they are demanding higher returns from such investments. The information comes first hand from the investors themselves, and offers insight into how corporate governance considerations impact their decisions. While an admittedly small sample set, the frank and honest commentary can offer a road map for where improvements and reforms should be focused. Such information can help inform policy reform agendas of emerging market nations, as well as provide guidance for emerging market companies that are seeking financing.

### 3. Research Methodology

#### 3.1 Objective of the Study

- To study and understand the perception of Indian Retail Investors towards the corporate governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd.
- To Analyse the impact of Gender on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd.

#### 3.2 Hypothesis of the Study

- $H_{01}$ : Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd
- $H_1$ : Gender have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd

3.3 Research Design: Empirical Research Design is used for this study which included analysis and Interpretation of Qualitative and Quantitative Data.

3.4 Universe and Sample of the Study: All Retail Investors comprises the Universe for this study. Whereas the Retail Investors of HDFC Bank Ltd were selected as Sample for the study.

3.5 Type of Data: Primary data was used in this study the perception of Retail Investors.

3.6 Sampling Method: Purposive Sampling method was used to gather the samples for data collection. A total of 100 Retail Investors were chosen for the study.

3.7 Data Collection Method: A Restructured questionnaire was made with the help of experts and its reliability was tested. Afterwards by Online and Offline Medium Questionnaire was distributed among the Retail Investors for studying their perception on Corporate Governance.

3.8 Tools and Techniques for Data Analysis:

Percentage Analysis was used to study the perception of Investors of HDFC Bank Ltd for Corporate Governance Practices. Mann Whitney Test of Independence was used to analyse the which Gender is more affected by Corporate Governance practices disclosure. Whereas Mann-Whitney U Test was conducted to study the impact of Gender on the Perception of Investors towards Corporate Governance Practices.

### 4. Analysis and Interpretation

#### a. Analysis of $H_{01}$ : *Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd*

In order to understand that whether Retail Investors perceive positively Corporate Governance practices, percentage analysis was conducted on Responses received on every questions through questionnaire. These responses were categorized further on the basis of different gender.

Below is the analysis on perception of Retail Investors view on Corporate Governance.

**Questionnaire Responses Analysis using Cross Tabulation ( Table No.1)**

		Gender		Total
		F	M	
1.Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Ownership Structure]	Yes	25	39	64
	No	2	16	18
	Neutral	8	10	18
	Total	35	65	100
2.Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Whistle Blower's Policy]	Yes	12	18	30
	No	9	29	38
	Neutral	14	18	32
	Total	35	65	100
3.Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Policies related to Ethical Business Practices]	Yes	23	25	48
	No	2	12	14
	Neutral	10	28	38
	Total	35	65	100
4.Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Corporate Visions/Missions]	Yes	27	29	56
	No	4	14	18
	Neutral	4	22	26
	Total	35	65	100
5.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Separation of Roles between Chairperson and CEO]	Yes	21	21	42
	No	5	21	26
	Neutral	9	23	32
	Total	35	65	100
6.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Gender Diversity ]	Yes	25	33	58
	No	4	16	20
	Neutral	6	16	22
	Total	35	65	100
7.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Board Composition]	Yes	25	34	59
	No	4	15	19

	Neutral	6	16	22
Total		35	65	100

8.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Shareholder's Grievance Redressal]	Yes	22	38	60
	No	3	11	14
	Neutral	10	16	26
Total		35	65	100

9.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Voting Rights in Annual General Meeting]	Yes	24	39	63
	No	6	10	16
	Neutral	5	16	21
Total		35	65	100

10.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Directors/Auditors Report]	Yes	24	35	59
	No	5	6	11
	Neutral	6	24	30
Total		35	65	100

11.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Financial and Operating Results]	Yes	24	45	69
	No	5	6	11
	Neutral	6	14	20
Total		35	65	100

12.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Related Party Transactions]	Yes	14	22	36
	No	12	21	33
	Neutral	9	22	31
Total		35	65	100

13.Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Foreseeable Risk Factors]	Yes	12	26	38
	No	7	18	25
	Neutral	16	21	37
Total		35	65	100

14. Other Miscellaneous Disclosures [Fraud Monitoring Committee]	Yes	17	27	44
	No	6	15	21
	Neutral	12	23	35
<b>Total</b>		<b>35</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>

15. Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Utilization of Funds]	Yes	16	28	44
	No	6	19	25
	Neutral	13	18	31
<b>Total</b>		<b>35</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Mean Rank Analysis for Indifference ( Mann-Whitney Test) ( Table No.2)</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean Rank</b>
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Ownership Structure]	Female	35	48.33
	Male	65	51.67
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Whistle Blower's Policy]	Female	35	51.84
	Male	65	49.78
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Policies related to Ethical Business Practices]	Female	35	42.56
	Male	65	54.78
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Corporate Visions/Missions]	Female	35	39.47
	Male	65	56.44
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Separation of Roles between Chairperson and CEO]	Female	35	42.56
	Male	65	54.78
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Gender Diversity ]	Female	35	44.24
	Male	65	53.87
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Board Composition]	Female	35	44.66
	Male	65	53.65
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Shareholder's Grievance Redressal]	Female	35	49.96
	Male	65	50.79
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Voting Rights in Annual General Meeting]	Female	35	47.06
	Male	65	52.35

	Total	100	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Directors/Auditors Report]	Female	35	44.51
	Male	65	53.72
	Total	100	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Financial and Operating Results]	Female	35	50.23
	Male	65	50.65
	Total	100	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Related Party Transactions]	Female	35	47.43
	Male	65	52.15
	Total	100	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Foreseeable Risk Factors]	Female	35	54.37
	Male	65	48.42
	Total	100	
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Utilization of Funds]	Female	35	51.63
	Male	65	49.89
	Total	100	
Other Miscellaneous Disclosures [Fraud Monitoring Committee]	Female	35	48.81
	Male	65	51.41
	Total	100	

Test Statistics ( Significance Analysis) ( Table No.3)	Mann-Whitney U	Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Ownership Structure]	1061.500	.519
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Whistle Blower's Policy]	1090.500	.718
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Policies related to Ethical Business Practices]	859.500	.028
Do you agree that your Bank provides all accountability related disclosures in below points? [Corporate Visions/Missions]	751.500	.002
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Separation of Roles between Chairperson and CEO]	859.500	.032
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Gender Diversity ]	918.500	.074
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Board Responsibility related disclosures in below points? [Board Composition]	933.000	.094
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Shareholder's Grievance Redressal]	1118.500	.875
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Voting Rights in Annual General Meeting]	1017.000	.310



Do you agree that your Bank provides all Shareholder's Rights related disclosures in below points? [Directors/Auditors Report]	928.000	.084
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Financial and Operating Results]	1128.000	.933
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Related Party Transactions]	1030.000	.410
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Foreseeable Risk Factors]	1002.000	.296
Do you agree that your Bank provides all Transparency related disclosures in below points? [Utilization of Funds]	1098.000	.760
Other Miscellaneous Disclosures [Fraud Monitoring Committee]	1078.500	.646

## 5. Findings

1. According to Cross Tabulation Method (Table No.1) for percentage Analysis, when Retail Investors were asked if their Bank provides them all accountability related disclosure on Ownership Structure 39% of Total Responded as “Yes” out of 100. When Mean Rank (Table No. 2) was analysed using Mann-Whitney test it was found that Males in comparison to Female were more affected by Corporate Governance practices. Also in Mann-Whitney U Test p value for Q1 according to table No. 3 is 0.519 which is greater than 0.05 implying acceptance of Null Hypothesis that “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd”.

2. When investors were asked if they were aware of Whistle Blower policies of their bank, 38% i.e. majority of Investors responded “No” out of 100. Also when mean ranks were compared it was found that Female investors were more sensitive as compared to Male investors in case of whistle Blower Policies. According to Table No. 3 for Mann-Whitney U Test, p value is 0.718 which is greater than 0.05 which implies that the Null hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted.

3. Majority of Respondents i.e. 48% out of total Responses agreed that their bank provide them enough of Policies related to Ethical Business Practices. When mean rank was compared using Mann-Whitney Test it was found that among both Genders Males are more susceptible towards Corporate Government Practices. Also the Mann-Whitney U Test value (Table No. 3) came 0.028 which is less than 0.05 which signified that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is rejected in this case.

4. When Investors were asked if they were aware of their banks Corporate Vision/Missions, 56% of total Respondents i.e. majority of them agreed to it. According to Mean rank analysis through Mann-Whitney Test it was found that Male respondents in comparison to Female respondents were more aware of Corporate Governance disclosure practices. Also the Mann-Whitney U Test p value came to be 0.002 which is less than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices (Vision/Mission) of HDFC Bank Ltd” is rejected in this case

5. Majority of respondents i.e. 62% of total respondents agreed that their bank provide them with disclosure related to Separation of Roles between Chairperson and CEO). When mean rank was compared (Table No.2) it was found that Male respondents were more sensitive towards these corporate governance practices in comparison to Female investors. According to Mann-Whitney U Test (Table

No.3) p value came 0.032 which is less than 0.05 signifying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is rejected in this case.

6. 58% of the respondents that constitute of Majority among total respondents agreed that Disclosure regarding Gender Diversity is an important disclosure in Corporate Governance practices. Mean Rank analysis concluded that among Males and Females, Male investors are more careful that whether their Bank are following proper Corporate Governance practices. Also according to Mann-Whitney U Test (table No.3) p value if 0.07 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

7. When asked from investors whether Disclosure related to Board Composition was an important disclosure related to Corporate Governance practices 59% of respondents out of total agreed to it. When mean rank was compared it was found that Male investors were more cautious in comparison to Female investors. According to Mann-Whitney U Test (Table No.3) p value came 0.094 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

8. Another important disclosure is the policies related to Shareholder’s Grievance Redressal and majority of shareholders i.e. 60% out of total agreed to it. According to Mean rank analysis using Mann Whitney test (Table No.2) it was found that Male investors were again more susceptible to disclosures related to Corporate Governance practices in comparison to Female investors. As per Mann-Whitney U Test (Table No.3) p value came 0.875 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

9. When Investors were asked about their perception on Voting Rights Disclosure of their Banks 63% of the total respondents agreed to that their Bank provide them all voting rights related disclosure. According to Mean Rank Analysis it was found that Male investors were more cautious in comparison to Female Investors when it comes to Voting Rights disclosure. As per Mann-Whitney U Test (Table No.3) p value came 0.310 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Alternate Hypothesis “Gender have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

10. 59% of Total respondents i.e. Majority of respondents agreed that their Bank provides them all Auditors Report related Disclosure. According to Mann-Whitney Mean Rank Analysis it was found that Male investors have more positive perception than female investors in Case of Auditors Report related Disclosure. Also according to Mann-Whitney U Test, p value is 0.84 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

11. When Investors were asked about their view on their Banks disclosure on Disclosure on Financial and Operating Results, 69% out of total Respondents agreed to it. According to mean rank analysis (Table No.2) using Mann-Whitney Test it was found that Male and Female both are equally sensitive that their banks provides these disclosures. Also Mann-Whitney U Test, p value is 0.933 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted.

12. Mixed responses came when investors were asked that whether their bank provide them all Related Party Transactions related disclosure. Majority responses i.e. 36% came for “Yes”, 33 % for “No” and 31% for Neutral. As per mean Rank Analysis (Table No.2) Male were more susceptible to Corporate Governance Practices as compared to Female Investors. According to Mann-Whitney U Test p value came 0.410 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

13. When Investors were asked about their view on their Banks disclosure on Disclosure on Foreseeable Risk Factors, 38% out of total Respondents agreed to it. According to mean rank analysis (Table No.2) using Mann-Whitney Test it was found that Male and Female both are equally sensitive that their banks provides these disclosures. Also Mann-Whitney U Test, p value is 0.296 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted.

14. 44% of Total respondents i.e. Majority of respondents agreed that their Bank provides them all Fraud Monitoring Committee Disclosure. According to Mann-Whitney Mean Rank Analysis it was found that Male investors have more positive perception than female investors in Case of Fraud Monitoring Committee related Disclosure. Also according to Mann-Whitney U Test, p value is 0.0646 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

15. Another important disclosure is the policies related to Shareholder’s Utilization of Funds and majority of shareholders i.e. 44% out of total agreed to it. According to Mean rank analysis using Mann Whitney test (Table No.2) it was found that Male investors were again more susceptible to disclosures related to Corporate Governance practices in comparison to Female investors. As per Mann-Whitney U Test (Table No.3) p value came 0.760 which is greater than 0.05 implying that Null Hypothesis “Gender do not have significant impact on the perception towards Corporate Governance practices of HDFC Bank Ltd” is accepted in this case.

## 6. Conclusion

The findings of the Retail Investors Survey provide conclusive proof that robust corporate governance practices are an essential component of developing market investors' decision-making processes. This information was provided by the investors themselves, and it provides a glimpse into the ways in which issues of corporate governance play a role in influencing their decisions. Despite the fact that this is a very small sample set, the open and forthright criticism can provide a road map for the areas in which changes and improvements should be concentrated.

The influence of gender on respondents' perceptions of corporate governance practices is another aspect of this research that was investigated. According to the findings of the study, it is clear that Female investors pay less attention to the corporate governance practices of the banks in which they invest. It is in their best interest to be more up-to-date and vigilant regarding the aforementioned procedures. Though the study rejected the impact of Gender on the perception but it cannot be denied that Investors do take into account the Corporate Governance Practices that their banks employs, and as a result, these considerations are reflected in the investors' investment patterns.

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