Phaenomenology and Lived Phases of Perceived Time

Plamen N. Nikolov
PhD, Sofia University 'St. Kliment Ohridski'

Abstract:
The paper represents an analysis of the concept for reflection in the context of Husserl's idea of the absolute flux of consciousness and phenomenological concept of time as a whole. In the first place, the goal here is to isolate the core of Husserl's understanding of subjectivity as the interconnection of different levels of temporariness. In the second place, the paper contributes for the correlation of the general premises of phenomenological method with the concrete intentional analysis, and thirdly – to specifically show the basic contradictions in regard to phenomenology: the reflection as a basis of the phenomenological method, which proclaimed "motion to objects themselves", there is, actually, a motion from the objects, because turning to the reflection is a rotation from the objective space and time, from the objective being of nature as a whole, from the objective practical and social activity to the subjectivity as their sole actual basis.

Keywords: Phenomenology, Time, Flux, Self, Being, Consciousness

The phenomenological doctrine about consciousness was generated in polemic with psychologism and experimental psychology, applying to monopoly in the sphere of research of consciousness. At the same time phenomenology is rather resolutely discharged from introversion: methods of introspection, obviously or implicitly, assume that various aspects of internal experience can be described as the certain objects of supervision. Study of consciousness is understood in phenomenology as the study of a variety of intentional attitudes: objects of phenomenological reflection become ways for formation of values and the values arising because of the orientation of consciousness on subjects. Thus, from the phenomenological point of view the method of studying consciousness should be based on properties of the consciousness: in the intentional formation of horizon lie the roots of values and the opportunity of its description.

Put, however, not only that the phenomenology refuses an explanation of activity of consciousness through subjects and processes which consciousness is not. Specificity of phenomenology will be, that "ultimate elements" of consciousnesses are interpreted as creative meaningful factors, the factors expressing primary applicability of consciousness: to perceive, represent, conceptually to think, etc., a various sort of concreteness. In traditional forms of subjective idealism (Berkeley, Hume) the consciousness appears as set of sensations to which the subject maintenance of the objective world, is reduced finally. Thus, sensations are no longer a consciousness in the true sense of words, although they do not constitute the sense of sensations and cannot be a basis for the unity of consciousness. For traditional forms of the objective idealism (Hegel) the essence of consciousness (absolute spirit) is expressed in a speculative manner, in coupling abstract forms of thinking. However, logistified
structures of thinking do not possess constitutive and creativemeaningful character. The certain semantic content, which only in the transformed form reflects ("guesses") the valid consistency of the valid world, is already embodied in them. Phenomenological philosophy attempts to remove alternatives between "segmentation" of consciousness on sets of sensations and the "connection" of consciousness to systems abstracted from its activity concepts which have been undertaken. "Primary elements of consciousness", being sensations, "legal offers", etc. just as systems of the concepts which have been tom off a support in sensual contemplation, become, as a rule, objects of designing, a primary material of numerous concepts, but cannot be direct objects of a phenomenological reflection. As an opposition to this the phenomenology discovers the tendency of abstention from construction of any sort of concepts of consciousness in which there is no reflective work with "the very consciousness". Phenomenology’s imperative character expresses first of all the attempt to make the way through concepts of consciousness to the consciousness and to transform the philosophical research from abstract manipulation concepts into studying various kinds of activity of consciousness in a context of diverse cultural-historical forms. Husserl's slogan "Back to objects!" means an aspiration to pass through stratification of already generated concepts to primary ways of construction, regarding this or that sort of concreteness, to itself intentional life of consciousness. For Heidegger this requirement means a refusal of concepts of being as well as a denial of a conception of the being and a sum of searches of this being too. It is an attempt to depict in a philosophical doctrine with the help of special language what contours of life mean, when they are indecomposable as elements and not reduced to thinking. Fundamental means of expression of Husserl's reflection and Heidegger's transcendention of time are the temporal structure of the consciousness and the being. In phenomenological philosophy time is being accepted as an unique method for the description of the ultimate elements of consciousness – the intentional acts which do not destroy their creative and meaningful basis as intentional acts representing a time structure. Similarly, by Heidegger: time means a description of "care", which initially possesses temporal structure. Not only to answer, but also to raise the question about time difficultly just because this question simultaneously contains a question on the most habitual, but nevertheless, unknown object – the question about consciousness. These difficulties are similar to the difficulties of Kant's deduction of categories: to explicate what is a constructive element of any explication, to comprehend what is an element of any statement, to specify what is an element of any instruction – this issue can be solved only by means of descriptive distinction of the generated value (content) and constructive elements of consciousness. Time, thus, is a subject of description for constitutive elements of consciousness’s essence of temporal varieties, and means of the description, for temporal varieties – always last sending in any description. The phenomenological doctrine about time-consciousness no longer opposes, but rather unifies, the statements about time by St. Augustinus and those by Kant. Within the framework of the phenomenological method the question on forms of comprehension of time is inseparable from the question about the use of various initially given time-forms regarding the description of primary moduses of consciousnesses (Husserl) or structures of transcendention (Heidegger). In the doctrine about time the general precondition of phenomenological methodology is most distinctly shown:
concurrency of experience and object of research. If, according to Husserl, the "pure consciousness" is a basis of the given concurrency, Heidegger on the other hand adopts as such a basis the specificity of the human existence. Concerning the being of the person’s temporariness as equal to the experience of time – being equal to understanding of being – the sense of being overlaps with the realization of this being.

For Husserl, the conditions of possibility for the constitution of anything meaningful must include synthetic processes and capacities that allow the transcendental subject to deploy its meanings and structures (such as noemata and horizons). Foremost in the synthetic processes is that of internal time – the passive synthesis of the flowing temporality of consciousness. Husserl wants to uncover the form of this transcendental synthesis. The on-hand world of objects we experience (things implicated in states of affairs) involves the endurance and the succession. We could not grasp anything transcendent in isolated instants (if such instants somehow existed), and neither could we grasp ourselves. There is endurance and succession and the transcendental synthesis needed to apprehend them. Husserl departs radically from any conception of a Cogito that would supposedly apprehend itself „as a simple act of mental vision” (Cf. Descartes’ Reply to the Second Set of Objections). This departure is to be seen in his analyses „Zur Phaomenologie des Inneren ZeitbewuBtseins“ (1893-1917).

A theory of time-consciousness must account for three levels of temporality. On the first place – the level of the objective or transcendent time. This is the time of the natural attitude. It is made up of objects (a house, a deep sorrow, a spring) that are split into past, present and future and measured in days, minutes, seconds etc. With the reduction, all this becomes phenomena of objects in clock-time which is correlated to the phenomena of solar light and planetary movement. On the second place – this is the level of internal (immanent or experienced) time. This level is vague and inexact to the particular objects of our lived experiences and it affects the apprehension of their length. A stay in a holiday resort is shorter than one in a hospital, a visit to a dentist longer than the one to a good friend. But such observations indeed constitute this second level, which pertains to the acts of experiencing these objects as temporal, acts of recognizing the durations and successions of various objects. These perceptual acts contribute to imagination and to distant memory. On the last place – the level of internal time-consciousness. The second level acts by which I recognize the first level objects possess (themselves) a synthetic character. The third level constitutes the immanent temporal unity of such second-level acts. Put another way, this deepest level allows the acts of recognition to be directed towards the first level. It is to be stressed that all three levels are interdependent; the language of the “internal” time is a shape and it should not offer an existence apart from the actual time.¹

Husserl begins by pointing out that experiences must already be temporally unified (and discriminated in this unity) to identify identical and changing objects. Take a dice that I see both far and near, in daylight and ¹ Husserl, E., Zur Phaomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuBtseins (1893-1917), Martinus Nijhoff Verlag, Haag, 1966, §§§ 1, 2, 7, 34-36 dusk, rolling and standing. Each experience is a reaching out and it points to other possible experiences. I have the sense that these various experiences are of one enduring thing, but this sense can only be deployed because consciousness has already unified these past and present experiences of the dice to give a grasp of endurance. Noematically informed experiences must have this unity – it is not pasted on exterior. ¹ “Another case is the hearing of a melody. If the successive notes or tones

¹
were not held together, I would never be given one melody, but single tones promptly forgotten."²
Prior to the reduction, there is an enduring dice or a melodic succession “outthere”, and I explain both endurance and succession causally – through the space and time and matter of physics and the organism of physiology. But such an explanation cannot show how endurance or succession appear to me, how I can grasp and hold them. The preceding visual aspect or the tone stays in consciousness after the "outer" stimulus and the neural process that it excites have ceased. Without the inner time of consciousness holding and discriminating it in the one blow, the "outer" endurance of the succession in the thing could not be registered by me.³
Husserl's point is that an enduring stimulus produces an enduring sensation, but this does not mean that the same sensation is grasped as enduring. A duration of sensation cannot of itself give a sensation of duration. So, it is with succession too, where Husserl agrees with Kant – a bare succession of experiences about something is multiple; it cannot by itself amount to a single experience of succession.⁴ I must have already unified a succession in inner time to know it as such. There is a closely related reason why the unity of inner time is so important – it also allows for reflection, without which the phenomenology or any other body of knowledge would not even be possible.

2 Ibid., § 3, S. 11
3 Ibid., § I
4 Ibid., § 3

Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Alcad. Verlag, Berlin, 1998, A 98-103; B 130, 133
Every lived experience is essentially temporal, never being instantaneous. But even so, the phase upon which I reflect always preceedes the phase in which I reflect – the first phase has already sunk away in the flux of consciousness and is gone forever. It is hard to see how the reflection can have anything to reflect upon if it has sunk into the past.¹

Husserl's solution to this problem of reflection, and to those of the dice and musical tone, is to argue for a retention in every current act-phase of consciousness. A retention or primary memory is a form of intentionality that holds onto and modifies the phase most recently lapsed. It is an originally presentive intuition that modifies this previously present phase by constituting it as "just-past". Such modification is crucial, for it provides a discrimination of passage or passing away within the unity of internal time. If the previous phase of visual or aural perception was reproduced by consciousness exactly as it was when present (as it would be in Kant's synthesis of reproduction in imagination), then the perception of some movements or sounds would be ruined. A rolling dice would be seen as a maggot – like a tube getting longer at one end. The ascending notes in a melody would be heard as the rising pitch of a siren. We would end up with the same sound as if someone had struck all the notes at once. And through the reflection on any mental process, I would be unable to distinguish the phase reflected upon as an anterior to the phase in which I reflect.²

In this regard, every new retention amounts to the original constitution of a "just-past" or "just-have-been". It constitutes the latter impersonal or in itself, though implicitly, not as a thematic object. By presenting the immediate past, the most recent retention counts as perception.³ Everything, in
regard to what the subject is conscious as given in this retention, is absolutely certain. Thus there is no significant gap between the present

2 Ibid., §§§ 3, 8, 12
3 Ibid. § 17

The retended content in every current act-phase holds its predecessors in its sum, so that the act carries a train of retentions in its steadlike the head of a comet in front of its tail. As retentions run off or fade away further and further into the past, they become vaguer and more compressed; the more distant retentions fuse gradually and imperceptibly into each other, so that clarity and distinctness give a way to obscurity and confusion.²

Because it immanently unites the immediate past and present to give consciousness of duration or succession, the retention or primary memory both precede and provide the material for memory in the common sense of reproduction or secondary memory, also called recollection, presentation or re-presentation (Vergegenwartigung). Reproduction is the recreation of an original consciousness of duration or succession lying in the distant and not-immediate past.³ The distance might be a few minutes ago or many years ago, the piano sonata I just heard in the concert hall or the little song that I sang in the play-school. Because it does not provide the past as a direct presentation but rather as a re-presentation, the reproduction cannot be understood as a form of perception. And because it reactivates experiences gone for some time, it can involve errors; its contents are never given apodictically, though these are sometimes vividly clear in their happiness or sadness.⁴

As well as having a retention, the current act-phase has a primary expectation or protention. This is the implicit expectation that a phase will immediately follow the present one, and of how this new phase will be fulfilled. Protention constitutes the "about-to-be".⁵ If I perceive a car starting off when the traffic lights go green, I expect that it will gather speed, and that the engine tone will fall with each gearchange and then it will rise again.

1 Husserl, E., Zur Phanomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuJ3tseins (1893-1917), Martinus Nijhoff Verlag, Haag, 1966§ 13, 16
2 Ibid. §§ 8, 11
3 Ibid. § 18
4 Ibid. § 17, 21, 22
5 Ibid. § 14

Protention is even more obvious with melodies; I expect a certain note to follow the present one, and one further after that, so that each protention contains a further one, losing the vividness of predelineation as they go further into the future. Unlike retentions, protentions have an element of empty intending; even though they predelineate or expect a certain future, they leave open the possibility that things will sum out otherwise or stop altogether. The future is never fixed or settled.¹ The car, for instance, may stall at the traffic lights. By radicalising the classical tradition
some contemporary composers have taken a particular advantage of this openness; their atonal works are designed to frustrate the contents of our protentional expectations. Protention helps to ground the possibility of anticipated scenarios; distant expectation is built out of immediate expectations, which operate together with the secondary memory and the imaginative phantasy. The third element constituting the current act-phase is receptive. It is called the primal impression or impressional phase. I hear the falling treecreak, the crescendo of the symphony, the dog begins to bark early in the morning. The impression of an object breaking in or changing is the 'source-point' or point of orientation for the protentions and retentions making up the act-phase with it. Primal impression constitutes the "now". By itself, the primal impression is an abstraction. The same is true about the now that it constitutes. The punctuality of each and every now is derivative, a part carved out from the unified whole. It can be nothing by itself, for it is continually mediated by the just-past and the about-to-be, themselves constituted by the act-phase's retentions and protentions. If we take a perception in a first and narrow sense, we can say that all this involves a continuous blending of perception and nonperception. If we take it in the wider sense of original constitution, however, we can remind ourselves that retention counts as perception. The conclusion of the theory of time consciousness is that there is no simple, instantaneous, independent now, and that the current act-phase of awareness is an extended and dynamic unity. This act-phase constituting the past, the now and the future is itself made up of the triple structure of retention, primal impression and protention. Husserl later calls that the wider present constitutes the "living present" (Lebendige Gegenwart). Consciousness is a Heraclitan flux, a streaming flow of lived experiences (Erlebnisstrom) which nonetheless runs according to this triple order of intentionality. Protentions point forward and mutate into new primal impressions; these in sum run off into retentional modifications. The constituting subject is itself constituted through the form of internal time. This synthetically ordered flux is not something objective, but it is named in conformity with what it constitutes. We might call it "an absolute subjectivity", but this would be to make a category mistake. The flow is unnamable, only known through the objects it reveals. Husserl states a judgement that knowing various moduses of time brings abilities to our mind, which can be used to a certain extent, and not only one of these abilities. The analysis, which is carried out by Husserl in relation to separate moduses of time, differs both depth and polyactivity in many respects because it does not insist on attraction of only one feature of consciousness – the knowledge corresponding to moduses of time. We will summarize the example of Husserl's judgement about the analysis as modus, as the past. The past in consciousness acts as memoirs. As notmodified consciousness it is "sensation", or, that means the same, "impression". Or it is more exact: it can contain fantasies, but it is not updating (made) by imagination (under the attitude) to some other consciousness as to
corresponding sensation. Already from this subtle statement it is clear Husserl's adherence to attraction of various abilities of our consciousness for the characteristic processes of knowledge separate moduses of time (in this case the past by means of memoirs). Husserl also does not exclude the role of sensations (at Aristotle the present is studied only by the help of sensations), and the role of imagination in the process of "reconstruction" of the past as during memoirs the past "is as though involved" in the present. (By Aristotle the question of imagination is only in connection with the analysis of the future, it is emphasized, that the imagination is necessary only for a reflection of the future. Probably, a specification of Aristotelian idea is necessary: can be, it meant that without imagination, without imagination reflection of the future is impossible, that is conducting ability of consciousness in reflection such a modus of time as the future).

Psychologists, with the exception of Brentano, Husserl notes, are unsuccessfully attempting to establish the sources of ideas about time according to that reason, that they mix up objective and subjective time. "Duration of sensation and sensation of the duration are different things."¹ Brentano assumed that the source of our experiences of different moduses of time is fantasy-idea (primary association), which is joined to the primary sensation after its caused stimulus ceases to act. "In that case – concludes Husserl – fantasy occurs, here, the special means of being productive. It is here the only present case, when fantasy truly creates the moment of idea, namely, the temporal moment."² Nevertheless, Brentano's "principle of primary associations" is subject to Husserl's criticism. According to Brentano, only the present ("now") is actual, ideas about the past or the future are created by the primary associations, which convert the real into the unreal.

² Ibid., § 36

Husserl indicates that the consequence of this theory will be the negation to primary givenness of sequence or to duration. This, in sum, means that the primary temporality of consciousness is not considered as the initial object of description, but it is constructed with the aid of the special mental act – fantasy, temporariness of which is forgotten. Husserl specifies: "Brentano did not carry out a distinction between the act and the maintenance, or between the act, the content of comprehension and the perceived object."¹ Therefore Brentano could not answer the question, whether the temporal moment produced by primary association, to the act of comprehension or to object of comprehension, say, belongs to a sound in its temporal being. Husserl believes, that the primary timecharacteristics – sequence and simultaneity – are connected not only with primary contents of comprehension, but also to perceived objects and perceived acts. Thus, the analysis of time should take into account all these levels.

Husserl agrees that one of the preconditions of Brentano's doctrine, the so-called dogma "about
instantaneousness for perceiving of the whole", for comprehension implies a necessary for sequence of representations, which were present as simultaneous for one conscious act. Such statement of a question, again leads to an explanation of comprehension of sequence by means of some out-temporal structure, and hence, interferes with a recognition of the comprehension of sequence and duration of initially given consciousness.

And still the basic difference of Brentano's theory from Husserl's phenomenology of time, counts that this theory which he names psychological, "works on a basis of transcendental preconditions with existing time objects which make "irritations" and "cause" in us sensations, etc.". Sphere of phenomenological research as sphere of the description should not, agrees Husserl, include anything transcendental in Kant sense.

2 Ibid., § 6, S. 15

And though the term "transcendental" can be met by Husserl in lectures on phenomenology of time, Husserl uses it in the other sense, unlike Kant. Husserl speaks about transcendental perception (which, according to Kant, is inconsistent in itself) as about a perception which the object has as an external subject. It is possible to identify transcendental perception with some simplification by Kant’s space as the form of external perception. Accordingly, the transcendent object is a phaenomenon which is perceived as external in the attitude to consciousness. In this case, the objective time and the time of phaenomena are transcendent. Husserl separates the question about how transcendental time objects constitute themselves from the question about constitution of immanent time objects, i.e. about constitution of the act of perception by means of primary time phases. At the description of immanent object, we should, according to Husserl, "bracket" a question on an empirical origin of a phaenomenon (for example, a sound), its physical basis, etc. We should take a phaenomenon only how it is given to consciousness, and to describe this givenness.

The method which Husserl uses for studying time, is, in essence, transcendental in the widest sense. This method is reduced basically to two procedures: first – to special supervision above various continuing objects, durations, sequences, etc., i.e. to supervision above the given consciousness in temporal distinctions, and secondly – to fixing the certain structure of consciousness owing to which, a comprehension of this or that time factor which can be carried out. In other words, Husserl creates such a model of consciousness which deals with comprehension of temporal distinctions.

The concept 'retention' (retention - capture) borrows, perhaps, the central place in Husserl's analysis. To clear the meaning of retention, Husserl resorts not to definitions through a sort and specific difference, and to the description by means of comparison with "point-source". This point, which Husserl names primal impression, is kept in consciousness as "just past". In other words, the initial impression passes in retention, and the retention is actually existing while "now-point" of the object appears as "just-past". This point which Husserl names “primal impression”, is kept in consciousness as "just-past". In other words, the primal impression passes in retention, and the retention is actually existing while "now-point" of the object appears as "just-past". Retention by itself stretches the present ("now-point") and keeps the embodied content: "The unity of consciousness
which intentionally covers the present and the past, is phenomenologically given”. Each "now-point" constantly changes from retention to retention, forming a continuum where each subsequent point is a retention of previous retention. At the same time every retention bears in itself, traces of primal impression, or as it is expressed by Husserl, of impressional consciousnesses. Husserl specifies, that retention is an instant realization of a phase which is already completed, and at the same time the basis for retentional comprehension of the following phase. "As each phase, continues Husserl, - is retentional comprehension of a previous phase, it includes, in itself, a circuit of interactive intentions, all number of expired retentions". Certainly, here it means a precession of every impression, instead of the object (in this case - a transcendent one) which causes impression. Thus, we can recall something never existing, and even we are able to perceive a non-existing phaenomenon. In this case “perception” – fixing the object as “now” – should be primary in relation to retention.

As against Brentano's "primal association", which is a construct for an explanation of sensations of time, the existence of retention is described by Husserl in the reflection. If "the primal association" adds to primarily felt content, so-called imagination-representation, retention does not comprise anything "fantastic". Retention carries out rather important functions in the phenomenological doctrine about time, and it is actually a basis of this doctrine.

2 Ibid., Beilage IX: Urbewusstsein und Möglichkeit der Reflexion, S. 118

Before the systemizing of these functions, it is necessary to specify the original retention's double – the protention. As against retention – primary storing – the protention carries out a function of a primary anticipation or a primary expectation. Protention constitutes "emptiness". It goes as such ahead of "now-point", "preparing a place" for primary impression. Protention characterizes consciousness as readiness for perception, as an activity which prepares perception, "creates" it, instead of simply copying an object. Thus, the unity of phases "retention-now-protention" is the most general structure of internal time and as it becomes clear from further consideration of intentional acts. "It is possible to present this phenomenon as Husserl does, -writes Merleau-Ponty, - time is not a line, and a network of intentionalities." 1

Thus, retention possesses double intentionality. "Cross-section" intentionality, i.e. actually "primary storing", serves for constituting the immanent time object; "extended" intentionality "constitutes unity of this storing in a flux". 2 As retention retains both objects, and a flux in which it lasts, it creates an opportunity for reflection, i.e. an opportunity to direct attention to the withheld phase and even to a lot of such phases. Husserl specifies, that "due to retention the consciousness can become an object". 3

This assertion, immediately, of course, runs against the comparison from Kant's point of view. Undoubtedly, we have here specific similarity of positions. According to Kant, time also gives the possibility to assign to an object a cognitive ability. The temporal descriptions of categorial syntheses are the confirmation of this. However, in the examination of the features of time, Kant is distracted from the analysis of the specific forms of the comprehension of time-phaenomena, and
therefore, he is not defining different levels of understanding of primary temporal differences.

3 Ibid., Beilage IX: UrbewuBtsein und Möglichkeit der Reflexion, S. 119

He shows edging, how it is possible to describe synthoses through the sequence and simultaneity, but he does not examine the question about the description of both sequence and simultaneity regarding the perception of temporal objects. Therefore, Kant does not distinguish the sequence of the formed ideas from the sequence of the phases of experience in the synthesis of comprehension. In contrast to Kant, Husserl attempts to deal concerning givenness of the durating objects and to isolate different levels of abstraction, in accordance with which the most detailed study of time is possible.

Assertion about the fact that retention creates the possibility of reflection, does not contradict according to Husserl with the discovered existence of retention in the reflection. Between the reflection and the retention there is no relation of precedence. The fact that the reflection exists, is proven not logically by the aid of the concept of retention but it is simplified by the fact of its realization. In fact, to convince someone in the existence of capability for reflection is possible only in such a case when this 'someone' is capable to direct his attention not only to the object, but also, to his perception of the object.

Reflection as the rotation of intentionality to itself can be described, according to Husserl's logic of description, through the new reflection. And then in the reflection itself that will be explained as existing. In other words, the retention is a base for the reflection, it is possible to learn only in the reflection. In this sense the reflection itself is the base and, according to Husserl, it is the quintessence of the phenomenological method. Turning of intentionality to itself does create new intentionality – intentionality of reflection. The connection between these internationalities is possible because of the retention (retention which retains retention). Moreover, retention is not something external regarding to intentionality. However, the structure of intentionality is a function of the retention. Perhaps, most fundamental, and not isolated phenomenons, are based precisely on it.

Intentional acts constitute only completely, i.e., always in the interrelation of "now-point", retention and protention. These phases themselves do not constitute temporal continuity. Actually, is it possible to comprehend the "now-point", if it does not follow the retention? "Now-point" and retention do not exist without each other, their unity cannot be resolved in the reflection. And when Husserl speaks about the retention and its functions, he thus always has in mind the correlation with the “now-point”. But if "now-point" or "normal comprehension" is to be considered as a comprehending act, then this does bring to the so-called regress of consciousness, since this act will cause another consequent one, in which we perceive the initial one. etc.

Thus, the complete intentional act constitutes the temporal phases, which are identified by Husserl with the partial intentions, carrying in themselves the separate features of the perceived object: moreover, precisely those features, due to which the object appears both in the unity and the integrity not realized by us. We comprehend the object itself and the very act of the ob1ect's
comprehension: however, the unity of the act of comprehension exists because the retention retains and connects partial intentions.

Since the partial intentions exist exactly as Abschattungen of different temporal phases, the temporal structure of intentionality characterizes perception as sui generis "drafts", "Ersatze", which accomplishes the consciousness, constituting: duration of the object. Phenomenologically given, this is "continuum of prospects", because of which we have the capability, according to Husserl, to "upgrade the image, to reproduce the object in his visible part. etc. It is interesting to note, that this characteristic of perception does correspond to contemporary concepts about the sight-ness without to photograph the object but seemingly they feel its outlines. However, Husserl does not give the examples, connected with the formation of visual means, since the object’s "set of prospects" is immediately plotted in the customary three-dimensional forms and in the reflection, it is difficult to grasp the very process of the appearance of the integrity of image. For this reason, the tone is selected. which appears faster as something internal, that also makes it possible to retain its nuances in the consciousness.

In the methodological aspect the concept of retention as a whole structure of "retention-now-protention" shows that the problem or the interrelation of reflection and consciousness is solved by Husserl only based on temporal descriptions – without the introduction of a mediator.

In the most general form, the difference in our understanding of Husserlian methodology about the study of time lies in the fact that Husserl did attempt to look" at the consciousness through the prism of time, but not vice versa. For Husserl, time is a primary intuition of relativized consciousness. Moreover, time and consciousness are not intermediated by the structure of “pure ego”. Husserl does not raise the question about the time relying on some already “completed” theory of consciousness. On the contrary, time is an instrument to search for the absolute bases of consciousness. Time is an initial and terminal point of analysis of the primary moduses of consciousness. The discussion of course does not deal with the fact that understanding time precedes (in the objective time) the understanding of consciousness. However, revealing the interrelation of time and consciousness as well as time and reflection, Husserl did not need the structure of "pure ego". On the contrary, only because of the temporariness of pre-reflective consciousness we can distinguish in the reflection the different phases of the experiences’ flow. Furthermore, the difference between “Me” in the “now and "just-past" "Me" does not include the criterion of the fact that it occurs in the “internal time”. This difference, taken without the reservations, can be understood as an interval in the objective time. Necessary "reservations" are furthermore the essence of the description of the temporary extension of experiences, but not of abstractly isolated "Me".

Thus, "temporalised" with a reflection temporality, i.e., animated by the temporal flux of pre-reflective consciousness of reflection, does create the possibility of self-identification, due to one of the "features" of temporality – the iteration. Capability for iteration, also can be "explained" by the aid of the retention. This "explanation" indicates the possibility of describing the iteration by the aid of the structure "retention-now-protention".

The analysis of the concept for reflection in the context of Husserl's concept of the absolute flux of consciousness and phenomenological concept of time as a whole, makes it possible, in the first place, to isolate the core of Husserl's understanding of subjectivity as the interconnection of different levels of temporariness. In the second place, it contributes to correlate the general
premises of phenomenological method with the concrete intentional analysis, and thirdly – to specifically show the basic contradiction against phenomenology: reflection as the basis of the phenomenological method, which proclaimed "motion to objects themselves", there is, actually, motion from the objects, since turning to the reflection is a rotation from the objective space and time, from the objective being of nature as a whole, from the objective practical and social activity to the subjectivity as their sole actual basis.

On the other hand, precisely this defining of the levels of time-consciousness indicates the limitedness of phenomenological method as a whole. Assuming as the starting point of phenomenological description the absolute flux of consciousness, as absolute subjectivity, as the most fundamental, deep level of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl reveals, thus, the discrepancy of the fundamental basis of the phenomenological method: the intendance of objectivity is only the formation of sense in the sphere of subjectivity. If we examine the common philosophical position of Husserl from the point of view of a basic question of philosophy, then Husserl's attempt to find the objective in the subjectiveness should be defined as the tendency to resolve the contradiction between the subjective and objective inclinations in the historical-philosophical context, although Husserl did not place this task, of course, before himself. As a result, he creates a philosophical doctrine, which, as we assume, entirely cannot be carried to one of the forms of idealism, but which preserves their basic contradictions.