

Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020)

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020). The study was prompted by the persistent conflict in the country that has made it difficult for the humanitarian agencies to fully meet the expectations of the needy. The study aimed to evaluate the financial effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan; the role of the political actors both state and non-state actors in conflict on humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan; the reasons humanitarian workers are targeted when offering humanitarian services and the way forward in providing humanitarian services in hard-hit areas like South Sudan.

The study employed a Cross-sectional survey design on a sample of 300 respondents who were selected using simple random sampling from humanitarian agency employees and humanitarian receivers. Questionnaires were designed and administered to the respondents and interviews were conducted with the top management of the humanitarian agency.

The findings of the study revealed Financing the humanitarian budget has become a problem because of conflict in South Sudan, and the negative effects of conflict are also there. The study further revealed that Humanitarian organizations are Faced with the challenge of Political objectives increasingly pursued on the ground in South Sudan. The study also revealed that the reason for targeting humanitarian workers is because of efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power in South Sudan finally the study revealed that there is a need for Innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs in South Sudan. The study recommended among others that; The humanitarian agencies should find some new ways of financing their various humanitarian budget without depending match on donors. Humanitarian agencies should practice the principles of neutrality, to have a proper operational environment. The humanitarian agencies and their workers should practice the principles of neutrality, to be targeted during their operation period. The humanitarian agencies should adopt the new innovative and sustainable means of addressing the effect of conflict on humanitarian assistance.

CHAPTER ONE

EFFECTS OF CONFLICT ON HUMANITARIAN SERVICES IN SOUTH SUDAN

1.0 Introduction

This chapter will basically be dwelled on the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020). The study will contain the background of the Study, Statement of the Problem, Objectives of the Study, Research Question, Significant of the Study, scope and limitation of the study, and the organization of the Study.

1.1 Background of the study

South Sudan, separated from Sudan in 2011 after almost 50 years of civil war, was drawn into a devastating new conflict in late 2013, when a political dispute that overlapped with pre-existing ethnic and political lines turned violent. Civilians have been routinely targeted in the conflict, often along ethnic lines, and the warring parties have been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The war and resulting humanitarian crisis have displaced more than 2.7 million people, including more than 200,000 who are sheltering at U.N. peacekeeping bases in the country. Over 1 million South Sudanese have fled as refugees to neighbouring countries. U.N. agencies report that the humanitarian situation, already dire with over 40% of the population facing life-threatening hunger, is worsening, as continued conflict spurs a sharp increase in food prices. Aid workers, among them hundreds of foreign nationals, are increasingly under threat—South Sudan overtook Afghanistan as the country with the highest reported number of major attacks on humanitarians in 2015 (Lauren Ploch Blanchard, 2016).

South Sudan has witnessed a lot of conflicts in its first decade of independent as compared to the other parts of the Sub-Sahara African countries. These conflicts have mainly been in the form of civil wars and have attracted little attention from the international community until of late. In actual terms, the consequences of these civil wars have been enormous and thus attracted the interest of the international community. Their involvement has been through humanitarian assistance as well as the political involvement through the regional mediation block.

Much of the scholarly and political attention on situations where disasters and conflict collide treats conflict as a singular unit, disregarding the diversity in conflict conditions and disaster response challenges (Hilhorst 2015). However, this research aimed to investigate the effect conflict on humanitarian services and how the responses of international and country-based actors largely depend on the type of conflict that occurs.

The humanitarian community itself is diffuse. It is an arena in which different actors operate under different labels, such as post-conflict reconstruction, emergency relief, humanitarian or development aid, capacity building and many more (Hilhorst & Jansen 2010; Salomons 2015). Moreover, it is part of that wider international community, together with the UN apparatus, multilateral and donor organisations, states, individual (I)NGOs, private and military actors, in an ‘international community’ that is rarely defined (Veit 2010). Yet the label ‘humanitarian’ carries a distinctly different connotation than ‘aid’ or ‘development,’ and humanitarians position themselves vis-a-vis the state and others accordingly. The humanitarian principles neutrality, independence and impartiality serve as a way of self-identification and legitimization and are used – and believed – to claim safe access to people and territory. In this understanding, humanitarianism necessarily depends and acts on this image of action exceptional to the state and international politics

A report authors by (Roanne van Voorst & Dorothea Hilhorst 2018) Humanitarian action in disaster and conflict settings; distinguish three types of conflict scenarios: high-intensity conflicts, low-intensity conflicts and post-conflict scenarios. They stated conflict is dynamic and complex: in reality, a country that is formally regarded to be in a post-conflict state, may experience insurgencies or violent eruptions. Hence, the boundaries between high, low, or post conflict are fuzzy.

In recent years’ humanitarian assistance provided in situations of war and disaster by donor governments, international organizations like the United Nations (UN), and, particularly, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in situations of war and disaster has saved hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of lives. The provision of food and medical supplies to refugees, displaced persons, and those

near the battlefields in Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, and elsewhere constitutes one of the most heroic and life-preserving activities of our time. Major NGOs like CARE, Save the Children, Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and many less well-known organizations have been on the front lines relieving desperate human suffering in Africa (David R. Smock, 1996).

The current crisis reflects underlying tensions and mistrust among South Sudanese leaders and ethnic groups that date back to Sudan's civil war (1983-2005), and before. While the war was described broadly as a north-south conflict, infighting among southern rebel commanders in the 1990s nearly derailed the southern bid for self-determination. Leaders of the insurgency, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), damaged their cause by competing for power and mobilizing supporters along ethnic lines; all sides committed atrocities. The major factions reconciled in the early 2000s, although several smaller southern militias continued to operate, primarily in the Greater Upper Nile area. As of 23rd May 2021; a total of 126 humanitarian workers, mostly South Sudanese have lost their lives while providing critical assistance to people across the country since conflict broke out in late 2013 (UNOCHA; 23 May 2021 press release).

1.2 Statement of the problem

On the evening of 15 December 2013, shootings broke out in the Giada Barracks of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. As the violence escalated over the following days, it spread from the barracks further into Juba, and then to the north, onto the towns of Bor and Malakal. It was unclear what exactly happened in these first hours and days. Explanations for the escalation ranged from a coup attempt by the deposed Vice-President Riak Machar – which was the official government line, to a forced disarmament of Nuer soldiers in the Presidential Guards Brigade, a mutiny that had triggered a violent response, to ethnic struggles within the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) (D. H Johnson 2014; Thomas 2015).

The war and resulting displacement have severely exacerbated humanitarian needs in a country that already had some of the world's lowest human development indicators. The conflict has disrupted farming cycles, grazing patterns, and trade routes, and local markets have collapsed. Many of the displaced lost their livelihoods when they fled their homes. Food prices have skyrocketed since the fighting, leaving many unable to meet basic needs. The repeated looting of aid stocks has deterred aid agencies from pre-positioning supplies in many areas, and logistical challenges and ongoing insecurity have necessitated the costly delivery of food by air, and sometimes via air drops. The humanitarian community in South Sudan face a lot of challenges ranging from government and other non-state actors' restriction on access to areas hit by conflict, the poor road network across the country, the targeting of humanitarian workers by the parties to the conflict, which may result to either loss of lives or serious injuries, to financial constraint as the world is fighting the global pandemic of Covid-19 which limit the donation to humanitarian community among others.

It is against these background that researcher will assess the effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance from the start of the conflict 2013 to 2020.

1.3 Research objectives

1.3.1 The board Objective

The general or the board objective of this study is to assess the effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance from the 2013-2020

1.3.2 Specific objectives

1. To find out the financial effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan
2. To investigate the role of the political actors both state and non-state actors in conflict on the humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan
3. Investigate the reasons humanitarian workers are targeted when offering humanitarian services
4. To suggest way forward in providing humanitarian services in hard-hit areas like South Sudan

1.4 Research questions

1. What are the financial effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan?
2. What is the role of political actors both state and non-state actors in conflict on the humanitarian assistance in South Sudan?
3. Why are humanitarian workers targeted when offering humanitarian services?
4. How can the effects on conflict on humanitarian assistance be address in South Sudan?

1.5 Research Hypothesis

According to Kothari, C. and Gaurav G (2014), hypothesis is a proposition or a set of propositions, set forth as an explanation for the occurrence of some specified group of phenomena either asserted merely as a provisional conjecture to guide some investigation or accepted as highly probable in the light of established facts. Hence forth, this study will test the null-hypothesis so, as to find out the effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan.

1. Humanitarian services cannot be affected by conflict.
2. Humanitarian services can be affected by conflict.

1.6 Scope and limitation of the study

In content that study will focus the effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance. Other factors such humanitarian financing and political restriction during the time of peace will not be included in the study. The study will cover a period of 2013 – 2020. The study will be confined to the three town blocks of Malakal, Wau and Juba Town. In Geographical scope, the study will be conducted in the Republic of South Sudan.

The study will face limitation in term of financial, logistics and time constraint, the sample chosen for the study is small in relation to the entire population of the country. The study may also face the challenge of lack of response from of the respondents.

1.7 The significance of the Study

The study will be significant to humanitarian services providers and the government of South Sudan and other non-state actors in the Country, because they will know the effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in the country.

1.7 Research Methodology

Considering the fact that the study covers such a vast area, not all the respondents can be included in the study. It is thus significant to draw a sample from the population. Both the probability and non-probability methods will employ to select the sample for the study.


The probability method will be used to select respondents from the NGOs for the study. The the humanitarian’s services receivers from the major three towns blocks in Juba, Wau and Malakal form strata in stratified sampling with each town forming a stratum for sampling.

1.8 Assumption of the Study

As this study will test the hypothesis above, the test will be further guide by the following Assumptions in regard to the effect of conflict on humanitarian services in South Sudan

1. Humanitarian services are not affected by conflict
2. There is significant free mobility of humanitarian staff to all part of the country.
3. Humanitarian services are only affected by the lack of finance to meet humanitarian needs of the people
4. There are more restriction on the moment of the humanitarian due to political believe that they are spy of their home government or international community.

1.9 Organization of the study



This study will be organize into five chapters as shown by the diagram below

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

There is an increasing demand for deploying humanitarian workers to conflict-affected areas. However, this need has expanded the risk of violent attacks against staff in insecure field settings. In this brief, the study identifies six country-level factors that can influence attacks on aid workers. These six factors help in the better understanding of the causes of aid worker attacks and may ultimately guide towards their prevention in the future. This chapter presents the review of the literature based on each specific objectives of the study.

2.1 The Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance

OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers (2015) on financing in Crisis? Making humanitarian finance fit for the future. Stated that Crises in middle income countries (MICs) pose a special financing challenge; the solution requires a paradigm shift about how to approach crises in these countries. Financing to meet crises in middle income countries is a growing problem – 53% of all humanitarian funds requested in 2015 were for crises in these countries – and problematical, given the limited access to anything other than pure humanitarian budgets. Why can't development funds help out in MICs? Because donors, and multilateral banks, invest in middle income countries for very different reasons – and using very different tools – than in least developed countries. The middle-income country toolbox is, not surprisingly, rather ill-suited to crisis response; therefore, most crisis funding comes from humanitarian budgets.

The solution will require a paradigm shift about how to approach crisis response in MICs: encouraging the use of development finance by focusing on building resilience in all parts of society, rather than pure crisis response; closer alignment with country priorities and using country systems, rather than assuming that the response should be conducted solely by humanitarian operational agencies; and helping development actors see crises as unique opportunities to shore up economic and social progress, allowing the full range of development instruments to come into play. This type of solution might see the use of concessional loans for improving infrastructure that can deal with refugee inflows but also with future population growth; debt swaps to allow governments to reallocate planned debt repayments to social protection systems; and a focus on building the capacity and systems of local authorities that are dealing directly with the crisis (OECD,2015).

According to High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing Report to the Secretary-General (2016) on Too important to fail—addressing the humanitarian financing gap. The world today spends around US\$ 25 billion to provide life-saving assistance to 125 million people devastated by wars and natural disasters. While this amount is twelve times greater than fifteen years ago, never before has generosity been so insufficient. Over the last years conflicts and natural disasters have led to fast-growing numbers of people in need and a funding gap for humanitarian action of an estimated US\$ 15 billion. This is a lot of money, but not out of reach for a world producing US\$ 78 trillion of annual GDP. Closing the humanitarian financing gap would mean no one having to die or live without dignity for the lack of money. It would be a victory for humanity at a time when it is much needed. Insufficient funding for humanitarian aid means not only more suffering but also a wider spread of global instability. Helping people in distress is morally right, but it is also in the interest of those who support aid. Today's massive scale of instability and its capacity to cross borders, vividly demonstrated by the refugee crisis in Europe, makes humanitarian aid a global public good that requires an appropriate fundraising model. In an interconnected world we need

solidarity funding capable of crossing borders. The panel proposes that governments use the opportunity of the WHS to sign up to the concept of a solidarity levy and create a steady revenue stream for humanitarian action.

Safarpour, et.al (2020) conducted a study, on the Challenges and barriers of humanitarian aid management in 2017 Kermanshah earthquake. Their study methodology was a qualitative case study design, with the population of 21 people which includes 6 humanitarian aid managers, 6 volunteers, 4 aid workers, and 5 affected people. They collect the data through semi-structured interviews and purposeful sampling, which continued until saturating the data. The strategies recommended by Guba were used for evaluating the trustworthiness of the data. The data was analyzed with conventional content analysis method according to method suggested by Graneheim and Lundman. Their study found out that, there were nine categories, and 19 sub-categories which were identified as the challenges and barriers of humanitarian aid and donors' management during the 2017 Kermanshah Earthquake. The categories included education, command and coordination, communication and information, rules, security, traffic and overcrowding, assessment, providing system, and cultural setting. Also, two themes including managerial and structural barriers were extracted. Their Study Concluded that, adopting an effective management and appropriate policies with respect to humanitarian aid and modifying structural and managerial barriers can improve the performance and management of humanitarian aid.

Ayada El-Zoghbi, Nadine Chehade, Peter McConaghy, and Matthew Soursourian (2017), The Role of Financial Services in Humanitarian Crises. Their Humanitarian crises pose a formidable development challenge. Whether caused by conflict, natural disaster, climate-related events, or some combination of the three, crises have been steadily increasing in frequency, severity, and complexity. While the nature and incidences of these crises vary significantly, they affect millions of people, particularly the most vulnerable. Some populations are displaced from their communities or countries as a result of crises; others stay where they are, by choice or necessity, and must navigate unpredictable and dangerous environments. Forced displacement is becoming more common and more protracted. In December 2015, the number of individuals forcibly displaced by conflict or violence peaked at 65.3 million, more than doubling in only five years.

In addition, (Bennett et al. 2016) argued that, since 2007, 25.4 million people are displaced every year, on average, due to natural disasters and climate-related events,¹ and in countries affected by such disasters, an estimated \$250– 300 billion is lost due to the disruption of local markets and livelihoods (UNISDR 2015). Crises are also becoming more protracted: 90 percent of countries making appeals for humanitarian assistance in 2014 had been registering annual appeals for three years or more; 60 percent of the appeals had lasted over eight years.

GHA/Development Initiatives (2014) Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report 2014; stated that, Humanitarian response is becoming increasingly stretched by the number, scale and severity of emergencies. An unprecedented number of people are now affected by crises, particularly protracted crises that demand large-scale and complex responses. Levels of displacement are at their highest since World War II. An estimated 10.7 million people were newly displaced by conflict or persecution in 2013, compared with 7.6 million newly displaced in 2012. Around 96 million people were affected by disasters, such as floods, earthquakes and storms in 2013. Not all those affected by crises were in need of international humanitarian assistance, as domestic resources responded to the needs of millions of people in countries such as China and India. However, the international community responded to remaining need in 2013 on a dramatic scale, with a record US\$22 billion in funding. Yet this was still not enough. While

UN coordinated appeals do not cover the full extent of needs, in 2013 only 65% of their stated requirements were met. There was a similar stretching of humanitarian resources in 2014 with the continuation of large-scale and complex crises including in Syria, Iraq, Gaza and South Sudan and the Ebola virus in West Africa, to name just some. By the end of 2014, UN-coordinated appeal requirements had increased by 49% compared with the previous year to US\$19.2 billion, but only 56% of these requirements were met. The cost of responding to these emergencies is also increasing, due to a number of contextual factors. The overall cost per beneficiary in UN-coordinated appeals has increased from US\$168 in 2013 to US\$204 in 2014.

GHA/Development Initiatives (2016) Think Piece: Humanitarian Financing. Stated that, the challenges of humanitarian financing. The challenges ahead are two-fold: a) How to ensure adequate, timely and appropriate resources to respond to acute and growing levels of need for international humanitarian response? This involves working within the humanitarian system – at international, national and local levels – to improve the mobilization, targeting, disbursement and transparency of funds and resources from diverse actors. b) How to ensure adequate and appropriate resources to respond to the underlying causes and protracted symptoms and consequences of crises? This implies reaching out beyond the traditional humanitarian sector to address the barriers and gaps in all resources to improve the lives of those vulnerable to and affected by crisis.

2.2 The Role of the Political Actors both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance

Maria Lange & Mick Quinn (2003) conducted a study on Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges. Their study found out that Humanitarian assistance does not in and of itself create either war or peace, and the ultimate responsibility for ensuring peace and stability falls to national governments and the international community. However, poorly planned and/or executed aid programmes in conflict zones may fail to reduce suffering or may at worst inadvertently exacerbate it. Negative consequences include contributing to the economy of war, bestowing unrepresentative legitimacy on warring parties and fuelling tensions between communities by the perceived favouring of one community over another. Changing realities of humanitarian aid delivery, agencies' experiences of undesired impacts and an increasing politicisation of aid has pushed the issue of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and conflict to the top of the aid agenda. Faced with real operational dilemmas, humanitarians want to understand the potential contribution of humanitarian assistance – in conjunction with longer-term development aid – to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. At the same time, a policy of 'coherence' or 'integration' of humanitarian and political objectives is increasingly pursued on the ground. However, efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of humanitarian assistance are regarded by some as likely to undermine core humanitarian principles and affect humanitarian access negatively.

Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener (2011) presented a paper on Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peacebuilding: options and strategies. They stated that Armed actors dominate contemporary conflict environments dramatically. Their degree of dispersion, influence, and effect on international politics make it necessary to establish strategies for interaction with them. This article makes a contribution by assessing particular strategies and their suitability and applicability with regard to specific actors. First, it delineates options for dealing with armed actors based on three perspectives from international relations theory: realist, institutionalist, and constructivist. Second, it matches these

perspectives to the capabilities of international actors. Finally, it offers an assessment of the difficulties that arise from the plurality of forms of armed actors, as well as of external actors.

Armed actors of different types shape the situation during and after armed conflict in manifold ways. On the one hand, they are often perceived as responsible for violence against unarmed civilians in breach of international humanitarian law, as well as for the establishment of criminal and informal economies. On the other hand, they are often the expression of social problems because they see themselves as representatives of distinct interests and may build on broad support within communities. Non-state armed actors, such as rebel groups, militias, organizations led by warlords, and criminal networks, often bear the potential to disturb, undermine, or completely truncate processes of peace- and state-building, leading violence to flare up again. Additionally, international actors, such as humanitarian aid workers, representatives of governments, and peacekeepers, are often affected by this violence in their work.

Considering the degree of dispersion of non-state armed actors, their potential influence, and their effects on international politics, and learning about the possibilities and chances of success of strategies and concepts regarding an interaction with them, appears crucial. This article aims to provide a general framework about possible strategies for actors in international politics to deal with armed actors. It offers first assessments of the prerequisites of specific strategies, as well as of the suitability and applicability of strategies for actors. It does so by reviewing existing strategies for countering and otherwise engaging non-state armed actors (realist, institutionalist, and constructivist) and introducing options for ‘spoiler management’ with reference to specific types of armed actor. From this framework, the article draws conclusions about which international actors (states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) are most likely to apply which option with regard to non-state armed actors. The article closes with an assessment of the problems and difficulties that arise from the plurality of approaches and options.

Ashley Jackson (2012), *Talking to the other side Humanitarian engagement with armed non-state actors*. Found out that, Engagement with Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs) on assistance and protection is integral to any effective humanitarian response to conflict-related needs. This engagement appears to have declined since the end of the Cold War, and the UN is no longer taking the lead. Counter-terror legislation and donor funding restrictions have discouraged, if not criminalized, dialogue, and there appears to be limited collaboration among humanitarian actors in engaging with ANSAs. Greater study and support is required in order to understand how humanitarian actors can successfully sustain productive humanitarian dialogue with ANSAs.

He further argued that In conflicts, it is essential that humanitarian actors engage with all belligerents. Dialogue is required to facilitate access to affected populations for the provision of humanitarian assistance, as well as to promote protection. As the majority of conflicts in which humanitarian actors operate are intra-state in nature, engaging with armed non-state actors (ANSAs) has become increasingly important. Yet the vast majority of humanitarian and multimandate agencies fail to engage strategically with ANSAs – with detrimental consequences for aid workers and those in need of their assistance.

Confidential ATHA interview (2016) put it that, many have pointed to the conflict in Syria, for instance, and the difficulty of aid organizations to assert their neutrality and independence when they are only willing or able to operate in regime or opposition-controlled areas, respectively. As one practitioner put it: It’s true that sometimes in conflict situations we are facing the choice between our security and the principles. Sometimes we stop activities because security isn’t there, or because the principles, e.g. neutrality, cannot be guaranteed. In other cases, it may be quite easy to remain neutral, but independence

is more complicated. For instance, in Syria, where interviewees stated that, if we decide to go to this area and not that area, we can be seen as not fully independent. They further went on to say, if we decide to cancel activities for security reasons, it raises questions of humanity, and civilians' access to aid.

Claude Bruderlein (2000) conducted a study on the role of non-state actors in building human security; The case of armed groups in intra-state wars. His study found out that, despite the increased role of non-state armed groups in internal conflicts, international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights standards offer only limited opportunities to persuade armed groups to comply, whereas a collection of legal instruments has been developed to supply state actors with a comprehensive framework, guiding the conduct of their combatants. This discrepancy between state and non-state actors reveals the extent to which the development of humanitarian law has been subjugated to political considerations, denying significantly less protection to armed groups than to state actors. Despite the critical role of armed groups in internal conflicts, human rights law is de jure applicable only to state entities, and IHL offers only general principles of protection under common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and some rules of engagement in Additional Protocol II. Moreover, the conditions for the application of IHL are often not met in minor conflicts.

He further argued that, most armed groups have been barred from participating in conferences on international standards applicable to armed conflicts, and contacts with armed groups remain under intense political pressure from many sides. The Rome Conference on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court provides a recent illustration of states' reluctance to recognize the role of non-state armed groups in the implementation of international standards. While hundreds of NGOs were represented at the Rome Conference among more than 130 state delegations, several in an official capacity, no representatives of armed groups were present. The statute adopted at the Conference in July 1998 offers very few provisions for engaging armed groups, imposing obligations only on states and individuals. In particular, it confers no legal authority on non-state actors for the prosecution of war crimes, despite the fact often only the leader of armed groups can exert control over non-state combatants. One can legitimately question the practical relevance of these legal developments where governments have lost their capacity to bring non-state criminals to trial or have relinquished this authority as part of a peace process, as in Sierra Leone regarding the RUF combatants.

He concluded that, from a practical perspective, armed groups remain key actors for protection strategies: as de facto governments within the territories under their control; as military entities active in combat; as authorities responsible for the protection of humanitarian operations; as political entities which may eventually be party to a peace settlement.

Report by the American Refugee Council Argued that the receptivity of armed groups to international standards also depends on their organizational structure. Armed groups can hardly be designated as a single political category considering the extreme diversity of their objectives and modus operandi. Interestingly, the willingness of armed groups to discuss humanitarian issues depends partly on their internal political dynamics. More sophisticated groups tend to be more inclined towards standards and codes of conduct, whereas groups with vaguer political objectives tend to be more reluctant to discuss standards they find counterintuitive. Some groups have clear political objectives (e.g. FARC or ELN in Colombia), whereas others are filling a political vacuum left by disintegrated states (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan). A critical aspect of efforts to promote the protection of civilians is the extent to which armed groups are seeking to gain and maintain basic political legitimacy within their constituency, such as a tribal area, an ethnic or social group, a region, or within the international community.

United States Committee for Refugees Country Reports for Burundi and Burma at www.refugees.org stated clearly that, from a military perspective, the principle that combatants should be separated from civilians often makes little sense to non-state-armed groups. On the contrary, nonstate-armed groups rely heavily on their proximity to civilian populations: to avert attacks from other parties (e.g. Sri Lanka); to sustain themselves in economic and human terms (e.g. Sierra Leone, Sudan); to consolidate their control over a territory and its resources (e.g. Colombia, Myanmar); to exert pressure on the adverse party, by terrorizing and displacing populations (e.g. Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Uganda). Arguably, the receptivity of an armed group to humanitarian standards in military terms involves a capacity to dissociate its combatants from the surrounding civilian population to some extent. This capacity depends on factors including: the vulnerability of the group to attacks, aerial or otherwise; its dependence on domestic resources rather than on foreign support (e.g. human resources from refugee camps in border areas rather than local villages); its control over a territory; the military advantages it can gain by displacing large populations. Humanitarian organizations and other actors seeking the adherence of armed groups to international standards may not be in a position to influence these factors significantly. However, an analysis of the military position of a group within these parameters facilitates the planning of negotiations with it. Humanitarian organizations can hardly expect an armed group under strong pressure in the field to make landmark concessions regarding their distance from the civilian population. However, an armed group may be inclined to consider practical measures to sustain the population in times of crisis to prevent the forced displacement of people by government forces. The extent to which humanitarian organizations should consider or even participate in such operations is always controversial. Engagement with armed groups should always proceed with a full awareness of the military reality.

2.3 The Reasons Humanitarian Workers are Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services

Humanitarian Outcomes (2017), on the Behind the attacks: A look at the perpetrators of violence against aid workers, found out that in 2016, 158 major attacks against aid operations occurred, in which 101 aid workers were killed, 98 wounded and 89 kidnapped. The number of attacks and victims increased only slightly from 2015. For the second consecutive year, South Sudan was the most violent context for aid workers, reflecting the fracturing conflict and an atmosphere of impunity for armed actors. Most aid worker attacks are perpetrated by ‘national-level’ non-state armed groups (NSAGs) seeking control of the state. Targeting aid operations serves their effort to dominate populations and territories and delegitimise the government in power. Global-level NSAGs, such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, are responsible for smaller numbers of attacks but higher fatality rates. They are more lethal in their means and often specifically target international aid workers. However, when measured by body count alone, states are responsible for the highest number of aid worker fatalities. In 2015 and 2016, 54 aid workers were killed by state actors. This was mainly the result of airstrikes by Russia and the US in Syria and Afghanistan and an upsurge in state-sponsored violence in South Sudan. NSAGs view aid organisations as potential threats to their authority as well as useful proxy targets. When attempting to govern territory and provide some measure of public services, NSAGs have incentives to grant aid organisations secure access, but this often requires the aid groups to accept conditions that compromise humanitarian principles. Different types of NSAGs (and different ranks within them) will pose different levels of threat to aid organisations. However, negotiations are almost always possible if humanitarians are willing and equipped to engage with these actors and understand their perceptions, incentives and red lines.

Kristian Hoelscher, Jason Miklian Håvard and Mokleiv Nygård (2015a), conducted a study, Understanding Attacks on Humanitarian Aid Workers, their study found out that There is an increasing demand for deploying humanitarian workers to conflict-affected areas. However, this need has expanded the risk of violent attacks against staff in insecure field settings. Their study identifies five country-level factors that can influence attacks on aid workers, such as Countries with greater criminal violence do not have more attacks on aid workers. International military forces do not add to aid worker risk, but International Peacekeeping Operations do; Groups who actively target civilians do not attack aid workers more; More democratic and economically developed countries pose fewer risks for aid workers and the conflict context of the country matters – to an extent.

Their study further stated that, not surprisingly, that aid workers are much more likely to be attacked in countries experiencing conflict than in peaceful countries. Somewhat surprisingly, though, the difference between minor and major conflict setting is not that large measured in the absolute expected count of attacks. An average country with a major conflict is likely to see double the aid worker attacks than a similar country with a minor armed conflict. This relationship holds when we measured conflict intensity through the number of battle related deaths as well. We found a strong and significant effect of conflict intensity on the expected number of attacks. An increase of battle deaths from around 400 deaths per year, a medium intensity conflict, to 2000 deaths a year, a high intensity conflict, roughly doubles the expected amount of aid worker attacks – from 20 attacks in a year to more than 40 attacks per year. This relationship holds when we differentiate between different types of attacks on aid workers, with one exception: Kidnappings are much less common in low intensity than in high intensity conflicts. For aid organizations the lesson here is fairly clear: the more intense the conflict, the more attacks are to be expected. Unfortunately, these are often precisely the conflicts where aid workers are most needed.

They conclude that, conflict context of the matters to an extent, in which they stated that, aid workers are much more likely to be attacked in countries experiencing conflict than in peaceful countries. Somewhat surprisingly, though, the difference between minor and major conflict setting is not that large measured in the absolute expected count of attacks. An average country with a major conflict is likely to see double the aid worker attacks than a similar country with a minor armed conflict. This relationship holds when we measured conflict intensity through the number of battle related deaths as well. We found a strong and significant effect of conflict intensity on the expected number of attacks. An increase of battle deaths from around 400 deaths per year, a medium intensity conflict, to 2000 deaths a year, a high intensity conflict, roughly doubles the expected amount of aid worker attacks – from 20 attacks in a year to more than 40 attacks per year. This relationship holds when we differentiate between different types of attacks on aid workers, with one exception: Kidnappings are much less common in low intensity than in high intensity conflicts. For aid organizations, the lesson here is fairly clear: the more intense the conflict, the more attacks are to be expected. Unfortunately, these are often precisely the conflicts where aid workers are most needed.

Maria Lange & Mick Quinn (2003) on Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: Meeting the Challenges. In an environment where conflict in (rather than between) states is the main cause of humanitarian need, agencies cannot ignore the imperative to ensure that their actions do not generate or fuel conflict. Many have taken steps to minimize the potential negative impact of their interventions, but there is considerable ambivalence over whether humanitarian assistance can be purposefully tailored to contribute positively to conflict transformation. Humanitarian assistance does not in and of itself create either war or peace, and the ultimate responsibility for ensuring peace and stability falls to national

governments and the international community. However, poorly planned and/or executed aid programs in conflict zones may fail to reduce suffering or may at worst inadvertently exacerbate it. Negative consequences include contributing to the economy of war, bestowing unrepresentative legitimacy on warring parties and fueling tensions between communities by the perceived favoring of one community over another. Changing realities of humanitarian aid delivery, agencies' experiences of undesired impacts and an increasing politicization of aid has pushed the issue of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and conflict to the top of the aid agenda. Faced with real operational dilemmas, humanitarians want to understand the potential contribution of humanitarian assistance – in conjunction with longer-term development aid – to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. At the same time, a policy of 'coherence' or 'integration' of humanitarian and political objectives is increasingly pursued on the ground. However, efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of humanitarian assistance are regarded by some as likely to undermine core humanitarian principles and affect humanitarian access negatively.

Kristian Hoelscher Jason, Miklian Håvard and Mokleiv Nygård (2015b), conducted a study on, *Understanding Attacks on Humanitarian Aid Workers*. Their study found out that, the humanitarian aid sector has grown exponentially over the past two decades. Global aid spending by governments and private actors has increased 400% since 2000 to \$25 billion USD in 2014 as the number of international aid workers has also tripled. Yet this international goodwill has also produced dangerous consequences. Aid delivery areas tend to be in conflict or crisis zones, increasing operational insecurity and at times blurring motivations for aid disbursement. 2014 was also the first year in almost three decades with more than 100,000 battle-related deaths globally, and an additional 58 million people were displaced in 2014 – the highest total ever recorded. Aid worker attacks have increased in tandem with the increases in violence. In 2013, 461 aid workers were attacked, representing the most violent year on record against aid workers. Their study further argued that the increased number of total attacks are driven by a small number of countries that register many more aid worker attacks than what is commonly seen, led by, in particular, Afghanistan and Syria. They furthermore stated that, Global South and the business-like actions of humanitarian aid agencies may be potentially eroding the value and neutrality of humanitarian space. Other scholars believe that this places INGO staff at greater risk, and that increasing institutional politicization and deeper ties with governments and/or militaries is considered a key factor motivating violence against INGO workers.

Humanitarian Outcomes (2021); *Aid Worker Security Report 2020* Contending with threats to humanitarian health workers in the age of epidemics. Stated that, Casualties in 2019 exceeded all past years recorded in the Aid Worker Security Database (AWSD): 483 aid workers were attacked in 277 separate incidents. Victims comprised 125 aid workers who were killed, 234 wounded, and 124 kidnapped. Syria, for the first time, was the country where the most major attacks took place. The other highest incident countries were South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, and Central African Republic. Humanitarian health workers made up a disproportionate 42% of aid worker fatalities in 2019—higher than any previous year recorded. Health workers in humanitarian aid face a unique constellation of risks regarding both the potential perpetrators of violence (patients, families, community members) and the context/location of attacks (greater exposure to airstrikes and to targeted attacks on facilities). In DRC, 15 of 27 reported attacks were committed against health workers responding to Ebola, and of these, a third were committed by community members. People's fears of disease and mistrust of responders are often stoked and manipulated by armed groups and other political actors. Aid

organizations' communication failures with communities created some of the risk to Ebola responders in DRC, reflecting some key lessons not learned from the West Africa outbreak six years ago.

The report concluded that, Successful programming methods and sound risk management for humanitarian health workers are tightly intertwined. Both require direct communication with the communities in their local languages and a collaborative approach to containment/treatment options, as well as multipronged efforts to identify and correct rumours and misinformation.

Ibid argued that, while some armed groups may exhibit hostilities toward humanitarian actors for ideological or strategic reasons, the behavior of humanitarians themselves is also critically important to their acceptance in the field. Indeed, several humanitarian practitioners point to poor understanding or implementation of the humanitarian principles among field staff – highlighting a tension between headquarters and field staff over understanding and implementation of the principles in difficult settings. Some practitioners, especially at headquarters, have expressed a concern that field staff lack a detailed awareness or understanding of the principles, or how to implement them in concrete decisions in the field. In many cases, however, field staff understand the principles well, but struggle to navigate in environments where the principles are continuously negotiated, and where compromises need to be made. Different environments raise these issues in different ways. In some contexts, for instance, the strict adherence to the principles is necessary for maintaining presence and acceptance; in other contexts, compromise is necessary. The dilemmas are particularly stark in contexts where both situations apply

Anderson (1996) said, intergroup tensions are also reinforced when NGOs provide external resources to some groups and not to others. For instance, NGOs hire people from certain groups and not others. When NGOs have more funds than local governments, that creates an imbalance between external resources and domestic resources, making it difficult for local institutions to build for peace. Also, NGOs hire away much of the best talent from domestic agencies. Anderson argued, insofar as their operations are now increasingly intertwined with those of official agencies. Donor governments and UN agencies increasingly rely on NGOs as their field agents. Moreover, NGOs now collaborate with military forces in the delivery of humanitarian supplies. This raises questions about the nongovernmental and pacific character of NGOs and suggests they may be adopting some elements of military operating style. Moreover, the military preoccupation with logistics and delivery systems may replace and in turn undermine local capacities to carry out locally initiated developmental activities. The predominant military presence can also undermine civilian control, which in turn slows peacebuilding.

Prendergast argued that one of the major reasons why humanitarian staffs are targeted in the conflict is to the fact that humanitarian organization are not politically neutral. Hence there is a need for the humanitarian community to be fully aware of the politicization of its activities. Although rarely intended, the actions of NGOs often influence both the military and political dimensions of conflicts. He further stressed that, Humanitarian assistance is the major outside resource for many war-torn areas, and in turn the suspension of humanitarian assistance can serve as a significant lever on the warring factions. Before NGOs impose conditions or threaten to suspend aid, however, they must elicit the views of the local populations. Beth Eggleston and Carrie McDougall (2010) Expert Roundtable on the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel found out that, Available information indicates that there has been a steady increase in the incidence of serious attacks on humanitarian personnel in the last decade, with a particular spike since 2006. This increase takes into account the fact that the number of humanitarian personnel in the field has increased over the study period – relative rates have increased. 75% of all incidents since 2006 are concentrated in six States (Sudan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Chad, Iraq and Pakistan),

with a spike in incidents since 2006 concentrated in Sudan (Darfur), Somalia and Afghanistan. There was a slight decline in the number of incidents in other contexts, perhaps due to the increased security measures implemented by humanitarian actors.

Their study further found out that, Motivations for attacks on humanitarian personnel and their assets can be hard to pinpoint in high intensity conflicts. At least three different motivations have been identified as lying behind deliberate attacks: Criminal - motivated by financial gain (non-State actors are increasingly criminal); Aid considered an obstacle to the objectives of belligerents – to gain or maintain control over an area or to undermine central authority; } Political – direct (whereby an organization is itself the primary target due to its own actions/ statements, or to prevent the delivery of aid to punish a population) and associative (whereby humanitarian actors are associated with ‘the enemy’ (government, rebel group or foreign power)); The caveat on these findings is that information is patchy, meaning no comprehensive data set is available, in part because humanitarian agencies are not always willing to share information relating to either their own personnel, or incidents of which they are aware. Available data sets also only capture ‘serious’ events – death, serious injury and kidnapping for a prolonged period. There is an alarming frequency of ‘lesser’ events. It was recognized that an increased analysis of data to further explore these ‘lesser’ security threats and incidents, could lead to better early warning about an escalation of the threat. Gareth Price Jones writes, it is fairly clear to many why combatants attack aid workers: The incentives to attack humanitarians remain much the same – denying assistance to populations that may support opposition groups, removing witnesses to atrocity, allowing greater military freedom of movement and blocking or discrediting independent narratives around levels of humanitarian suffering. Jones argued that other authors or researchers have noted that attacks against aid workers do not necessarily reflect a misunderstanding of their mission, since even principled humanitarian action comes at a price. In attempting to provide aid in a neutral and impartial manner, for instance, humanitarian actors may face opposition from groups who see them as providing aid to their enemies. In still other cases, the motives for attacks against humanitarian actors are more criminal and financial than strategic.

Ibid, argued that, when State and Non-State Actors are pressed on the issue of violence against aid workers, they offered explanations of violence against humanitarians which ranged from “blaming other parties to the conflict” and “claiming that they have made mistakes in identifying targets” to “frustration, directed towards aid workers because they were representatives of the international community.

According to Geneva Call, many members of armed groups felt that “aid workers could lose [their] protection if they collaborate with enemy forces.” This may refer to the situations – such as recently in Iraq and Afghanistan – where the co-location or close coordination of humanitarian actors with invading international military forces provoked hostility among armed actors opposing those forces, and by association, their humanitarian allies. Thus, while some groups may express categorical opposition to humanitarian actors, the views of many others can be influenced by humanitarian actors’ observed behavior and engagement in the field. Moreover, while some non-state armed actors may actively oppose international norms, many others have incentives to comply, or to appear to comply with international norms, which can grant them legitimacy or other reputational benefits (Ibid).

2.4 Way Forward in Providing Humanitarian Services in Hard-hit Areas

United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) policy and study series (2011) on the Safety and security for national humanitarian workers; stated that National aid workers constitute the majority of aid staff in the field – upwards of 90 per cent for most international NGOs – and undertake the bulk of the

work in assisting beneficiary populations. The issue of national aid worker security is becoming critical for humanitarian agencies and their donors for several reasons, including the declining access for international staff in some high-risk contexts and increasing reliance on national staff and local partners to remain where international staff members have left. Their study findings suggest that most national aid workers see an international aid system that at times exaggerates the security risk, but which focuses its resources for mitigating that risk on its international staff members –not the national aid workers who are more often, in their own view, the subject of violence. International organisations clearly have an interest in bridging this keenly felt divide for practical and ethical reasons.

European Union, 2015 conducted a study towards more effective global humanitarian action: How the EU can contribute. Their result found out, three main priorities have been highlighted: the need for humanitarians to protect and preserve the dignity of people affected by conflict and disaster; a call to find innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs; and a demand from the global South to 'localize' humanitarian response by strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis. There is potential for the European Union (EU) to take a leadership role in the process and influence the WHS outcome. ECHO's new need assessment tools and the Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) as well as Resilience approaches offer a framework for responding to the challenges posed by protracted crises. This study recommends that the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid should be applied as a model for a 'Global Consensus on Humanitarian Action' or a 'Global Compact' recognizing the diversity of today's humanitarian response system while taking advantage of all actors' complementary role. Furthermore, the EU and member states must commit to placing protection at the Centre of humanitarian action and ensure that the EU's humanitarian aid is not regarded as a crisis management tool, and allowed to become an instrument of its foreign policy.

Abby Stoddard, Lydia Poole, Glyn Taylor and Barnaby Willitts-King (2017) conducted the Efficiency and Inefficiency in Humanitarian Financing. Their study found out that, is to support timely response efforts. Because only a few humanitarian actors have standby funds that can be tapped in advance of donor funding, this means that a grant must be requested, approved, and disbursed within a very short timeframe for it to function as a rapid response resource. Their study further found that necessary speed in disbursements for rapid response was lacking in all three case examples and across the major modalities, including those designed specifically for the purpose. An array of transaction costs, including overly heavy bureaucratic structures currently works against technical efficiency of funding flows. In the case of bilateral grants, because the proposal-to-award period typically represents the longest time lag, donors should provide greater “pre-positioned” funding with individual agencies and/or multiagency consortia capable of putting the money to work immediately in the event of a sudden crisis. Strong UN-NGO partnerships in some chronic crisis settings, and the experience of the Start Fund, illustrate how this preparedness approach can reduce funding delays and support rapid response. Pooled fund grants were decided more quickly than grants from bilateral donors, but nevertheless faced delays on both the front and back ends of the approval process. This could be improved by waiving the requirement for joined-up proposals in cases where this process would hinder critical rapid action, and overly heavy cluster-level processes in general.

Barnaby Willitts-King and Alexandra Spencer (2021), conducted a study on, Reducing the humanitarian financing gap, Review of progress since the report of the High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing. Their study found out that, the key recommendations from the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing (HLP) in 2016, to reduce need by adopting more development approaches to

crises and to broaden the resource base by increasing the diversity of donors, continue to be valid and even more relevant today. Needs measured by inter-agency appeals have doubled since then, and conflicts have persisted in Syria and Yemen, and flared up in new areas, with little optimism for a reduction in conflict globally. The High-Level Panel solutions to the ‘financing gap’ between humanitarian need and resourcing therefore continue to be relevant. In hindsight, this was clearly a long-term agenda, that required a strategy, focus and leadership to drive it forward, rather than one that could be achieved within five years. Progress on ‘reducing need’ (Pillar 1 of the HLP) is greater than perceived, particularly relating to the humanitarian–development–peace nexus and risk-informed anticipatory action; but this progress is uneven, fragmented and not at scale. There has been a disappointing lack of progress on widening the resource base of the existing humanitarian system (Pillar 2) through partnerships with new/emerging bilateral donors, the private sector or Islamic social finance. Consistent, high-level leadership supported by broad coalitions, such as on anticipatory action, has helped drive progress in some areas. However, the lack of a dedicated structure to follow up on the HLP’s recommendations has meant overall progress is challenging to measure. There are opportunities to make further progress on the HLP recommendations, particularly on financing development approaches in crisis, but a focused approach has the greatest likelihood of impact in the short term given the demands on the humanitarian system and current limited appetite for ambitious reform. This narrow approach should make stronger connections to existing fora such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee OECD/DAC and Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Groups and be complementary to the Grand Bargain (GB) in its next iteration. While a more focused approach is recommended in the short term, there is a need for a more ambitious future vision to strengthen the global system for responding to crisis, including through the humanitarian system, but also through scaling up development approaches in crises and financing crisis responses more predictably.

Saavedra, L. and Knox-Clarke P. (2015, Working together in the field for effective humanitarian response; stated that, Cooperation and coordination are not ends in themselves. Rather, working together means that humanitarian organisations can obtain tangible benefits. Most crises that require international assistance are too large for any one organization to address. By working together, organisations can cover broad geographical areas and address a variety of sectoral needs. For example, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) intensified appeals to the international community after the declaration of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea in March 2014, underlining the importance of a multi-agency response. They further argued that, by working with local NGOs and civil society groups, international actors can obtain information about affected people and areas and gain access to affected people in situations where security or political constraints hinder an international presence

Hedlund and Knox Clarke, (2011) argued that, working together can improve effectiveness by increasing the speed of response – such as international NGOs working with national NGOs that are closer to the ground. Similarly, private sector actors may be able to respond more rapidly than international actors reliant on receiving donor funding. Working together can help improve learning and sharing of good practice. Clusters often disseminate guidance and best practice and can serve as hubs for learning and improvement. In partnerships, NGOs can learn from one another and build mutual capacity.

Grunewald et al., (2014), stated that, significant progress has been made in the Sahel in the area of food crisis prediction and diagnosis. National and regional Early Warning Systems ... are in place and most DFID-funded partners are either involved in these or take their warnings into account when preparing and designing intervention schemes. They substantiate their find by citing the real-time evaluation of

Department for International Development (DFID)-funded humanitarian programmes in the Sahel in 2013-2014, by addressing diagnosis, decision-making and resource allocation effectiveness, in countries like Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, which found out that working together in cluster help the institutions to create higher levels of communication and so makes more information available to humanitarian actors, allowing them to make more informed decisions.

David R. Smock (1996), on Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict in Africa put forwards the following eight major steps on how NGOs can minimize or eliminate the negative impact of humanitarian aid: (1) improve planning; (2) assess need more accurately; (3) analyze the consequences of agreements negotiated to gain access to needy populations and obtain security for NGO personnel; (4) provide aid that will have the longest term benefit to particular targeted groups; (5) contract for independent monitoring and evaluation of assistance programs to reduce mismanagement and the diversion of supplies; (6) make the empowerment of local institutions a high priority; (7) coordinate closely with other assistance organizations operating in a particular crisis situation; and (8) deploy human rights monitors to help protect local populations from exploitation and repression by the fighting factions.

Beth Eggleston and Carrie McDougall (2010) Expert Roundtable on the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel. The recommended that, there is a need Increased investment in risk assessment to better inform the management of security risks. The adoption by all humanitarian organisations of a combination of the acceptance, protection and deterrence strategies – over-reliance on any one approach carries risk. Improved mitigation of the secondary risks of remote management. Improved coordination and the collective management of security – at present there is only a limited sharing of information and a poor investment (financial and political) in coordination functions. Deployment of staff with the appropriate expertise to manage crises, attention to the process management of serious incidents. Increased donor support to mitigate the costs of security management. Increased dialogue with, and assistance from, other sectors.

Somalia

The most notable feature of the relief operation in Somalia in late 1995 was the degree to which the Somali Aid Coordination Body succeeded in promoting collaboration among the operating agencies. This coordinating body developed a code of conduct that guides humanitarian operations in Somalia. Consistent with this code, development activities in the post-emergency phase will be provided only on condition that safety can be assured for agency personnel and supplies. Many donors and NGOs have withdrawn from Somalia because they have become frustrated and question the effectiveness of their assistance. As already mentioned, much relief is now efficiently delivered through commercial channels, using indigenous networks. This experiment needs to be evaluated to draw lessons for other relief operations. United Nations Development Program, the designated lead agency in Somalia, concentrates on gathering and sharing information and closely monitoring developments. Stephen Tomlin of the International Medical Corps emphasized the value of the Somali Aid Coordination Body, which has given the UN, donors, international NGOs, and Somali NGOs an opportunity to share information and be heard. Prior to December 1994, when it was moved from Nairobi to Europe, this body was an effective clearinghouse for field operations.

Sierra Leone

Symposium conducted by US institute of Peace (1996) stated that lessons learned from Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda can be applied in Sierra Leone, site of the most recent humanitarian crisis in Africa. Roberts urged DHA and collaborating NGOs to grasp the nature of the conflict and the warring parties more successfully than they did in other African crises. NGO staff must produce accurate background information and incorporate it in their plans. “Let’s find which of these relief strategies could work for Sierra Leone and which we, as the responsible and caring community, are willing to try out in Sierra Leone,” Roberts said. Will Lynch, until recently Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS) manager of relief services in Sierra Leone, lamented the failure of international planning commissions on Sierra Leone to consult with those with field experience and operational responsibility in the country. These commissions have also failed to engage local NGOs in either planning or operations. Assessment missions typically fail to visit the areas of greatest need because those places are dangerous. It is encouraging, however, that international NGOs have been incorporated in the DHA-sponsored assessment mission for Sierra Leone, Taft said. One role these NGOs can play is to insist that the assessment mission fully comprehend the political dynamics underlying the conflict, and not merely plan the logistics of a relief operation.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the research design, study population, sampling procedures, sample size, sampling techniques, data collection methods, data analysis, ethical considerations and limitations to the study.

3.2 Research Design

According to Upagade and Shende (2012), research design refers to the procedure regarding the collection and analysis of data relevant to research work.

The research design to be used by the researcher in this sense will be Survey design. According to Garg and Kothari (2014), Survey Study design is often flexible, appropriate, efficient, and economical. Generally, the design minimize bias and maximize the reliability of the data to be collected and analyzed. This study will cover the time frame from 2013-2020. This design is deemed necessary owing to the fact that it analyzes the issue at stake more comprehensively and elaborately.

3.3 Target Population

According to Cooper and Schindler (2003), a population is the total collection of elements about which we wish to make some inferences. Odo (1992,) defines population as the entire number of people, objects, events or things that all have one or more characteristics of interest to study. So, the target population of this study consisted of some staff of the humanitarian organization operating in South Sudan, more specifically Juba, Wau and Malakal, a few humanitarian receivers within the three towns.

3.4 Description of the Data Collection Instruments

According to (Hynman, 2008), the choice of data collection instruments is paramount to the success of the survey. When determining an appropriate data collection method, many factors such as sensitivity to the study, time availability, and financial availability will be consider. The researcher will use both primary and secondary data in order to accomplish research objectives.

The researcher will also use, interview guide to gather information from the top management of the NGOs and other Humanitarian agencies to find out the effect of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan.

3.5 Description of the Sample and Sampling Procedures

Sampling refers to a method used in drawing samples from a population usually in such a manner that the sample facilitates the determination of some hypothesis concerning the population (Chandran 2004). Sampling is a process of selecting a number of individuals or objects from a population such that the selected group contains elements which are representatives of the characteristics found in the entire group (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). The researcher will randomly select 3000 respondents from whom a sample size of 300 respondents will be drawn. The researcher will use Simple probability random sampling technique. The simple random technique is important owing to the fact that it is objective, unbiased and the errors involved in the estimation of the population characteristics can be estimated and controlled. Moreover, the inferences based on it will be valid. This will be achieved by writing certain digits (i.e. from 01-10) on pieces of paper and they will be fold. After folding the papers will be put into the box and the number will be fix blindly without replacement and the reminding one in the will be rotated and another number will be fix. The process will continue until the 300 of them will be achieved. The three hundred respondents will be distributed into three, 100 of the respondents will be from Wau, 100 will be from Malakal and the 100 will be from Juba, so totaling to 300 respondents.

3.6 Validity and Reliability

According to Mugenda. O and Mugenda. A, (2003), the quality of any research study depends on the accuracy of the data collection procedures. That is to say, the instruments or tools used to collect the data must yield the type of data the researcher can use to accurately answer his or her questions. For reliability and validity to exist in the data, the data collection techniques must yield information that is only relevant to the research hypothesis.

3.7 Description of Data Collection Procedures

Data collection procedure will start with the issuance of the introductory letter by the head of department. This document will be acting as a ticket that enables the researcher to be welcomed by the concerned authority and institution of the research area. After the researcher will obtain the aforementioned document/letter, interview guides with the help of his supervisor. After giving appropriate and ample time to the respondents to complete the task, he will go and collect them back and sort them out. This will be followed by feeding the data into the computer and their follow data analysis.

3.8 Description of Data Analysis Procedures

Data analysis involves organizing, accounting for and explaining the data. That is to say, making sense out of data in terms of the respondents' definition of the situation noting patterns, themes, categories and irregularities (Gay, 1992).

Data analysis will pass through several procedures before interpreting the results. In view of this, the researcher will follow the same process in his data analysis. The will be thematic analysis. The data will be analyzed in relation to the objectives of the study so as to provide concrete basis for decision- making and conclusion.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

During the development of the proposal and final proposal write up, plagiarism will be avoided as much as possible by citing relevant sources and authorities of secondary sources of information. Confidentiality will be maintained to some extent, in relation to the data obtained from the respondents. Also, the researcher, in any way, will not influence respondents to give information that suited his expectations; rather, he will gather all data as objectively as possible. When feeding the data into the computer, the researcher will be very keen not to alter the answers provided by the respondents on the questionnaires. As such, all these actions will be under-taken by the researcher in line with ethical considerations (Shah, 2011).

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION, AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presented the findings of the study, the analysis of the findings and interpretation of the data collected from the field. These findings were described by use of tables, pie charts and graphs. The findings presented in this chapter are in line with the study objectives or research questions as: the financial effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan; the roles of political actors both state and non-state actors in conflict on the humanitarian assistance in South Sudan; The reason humanitarian workers are targeted when offering humanitarian service in South Sudan and the effects on conflict on humanitarian assistance be addressed in South Sudan.

Table 4.1 The Rate of Return

Rate of Return	Frequency	%
Return	290	96.7
Missing	10	3.3
Total	300	100

Source Field Data (2021)

Table 1 above show the rate of return for the study, which 96.7 % and the missing is 3.3% with 5 questionnaires excluded due illegibility of the handwriting of the respondents, while two were reported by the respective respondent that the questionnaire got misplaced in the office document, meanwhile the other three questionnaires were not collected from respondents to the fact the respondents were in isolation centre as Covid-19 routine practice.

4.2. Demographics Information of the Respondents

Gender of Respondents	Frequency	%
Female	61	20.8
Male	229	79.2
Non-binary	-	-
Prefer not to say	-	-

Total

290


100

Table 4.2. 1. Distribution of Respondents by Gender

Source: Field Data (2021)

The table 2 above show the distribution of respondents by gender. 61(20.8%) of the respondents were females and 229 (79.2%) of the Respondents were males. This indicate that majority of the respondents were males.

Figure1 Show the Age Bracket of the Respondents



Source: Field Data 2021

Figure.1 above show the age of the respondents. age range between 18-25 years were at the frequency 39(13.5%) of the respondents, age range between 25-35 were at the frequency 173 (59.7%) of the respondents, age range of 35-45 years were at the frequency of the 33(11.3%) of the respondents, the age range of 45 and above were at the frequency 42(14.5%) of the respondents.

Therefore, the researcher conclude that majority of the respondents were at the range of 25-35 which were the right age of the doing any work.

Marital Status of Respondents	Frequency	%
Married	120	41.4
Single	104	35.9
Divorced	20	6.9
Widowed	40	13.8
Separated	6	2.0
Total	290	100

Table 4.2.2 Distribution of Respondents by Marital status


Source: Field Data (2021)

In analysis of the data collected, respondents who were single were classified into one category, married ones were grouped alone, and those who got separated from their loved ones were put into their own category.

The table 3 above show the distribution of respondents by their marital status. 120(41.4 %) of the respondent were married. 104(35.9%) of the respondents of the respondents were singles; 20(6.9%) of the respondents were divorced. Meanwhile 40(13.8%) of the respondents were widowed and finally 6(2.0%) of the respondents were separated.

Therefore, the study concluded that majority of the people are married, follow by singles. This means that most of the people in market or working are the married one because they have family to feed.

Figure 2 Educational Qualification of the Respondents



Source: Field Data 2021

Figure 2 above show the educational level of the respondents; others Level were at the frequency 6(2.0 %) of the respondents; secondary school level was at the frequency 42(16%) of the respondents, University level were at the frequency 137 (51%) of the respondents; PhD level were at the frequency of 10(4%) of the respondents and master’s level were at the frequency 55 (20%) of the respondents. therefore, the researcher conclude that majority of the respondents were the university graduate who are occupying the various position in the organizations.

Table 4.2. 3 Occupation Level of Respondents


Occupation of Respondents	Frequency	%
Humanitarian Staff (NGO Staff)	170	58.6
Student	20	6.9
Humanitarian Organization Manager (NGO Manager)	40	13.8
Humanitarian Receiver	60	20.7
Total	290	100

Source: Field Data (2021)

Table 4 above show the occupation of the respondents, Humanitarian Staff (NGO Staff) were at the frequency of 170(58.6%) of the respondents, Student were at the frequency 20(6.9%) of the respondents, Humanitarian Organization Manager (NGO Manager) were at the frequency of 40(13.8) of the respondents and Humanitarian Receiver were at the frequency of 60(20.7%) of the respondents.

Therefore, the study concluded that majority of the respondents were the employees or Humanitarian Staff (NGO Staff).

Figure 3. The Level of Experience of the Respondents




Source Field Data (2021)

Figure 3 above show the experience level of the respondents 1-2 years were at the frequency 39(13.5%) of the respondents; 2-3 years were at the frequency 123(42.4%) of the respondents, 3-4 years were at the frequency of 50 (17.3%) of the respondents; 4-5 years were at the frequency of 33(11.3%) of the respondents and more than 5 years of experience were at the frequency 42 (14.5 %) of the respondents.

Therefore, the study conclude that majority of the respondents were the 2-3 years’ work experiences in their various position in the organizations, hence making them to be right source for the information needed for this research.

Figure 4. Show the respondents views on whether conflict have negative effect on humanitarian assistance or not.



Source: **Field Data (2021)**

Figure 4 above shows the respondents, response on the question, does conflict have negative effect on humanitarian assistance. Those who responded Yes were at the frequency of 200(68.9%) of the respondents. While those who responded No were at the frequency of 90(31.1%) of the respondents. Therefore, the study concluded that, indeed conflict have negative effect on the humanitarian services.

Table 4.3.4 The Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

Statements	Frequency	%
Financing humanitarian budget has become a problem.	100	34.5
Limited access to financing the humanitarian funds	40	13.8
Financing to meet crisis in middle income countries is a growing problem	60	20.7
The humanitarian funds failed to meet the dire humanitarian needs in the countries with conflict	40	13.8
Insufficient funding for humanitarian aid means not only more suffering	50	17.2
Total	290	100

Source: **Field Data 2021**

Table 4 above show the respondents' views on the financial effects of conflict on humanitarian assistance in South Sudan. 100(34.5%) of the respondents indicating that Financing humanitarian budget has become a problem as a result of conflict in South Sudan; 40(13.8%) of the respondents indicating that there is Limited access to financing the humanitarian funds as a result of conflict; 60(20.7%) of the respondents indicating that, there is a problem of financing to meet crisis in middle income countries that become a continuous growing concern; 40(13.8%) of the respondents responded that, The humanitarian funds failed to meet the dire humanitarian needs in the countries with conflict and finally 50(17.2%) of the respondents indicated that, there is Insufficient funding for humanitarian aid means not only more suffering.

Therefore, based on the above views, the study concluded that Financing humanitarian budget has become a problem as a result of conflict in South Sudan, and the negative effect of conflict are also there. This

finding is substantiated by response of one humanitarian senior officer during an interview in which the officer stated that, the recurrent conflict in South Sudan both at national and sub national levels put the pressure on donor countries and humanitarian community. Due to other emerging conflicts and adverse climatic conditions in the country and in the region, there is no enough money to meets the increasing needs and conflicts hinders resilience activities. In summary, conflict depleted financial resources and without money, it is impossible for the humanitarian partners to response to saving of live and protecting livelihood.

The finding concurred with the findings of, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Working Papers (2015), in which it was found out that, Financing to meet crises in middle income countries is a growing problem – 53% of all humanitarian funds requested in 2015 were for crises in these countries – and problematical, given the limited access to anything other than pure humanitarian budgets.

Table 4.4.5 The Role of the Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

Statement	Frequency	%
Faced with real operational dilemmas	52	17.9
Political objectives are increasingly pursued on ground	135	46.6
Bestowing unrepresentative legitimacy	50	17.2
Political actors wanted to enforce their authority on ground	53	18.3
Total	290	100

Source: **Field Data 2021**

Table 5 above show the respondents view on the Role of the Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan. 52(17.9%) of the respondents indicates that Humanitarian organizations are Faced with real operational dilemmas; 135(46.6%) of the respondents indicates that Humanitarian organizations are Faced with the challenge Political objectives increasingly pursued on ground ; 50(17.2%) respondents responded that there is, Bestowing unrepresentative legitimacy, hence affecting the operation of humanitarian organization; 53(18.3%) of the respondents responded that Political actors wanted to enforce their authority on ground in South Sudan, hence affecting the activities of humanitarian organization;

Therefore, the researcher conclude that Humanitarian organizations are Faced with the challenge Political objectives increasingly pursued on ground in South Sudan. This finding was also supported by the couples of interviews done with the top management of humanitarian organization in which it was stated by most of the interviewees, that both state and non-state actors have a pivotal role on the unhindered access by humanitarian organization to areas where there are people in needs of the services.

These finding, concurred with findings of Maria Lange & Mick Quinn (2003), which stated that, at some time, a policy of ‘coherence’ or ‘integration’ of humanitarian and political objectives is increasingly pursued on the ground. However, efforts to strengthen the peacebuilding impact of humanitarian assistance are regarded by some as likely to undermine core humanitarian principles and affect humanitarian access negatively.

Table 4.5. 6 The Reason Humanitarian Workers are Targeted When Offering Humanitarian Service in South Sudan

Statement	Frequency	%
Humanitarian organizations are not politically neutral	65	22.4
Efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power	122	42.1
Attempting to govern territory and provide some measure of public service	53	18.3
Non-state armed groups seeking control of the state	50	17.2
Total	290	100

Source: **Field Data 2021**

Table 6 above Show the Reason Humanitarian Workers are Targeted When Offering Humanitarian Service in South Sudan. 65(22.4%) of the respondents indicates that Humanitarian organizations are not politically neutral, hence prompting their targeting; 122(42.1%) of the respondents indicates Efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power; 53(18.3%) of the respondents indicates that Attempting to govern territory and provide some measure of public service and finally 50(17.2%) of the respondents indicates that Non-state armed groups seeking control of the state. Therefore, the Study concluded that reason for targeting humanitarian workers is as a result of efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power in South Sudan. In an interview with top management of humanitarian organizations, it was stated that some of the attack on humanitarian workers were carried in order scares the humanitarian works (induce the fear on humanitarian agencies) or loot the humanitarian items meant to support the needy people. The humanitarian workers are perceived to belong or following certain ideology, be it political or religious or ethnic group, and so taken as spies. Humanitarian workers themselves can be the cause of their fates. There are number of occasions where humanitarian staff do not follow humanitarian principles of neutralism. They tend to causally involve in the local politics, hence making them vulnerable to abuse or harassment. The finding concurred with the finding of Humanitarian Outcomes (2017) which stated that, targeting aid operations serves their effort to dominate populations and territories and delegitimise the government in power.

4.6. 7 The Effects on Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance be Addressed Service in South Sudan

Statement	Frequency	%
Humanitarian agencies should protect and preserve the dignity of people affect by conflict and disaster	75	25.9
Innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's need	132	45.5
Strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis	33	11.4
All the above	50	17.2
Total	290	100

Source: **Field Data 2021**

Table 7 above Show the solutions to the effects on Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance be Addressed Service in South Sudan. 75(25.9%) of the respondents indicates that Humanitarian agencies should protect

and preserve the dignity of people affected by conflict and disaster; 132(45.5%) of the respondents indicates that there is a need for innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs; 33 (11.4%) of the respondents indicates that there is a need for strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis and finally 50(17.2%) of the respondents indicates that all of the above mentioned strategies such as that humanitarian agencies should protect and preserve the dignity of people affected by conflict and disaster; need for innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs; and need for strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis. Therefore, the study concluded that there is a need for innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs in South Sudan. This position was clarified by the response from various interviews in which most of the management stated that, observation of the humanitarian principle is a key for avoiding targeted killings of humanitarian workers in South Sudan. Secondly, there is a need of educating our populace through civic education and life-skills to help them understand the societal and political dynamic of South Sudan, thus alleviate ethnicity crisis among the civil populations. Thirdly, humanitarian agencies have to take precautions to avoid subjecting their staff to risky areas in the name of saving lives. Fourthly, timely information sharing by humanitarian security agents as well working in collaboration with local security operatives would help curb incidences of losing lives of our frontline staff.

The finding concurred with the finding of Barnaby Willitts-King and Alexandra Spencer (2021) which found out that, there is a need to adopt more development approaches to crises and to broaden the resource base by increasing the diversity of donors, continue to be valid and even more relevant today. European Union (2015) which found out that, there is a need for humanitarians to protect and preserve the dignity of people affected by conflict and disaster; a call to find innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs; and a demand from the global South to 'localize' humanitarian response by strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter encompasses the summary, conclusions and recommendations based on the findings by comparing what was established in this study with what other scholars have established before in the literature review on the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020).

5.2 Summary

The study assessed the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020). The research was directed by three research objectives namely, The Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan; The Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan; The Reason Humanitarian Workers are Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services and The Effects on Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan.

Chapter one of the studies had explored more on the background of the study, significant, scope and delimitations, hypothesis of the study, justification of the hypothesis, the research objectives and questions and the organization of the study.

Chapter two involves the review of different literatures which were related to the study questions and in which primary and secondary sources of information such as books, magazines and journals were used in

gathering more data for the study. The literature review gave some notable aspects of the effect of fluctuating oil price on the performance of fuel Station.

Chapter three of study cover; the research design used by the researcher which was case survey study, purposive and simple probability randomly sampling technique for selecting 70 respondents from employees, managers of Trinity Energy and customers of Trinity Energy. The researcher designed questionnaires that agreed with the research questions to generate sufficient information in regard the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020).

The data was collected by the researcher and their different variables were coded accordingly. Statistical Pages for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyze the assembled data. The qualitative and quantitative information were collected through interview guide and questionnaires using both closed and open-ended questions, the questionnaires information were quantified and presented in the tables, charts and figures in form of frequencies and percentages.

The Chapter four of the study covers, the data analysis, discussion, interpretations, and presentations of the findings inform of graphs, tables and charts. The finding revealed Financing humanitarian budget has become a problem as a result of conflict in South Sudan, and the negative effect of conflict are also there.

The study further revealed that Humanitarian organizations are Faced with the challenge Political objectives increasingly pursued on ground in South Sudan. The study also revealed that, the reason for targeting humanitarian workers is as a result of efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power in South Sudan and finally the study furthermore revealed that there is a need for Innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's need in South Sudan.

Chapter five of the study covers the Summary, conclusions and recommendations in accordance with the findings of the study.

5.3 Conclusions

From the above findings on the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020).

The study concludes that the following:

1. Financing humanitarian budget has become a problem as a result of conflict in South Sudan
2. Humanitarian organizations are Faced with the challenge Political objectives increasingly pursued on ground in South Sudan
3. the reason for targeting humanitarian workers is as a result of efforts to dominate populations and territories and delegitimize the government in power in South Sudan
4. There is a need for Innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's need in South Sudan.

5.4 Areas for further Study

The study also faced the challenge of lack of responds from some of the selected respondents.

1. Effect natural disasters on the livelihood in South Sudan
2. The role humanitarian agencies in saving life in the Republic of South Sudan.

5.5 Recommendations

The study put forward the following recommendations from the research objectives such as The Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan; The Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan; The Reason

Humanitarian Workers are Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services and The Effects on Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance be Address in South Sudan.

To Humanitarian Agencies

- The humanitarian agencies should find some new ways of financing their various humanitarian budget without depending match on donors.
- The humanitarian agencies should practice the principles of neutrality, in order to have proper operational environment.
- The humanitarian agencies and their workers should practice the principles of neutrality, in order being targeted during their operation period.
- The humanitarian agencies should adopt the new innovative and sustainable means of addressing the effect of conflict on humanitarian assistance.

5.6 Limitations of the Study

This study was limited to the Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020), holding other factors that can affect humanitarian services constant. The study was also limited to few areas due to financial constraint, as the researcher was not in a position to hire more assistant researchers, hence, all these and other problem not considered here were the limitation of the study.

The study had numerous limitations, in regard to time, finance, and the population coverage, as well as the content related matters. Since this study was conducted in three months times, it did not cover the whole country, therefore a sample of the population was used to collect the data.

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APPENDIX 1: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES



UNIVERSITY OF JUBA
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMICS STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Dear Respondent,

I am **Makuach Alexander Kuol**, a student at the University of Juba, under the Index number: **019-MAIR-063** and pursuing Master of Arts in **International Relationship**. I am currently conducting research entitled "**Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020)**," as a requirement for the fulfilment for the award of **Master of Arts in International Relations**.

The information that will be obtained from you will solely be used for academic purpose only. As such, I kindly request your consideration to provide the necessary information as required in the questionnaires herein, even though there will be no direct benefit that you may get out of this vital exercise.

Thank you in advance and May God bless you!

Faithfully Yours,

Signature.....

Contact: 0921705505

SECTION A: GENERAL INFORMATION OF THE RESPONDENTS

Instruction: Please put tick (✓) where necessary in the following multiple choices.

1. Occupation:

- (a) Humanitarian Staff (NGO Staff) () (b) Student ()
- (c) Humanitarian organization Manger (NGO Manager) () (d) Humanitarian Receiver ()

2. Gender

- (a) Female () (b) Male ()

3. Age Bracket

- (a) 18-25 years () (b) 25- 35 years ()
- (c) 35-45 Years () (d) 45 and Above ()

4. Marital Status

- (a) Married () (b) Single ()
- (c) Divorced () (d) Separated () e) Others ()

5. Educational Qualification/level

- (a) Primary School Level () (b) Secondary Level ()
- (c) University Level () (d) Masters Level ()
- (e) PhD level () (f) others. Please Specify-----

6) EXPERIENCE

- a) Less Than 1 Year () b) 1-2 Years ()
- c) 2-3 Years () d) 3-4 Years ()
- e) 4-5 Years () F) More Than 5 Years ()

7) Does Conflict have negative effect on humanitarian assistance

- a) Yes () B) No ()

SECTION B: The Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

Instruction: Please put Tick (✓) where necessary in the following multiple choices.

(1) What are the Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

- (a) Financing humanitarian budget become problem ()
- b) Limited Access to financing the humanitarian funds ()
- (C) Financing to meet crises in middle income countries is a growing problem ()
- D)** The humanitarian funds fail to meet the dire humanitarian needs in the Countries with conflict ()
- E)** Insufficient funding for humanitarian aid means not only more suffering ()

(2) How would you agree with the statement that, there is high Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

- a) Agree () b) strongly Agree () c) Neutral ()
- d) Disagree () e) Strongly Disagree

(3) In Your Own View what do you think are the other Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

Section C: The Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan

Instruction: Please put tick (✓) where necessary in the following multiple choices.

(4) What are The Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

- (a) Faced with real operational dilemmas ()
- b) Political objectives is increasingly pursued on the ground ()
- (c) Bestowing unrepresentative legitimacy ()
- d) Political actors wanted to enforce their authority on the ground ()

5) How Related are the Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

- (a) Strongly Related () b) Somehow Related ()
- (c) Related () d) Not related ()

6) In your own view, what do you think are the others Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

Section D: The Reason Humanitarian Workers are Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services

7). Why are Humanitarian Workers Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services in conflict afflicted areas like South Sudan?

- (a) The major reasons why humanitarian staffs are targeted in the conflict is to the fact that humanitarian organization are not politically neutral ()
- (b) Effort to dominate populations and territories and delegitimise the government in power ()
- (C) attempting to govern territory and provide some measure of public services ()
- (d) Non-state armed groups seeking control of the state ()

8) How would you agree or disagree with the statements that, the reason Humanitarian workers are targeted when offering humanitarian services is due to; ideological or strategic reasons, as well as the behavior of humanitarians' workers themselves in the field?

- a) Agree () b) Strongly Agree () C) Neutral ()
- d) Disagree () e) Strongly Disagree ()

9) In Your own opinion what are the other reasons, why are Humanitarian Workers Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services in conflict hide areas?

Section E: The Effects on Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance be Address in South Sudan

10) How can the effects on conflict on humanitarian Assistance be address in South Sudan?

- a) Humanitarians to protect & preserve the dignity of people affected by conflict and disaster ()
- b) Innovative and sustainable ways of meeting people's needs ()
- c) Demand from the global South to 'localize' humanitarian response by strengthening local, national and regional capacities to prevent, manage and respond to crisis ()
- d) All of the above ()

11) In Your own opinion, what are the other solutions to the factors affecting employees, employer’s relationship

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.....
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TOP MANAGEMENT HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES (INGOS AND NNGOS)

I am A research assistance, who is collecting data for research title; **“Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Services in South Sudan (2013-2020),”** on behave, the Researcher called, Makuach Alexander Kuol, who is pursuing Masters of Arts in International Relation, University of Juba. Your participation in this process will be highly appreciated.

1. What is your name

.....

2. How old are you?

.....

3. Gender

.....

4. Occupation or position

.....

5. What is the name of your organization?

.....
.....

6. How long have you been operating in South Sudan?

.....
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7. What are the Financial Effects of Conflict on Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

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8. What are The Role of Political Actors Both State and Non-State Actors in Conflict on the Humanitarian Assistance in South Sudan?

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9. Why are Humanitarian Workers Targeted when Offering Humanitarian Services in conflict afflicted areas like South Sudan?

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10. How can the effects on conflict on humanitarian Assistance be address in South Sudan?



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