

Nagaland Peace Accord and It's Relevance in Contemporary Times

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Abstract

The Nagaland Peace Accord, formally known as the Framework Agreement signed on August 3, 2015, represents a pivotal chapter in the history of India's internal security and conflict resolution efforts. This accord, signed between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) or NSCN (IM), sought to bring an end to decades of violent insurgency and unrest in the Naga-inhabited areas of Northeast India. Although hailed as a breakthrough, the accord has not led to a conclusive peace settlement, and the issues surrounding Naga sovereignty, identity, and territorial integrity remain deeply contentious. This paper delves deep into the historical backdrop, political intricacies, societal implications, and the contemporary relevance of the peace accord. It attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of how the accord was shaped, its partial successes, its unresolved issues, and its broader impact on Indian federalism, ethnic politics, and regional security. Furthermore, the study includes case studies, stakeholder interviews, conflict statistics, and policy analysis to enhance the depth of understanding. The relevance of this accord continues to evolve in today's socio-political landscape, making it essential for contemporary political discourse and policy planning.

Keywords: Nagaland, NSCN (IM), Peace Accord, Insurgency, Northeast India, Indian Federalism, Conflict Resolution, Greater Nagalim, Article 371A, Ethnic Identity, Sovereignty, Peace Process, Indian Constitution, Naga Nationalism, Political Negotiation.

Introduction

The North-Eastern region of India has historically been a site of cultural plurality, geographical isolation, and political unrest. Among the many ethnic communities residing in this region, the Nagas have remained one of the most politically assertive and historically conscious groups. Their demand for a separate homeland based on a distinct cultural and historical identity has culminated in one of the longest-running insurgencies in South and Southeast Asia. The roots of the Naga political movement can be traced back to the early 20th century, particularly the formation of the Naga Club in 1918 and the subsequent submission of a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929. These early articulations of political identity laid the groundwork for the emergence of organized resistance in the post-colonial period.

After India gained independence in 1947, the Naga National Council (NNC) under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo declared independence on 14th August 1947, a day before India's own declaration of sovereignty. This event marked the beginning of decades of insurgency, armed resistance, and political negotiations between the Government of India and various Naga factions. Over the years, multiple ceasefire

agreements, accords, and frameworks were initiated—such as the Shillong Accord of 1975—but these often failed due to lack of inclusivity and mutual trust.

A major breakthrough came on 3rd August 2015, when the Government of India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, signed a Framework Agreement with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN-IM]. This agreement was hailed as a historic step towards resolving the long-standing Naga issue. While the exact details of the accord were kept confidential, it was confirmed that the agreement recognized the “unique history, culture, and position” of the Nagas and aimed to bring an end to violence through a negotiated settlement.

The Nagaland Peace Accord, as it is popularly referred to, carries significant importance in contemporary Indian political and social discourse. Firstly, it represents a shift in the Indian government’s approach from military suppression to political engagement and inclusive dialogue. Secondly, it underscores the importance of federal negotiations in addressing ethnic aspirations within a democratic framework. The accord also demonstrates India’s commitment to resolving internal conflicts through constitutional means while maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation.

However, the relevance of the accord in present times is complex and layered. Despite the initial optimism, the peace process has encountered several roadblocks. Various Naga groups, particularly the NSCN (Khaplang) and the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs), have expressed dissatisfaction with the Framework Agreement. There remains ambiguity over issues like the integration of Naga-inhabited areas across state boundaries, the future of the Indian Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in the region, and the extent of autonomy promised. Furthermore, the lack of public disclosure regarding the terms of the accord has led to confusion, speculation, and continued mistrust among the stakeholders.

In the contemporary political landscape, marked by growing demands for regional autonomy, identity assertion, and decentralization, the Nagaland Peace Accord serves as a case study in balancing diversity with national unity. It also offers insight into the challenges of conflict resolution in a pluralistic society, where historical grievances, ethnic identities, and state interests must be reconciled through negotiation, dialogue, and mutual accommodation.

As India continues to grapple with multiple internal security challenges, the success or failure of the Nagaland Peace Accord will have far-reaching consequences—not only for peace in the North-East but also for the broader project of nation-building in a multicultural and federal polity. Therefore, understanding the historical trajectory, political dynamics, and contemporary relevance of the Nagaland Peace Accord is crucial to comprehending the complexities of ethnic conflict resolution and democratic governance in India.

2. Historical Context of the Naga Conflict

Understanding the roots of the Naga conflict is essential to grasp the complexities surrounding the Nagaland Peace Accord. The Naga issue is not a recent phenomenon but a product of colonial history, ethnic identity, resistance against integration, and the prolonged failure of political dialogue. This section outlines the historical evolution of the conflict in three key phases: pre-independence Naga nationalism, the insurgency period post-1947, and the impact of the Shillong Accord of 1975.

2.1 Pre-Independence Naga Nationalism

The seeds of Naga nationalism were sown during the British colonial period. The British annexed parts of the Naga Hills in the 19th century but adopted a policy of indirect rule through tribal leaders, keeping

the region administratively isolated from the rest of British India. The Naga Hills were classified as “Excluded Areas”, meaning they were governed separately with minimal Indian interference. This administrative isolation led to the early formation of a distinct Naga identity, separate from mainstream India.

The first organized political expression of Naga aspirations came with the formation of the Naga Club in 1918. In 1929, the Naga Club famously submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission, stating that the Nagas should be allowed to “be left alone” after the British left India. This request marked the beginning of political consciousness among Nagas and indicated their desire to remain independent of both British India and any future Indian government.

The momentum intensified in the 1940s with the formation of the Naga National Council (NNC) under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo. The NNC declared Naga independence on August 14, 1947, a day before India’s own independence, asserting that Nagaland was never a part of the Indian union. When the Indian government dismissed this declaration, it laid the foundation for the conflict that would dominate the region for decades.

2.2 Post-1947 Insurgency and Statehood Demands

Following India’s independence, efforts were made to integrate Nagaland into the Indian Union, including the signing of a Nine-Point Agreement in 1947 between Naga leaders and the Governor of Assam. However, differences in interpretation and lack of trust led to its breakdown. The NNC, under Phizo’s leadership, initiated an armed struggle for an independent Naga nation. The formation of the underground Naga Federal Government (NFG) and the Naga Federal Army (NFA) in the 1950s marked the escalation of the insurgency.

In response, the Indian government passed the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in 1958, giving the military sweeping powers in “disturbed areas.” This move, widely criticized for human rights violations, deepened resentment among the Nagas and fueled the conflict further.

To accommodate Naga demands, the Indian state granted Nagaland full statehood in 1963, making it the 16th state of the Indian Union. While this was a significant step, it failed to satisfy key insurgent factions who viewed it as a compromise that fell short of true sovereignty. Violent insurgency continued, driven by demands for self-determination and territorial unification of Naga-inhabited areas—often referred to as Greater Nagalim.

2.3. Formation of the Naga Club 1918

The First World War, which occurred from 1914 to 1919, was fought between the Axis Powers and the Allied Powers, with Great Britain aligning with the latter. As a part of its colonial obligations, India contributed both manpower and resources to support the war effort. Approximately 50,000 Indian soldiers were deployed, among whom around 2,000 Nagas were recruited to serve in the war under the banner of the 21st Naga Labour Corps.

For many of these Nagas, this was their first direct exposure to the world beyond their homeland. Their experiences abroad served as a revelation, broadening their worldview and igniting a new consciousness. Upon returning, these war veterans, together with emerging Naga intellectuals, went on to form the Naga Club on 31st October 1918, under the guidance of Dr. Khosa. The Club was modeled after the English social clubs they had encountered during their service, reflecting both in its structure and purpose.

The members of the Naga Club would meet regularly, particularly in the evenings, to deliberate on pressing issues affecting Naga society. These discussions and interactions laid the groundwork for a collective political identity among the Nagas. The formation of the Naga Club is widely regarded as the

first organized political initiative of the Nagas, marking the beginning of their resistance against British colonial control. It symbolized the assertion that Nagas should be granted the right to determine their own future, especially in the context of the eventual British withdrawal from India.

3. Events Aftermath Statehood – The Naga Peace Process

The creation of the state of Nagaland by the Government of India marked a significant milestone in addressing the aspirations of moderate Naga leaders. However, this move simultaneously deepened the divide with the Naga nationalist factions, who viewed statehood as a compromise that fell short of their demand for full sovereignty. The nationalist groups saw the moderate leaders as having become subservient to Indian political interests, which further escalated tensions and led to frequent confrontations between the Indian Armed Forces and the nationalist insurgents.

Unwilling to abandon their long-standing demand for an independent Naga homeland, the nationalists intensified their efforts to destabilize the state government and challenge Indian authority. This resistance continued unabated even after the Indian government transferred administrative responsibility for Nagaland from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Home Affairs on 1st June 1972, symbolizing the shift from external to internal security concerns.

In response to the growing unrest, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act was imposed in Nagaland on 1st September 1972. Under this law, the Naga National Council (NNC), the Naga Federal Government (NFG), and the Naga Federal Army (NFA) were declared illegal entities and labeled as criminal organizations. This legislation legitimized the use of severe legal, political, and military actions against them.

The Indian government deployed a massive military presence across Naga areas in a bid to eliminate the nationalist elements. However, the insurgency persisted, and it was the villagers and civilian population who bore the brunt of the conflict. Their fields and homes, often located in unprotected zones, became battlegrounds, leading to widespread suffering among non-combatants. This phase of conflict extended for nearly two decades.

Amidst the escalating violence, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) recognized the urgent need for peace and took the initiative to mediate between the conflicting parties. The NBCC helped establish the Peace Council, which included representatives from both the Naga side and the Government of India. One of its most prominent figures, Rev. Longri, came to be known as the “Peace Man of Nagaland” for his pivotal role in advocating for reconciliation.

The Peace Council took over the responsibilities of the earlier Peace Mission and worked diligently to facilitate dialogue and a cessation of hostilities. Despite these efforts, negotiations remained stalled. The nationalists firmly maintained their demand for complete sovereignty, while the Government of India insisted on a solution within the constitutional framework.

Eventually, it became apparent that a military solution alone could not resolve the conflict. The Indian government shifted its strategy toward political negotiation, urging the nationalists to lay down arms and engage in peaceful dialogue. This pressure led to several nationalists surrendering their weapons and coming above ground.

Following this, the Indian government compelled the representatives of the NNC to participate in formal peace talks. These culminated in the signing of the Shillong Accord on 11th November 1975 in Shillong, Meghalaya. The accord was signed between the “Representatives of the Underground Organizations” and L.P. Singh, the then Governor of Nagaland, representing the Government of India.

As per the terms of the Shillong Accord:

- The underground nationalists agreed to surrender their arms, which were to be deposited at designated locations.
- It was also agreed that the underground members would be accommodated in peace camps, and the responsibility for their upkeep would lie solely with the Peace Council.

While the Shillong Accord aimed to bring about peace, it would later face criticism from various Naga groups who viewed it as a betrayal of the core political aspirations of the Naga movement. Nonetheless, it marked a crucial chapter in the ongoing Naga peace process and set the stage for future dialogues between the Indian state and the Naga insurgents.

4. Birth of the NSCN

The signing of the Shillong Accord and the subsequent surrender of arms by Naga nationalists brought about a temporary period of peace that was welcomed by both the peace-seeking Nagas and the Government of India. There was a prevailing sense of optimism that the prolonged conflict in Nagaland had finally come to an end and that the state was poised for a new era of growth and stability. The Government of Nagaland even hailed the Shillong Accord as the “Dawn of Peace.” However, this optimism was short-lived.

Discontent soon began to surface within the Naga National Council (NNC), particularly among those who felt that the Shillong Accord compromised the fundamental demand for Naga sovereignty. This ideological divergence led to a significant split within the movement. On 31st January 1980, a group of leaders broke away from the NNC to establish a new political and militant organization called the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).

The NSCN was founded with Isak Chishi Swu as Chairman, S.S. Khaplang as Vice Chairman, and Thuingaleng Muivah as General Secretary. These leaders reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to the Naga cause and declared that they would continue to fight for complete Naga sovereignty, refusing to accept any settlement within the framework of the Indian Constitution.

Split within the NSCN

Despite its determined beginnings, the NSCN was soon plagued by internal discord. By April 1988, the organization fractured into two rival factions due to differences in personality, leadership ambitions, ethnic loyalties, and ideological perspectives.

The division largely stemmed from the ethnic and regional identities of its key leaders. S.S. Khaplang hailed from the Hemi Naga community in Myanmar, Th. Muivah was a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur, and Isak Chishi Swu belonged to the Sumi Naga tribe of Nagaland. As their strategies and visions for the Naga movement diverged, tensions escalated, eventually leading to a formal split.

The two new factions that emerged were:

- NSCN (IM) – led by Th. Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu
- NSCN (K) – led by S.S. Khaplang

Following the split, both factions not only continued their armed struggle against the Government of India but also became bitter adversaries of each other, often engaging in violent clashes. This internal conflict further complicated the peace process and fragmented the broader Naga nationalist movement.

5. Ceasefire Agreement, Peace Accord, and the Framework Agreement

On April 25, 1997, the Naga Tribal Hoho in Kohima made a significant appeal by declaring a ceasefire

among all warring Naga factions. This initiative was further reinforced during another Tribal Hoho meeting held in May 1997, where a similar call was extended to all factions of the NSCN.

Subsequently, on 24th July 1997, a formal announcement was made by the NSCN (IM) and the Government of India (GOI) to enter into a mutual ceasefire, initially set for a period of three months, with the aim of initiating political dialogue. This move received strong backing from both Houses of the Indian Parliament, and the ceasefire officially came into effect on August 1, 1997.

In the same month, the Government of India extended the offer of ceasefire to other Naga factions, including NSCN (K), the Naga National Council (NNC), and the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), for a one-month period. However, due to ongoing hostilities and rivalry with NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) initially declined to participate. Despite this, the broader cessation of armed hostilities officially began on August 1, 1997, with all parties agreeing that future disagreements would be resolved through political negotiations rather than armed conflict.

Later, in April 2001, the NSCN (K) also formally entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Government of India, further reinforcing the peace-building efforts.

A landmark development took place on 3rd August 2015, when the NSCN (IM) and the Government of India signed the Naga Peace Accord, including the Framework Agreement, at 7 Racecourse Road, New Delhi. The event was attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag, and R.N. Ravi, the official interlocutor for the Naga peace process. The Naga delegation was led by Thuingaleng Muivah, the chief negotiator of NSCN (IM).

In 2016, an important step toward unity was taken when six Naga armed factions came together under the banner of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs). With the later inclusion of the NSCN (Khango) faction, the number of groups rose to seven. The 'Agreed Position' was formally signed between the Government of India and the NNPGs, led by Kitovi Zhimomi, on 17th November 2017, marking another milestone towards achieving a final resolution.

After multiple rounds of negotiations, the interlocutor R.N. Ravi declared on 31st October 2019 that the final round of talks had been concluded, and that the final solution would soon be formulated and announced by the Government of India.

6. Nagaland Peace Accord (2015) – Key Provisions & Contemporary Relevance

Background:

The Nagaland Peace Accord, formally known as the Framework Agreement, was signed on 3rd August 2015 between the Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) or NSCN-IM, the most prominent Naga insurgent group. It marked a major step in resolving one of India's longest-running insurgencies.

Key Provisions :

While the full text of the agreement has not been made public, the following are widely understood key elements:

Recognition of the Unique History of the Nagas:

- The Government of India acknowledged the unique cultural, historical, and political identity of the Nagas.

Shared Sovereignty Framework:

- The Accord outlined a vision of shared sovereignty, suggesting cooperative federalism where nagal-

and would have greater autonomy while remaining within the Indian Union.

Establishment of a New Political Entity:

- A new administrative or political arrangement was envisioned that would integrate the Naga-inhabited areas in a special framework (though not necessarily through boundary changes).

Devolution of Powers:

- More autonomy for Nagaland in matters such as law, land, resources, and customary practices was proposed.

Peaceful Resolution through Dialogue:

- The Accord committed both parties to a peaceful and democratic solution, ending decades of armed conflict.

Integration of Naga Armed Cadres:

- Provisions were made for the rehabilitation and integration of NSCN-IM cadres into civil society, including employment and socio-political opportunities.

Contemporary Relevance:

1. Unresolved Issues: Talks have stalled due to disagreements over a separate Naga flag and constitution, which NSCN-IM insists on but the Indian government resists.
2. Governance and Development: The Accord set the foundation for better governance and economic development in Nagaland and neighboring tribal areas, though implementation lags.
3. Model for Other Insurgencies: The Framework Agreement is seen as a potential model for resolving other ethnic or insurgent conflicts in India's Northeast (e.g., in Manipur, Assam).
4. Ethnic Tensions and Regional Stability: Delayed implementation has led to tensions among Naga factions (e.g., between NSCN-IM and Naga National Political Groups - NNPGs), affecting regional peace.
5. Geopolitical Importance: Nagaland's proximity to China and Myanmar makes the peace process strategically crucial for India's Act East Policy and border security.
6. Youth and Identity Politics: The Accord remains central to identity politics in Nagaland, especially for younger generations demanding dignity, jobs, and cultural recognition.

The 2015 Nagaland Peace Accord represents a landmark attempt to reconcile tribal identity with national unity. While it holds promise, its relevance hinges on transparent implementation, inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, and balancing sovereignty with national integrity.

6.1 Framework Agreement Overview:

The Framework Agreement, signed on 3rd August 2015, was a historic pact between the Government of India and the NSCN-IM (National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak-Muivah). It aimed to bring a permanent political solution to the Naga issue, one of the oldest insurgencies in India.

Highlights of the Framework Agreement:

1. Recognition of Naga Identity: The Indian government acknowledged the “unique history, culture, and position” of the Naga people.
2. Shared Sovereignty: Both parties agreed to a model of shared sovereignty, allowing Nagas significant autonomy while remaining an integral part of India.
3. Peaceful Resolution: Emphasis was placed on resolving the conflict through dialogue and mutual respect, not violence.

4. Inclusive Process: The agreement was framed as the beginning of a broader peace process that would eventually include other Naga factions and civil society groups.
5. New Relationship Structure: It proposed a “new political relationship” between Nagaland and the Union Government, based on equal partnership and mutual respect.

While the full text was never made public, the agreement set the tone for a future peace accord with provisions on autonomy, governance, and cultural rights.

6.2. Autonomy vs. Integration Debates

One of the most contentious and philosophically complex dimensions of the Naga peace process is the debate between autonomy and integration—a debate that strikes at the very heart of Indian federalism, sub-national identity, and constitutional limits. Since the inception of the Naga nationalist movement, led initially by the Naga National Council (NNC) and later by groups like the NSCN (IM), the primary political demand has been for a distinct and sovereign Naga identity, often articulated through the concept of a Greater Nagalim. This proposed homeland would incorporate all Naga-inhabited areas, including parts of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Myanmar, thereby transcending the current boundaries of the Indian state.

This demand, however, conflicts directly with India’s constitutional framework and the political interests of the neighboring states. The Indian government, from the outset, has been clear that any solution must remain within the bounds of the Constitution. The result has been a long-standing negotiation between granting maximum autonomy to Nagaland and rejecting the integration of Naga areas beyond its existing borders.

The Case for Greater Autonomy

Autonomy in the context of the Naga Accord implies enhanced powers for Nagaland in matters of governance, culture, law, and land. Under Article 371(A) of the Indian Constitution, Nagaland already enjoys a special status—state laws cannot interfere with Naga religious or social practices, customary laws, and land ownership.

However, groups like NSCN (IM) have consistently demanded an expanded definition of autonomy, including:

- A separate Naga Constitution (which the Indian government has rejected).
- A unique national flag representing the Naga people.
- Greater control over internal security, policing, and economic planning.
- Recognition of a distinct Naga identity within the Indian Union.

Such a framework would essentially create a quasi-federal structure, offering more autonomy than that granted to any other state or union territory in India.

The Case for Integration (Greater Nagalim)

The more ambitious part of the Naga demand is for integration of all Naga-inhabited areas into one administrative unit—Greater Nagalim. This demand is emotionally charged and tied to a sense of historical injustice and cultural unity. NSCN (IM) views this as the ultimate expression of Naga identity. However, the states of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh have categorically opposed any redrawing of their boundaries, fearing territorial loss and ethnic discord. Public protests and political resolutions in these states have reaffirmed their position, making integration a politically volatile and legally untenable demand.

Government’s Balancing Act

The Government of India has consistently refused to consider boundary changes but has expressed willi-

ngness to explore special administrative arrangements in Naga-inhabited areas of other states. These could include:

- Local self-governance with traditional tribal councils.
- Cultural autonomy without territorial reorganization.
- Regional development councils under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

This approach attempts to satisfy the Naga aspiration for unity without altering existing boundaries, thus keeping national unity intact while acknowledging ethnic uniqueness.

This autonomy vs. integration debate is central to the relevance of the Nagaland Peace Accord in contemporary times, as it reflects broader questions about pluralism, nationhood, and the accommodation of ethnic identities within a multi-ethnic, democratic framework.

6.3 Role of the Interlocutor

The position of the interlocutor in the Nagaland peace process has been pivotal in bridging the vast gap between the aspirations of the Naga nationalist groups and the policy boundaries of the Indian state. The interlocutor functions as a mediator, facilitator, and negotiator, entrusted with understanding the grievances of Naga factions, building trust, and navigating the intricate landscape of cultural, political, and constitutional concerns.

R.N. Ravi: The Architect of the Framework Agreement

The most prominent interlocutor in recent years has been R.N. Ravi, a former Intelligence Bureau officer and the Government of India's official representative to the peace talks from 2014 to 2020. Ravi is widely credited with crafting the 2015 Framework Agreement with the NSCN (IM), which marked a shift from intermittent negotiations to a more structured and results-oriented dialogue.

Under Ravi's stewardship, the negotiations achieved several key milestones:

- Mutual recognition between the Indian state and NSCN (IM).
- Agreement on the uniqueness of Naga history and identity.
- Initiation of working groups to translate the framework into a final accord.

However, Ravi's tenure was also marked by deteriorating relations with NSCN (IM) post-2019, particularly due to:

- His reluctance to accommodate the demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution.
- His parallel engagements with the NNPGs, which NSCN (IM) viewed as undermining their central role in the process.
- His tenure as Governor of Nagaland, during which he was accused of bypassing state machinery and civil society, and being too aggressive in his approach.

These developments led to a breakdown in trust, and NSCN (IM) formally demanded his removal from the interlocutor role in 2020.

A.K. Mishra and the New Phase of Negotiations

Following Ravi's controversial exit, the government appointed A.K. Mishra, another experienced intelligence officer, as the new interlocutor. Mishra's style has been more discreet and consultative, focusing on:

- Rebuilding trust with all factions, including both NSCN (IM) and NNPGs.
- Encouraging civil society participation in peace-building efforts.
- Exploring creative legal and constitutional mechanisms to resolve key sticking points.

Mishra's appointment brought cautious optimism and saw a revival of talks with less confrontational rhetoric. His approach underscores the importance of flexible, empathetic negotiation in ethnic conflicts,

especially those involving competing historical narratives and emotional claims.

Challenges for the Interlocutor Role

The interlocutor's task is extremely challenging, given the following complexities:

- Managing multiple factions with divergent goals.
- Reconciling constitutional limits with symbolic and political aspirations.
- Dealing with public pressure, media scrutiny, and inter-state politics.
- Ensuring continuity in dialogue despite regime changes, both in the center and in Nagaland.

Moreover, the interlocutor must constantly balance transparency and confidentiality, releasing enough information to sustain public faith in the process, while keeping sensitive negotiations shielded from political exploitation.

Importance in Contemporary Context

In the present context, the role of the interlocutor remains vital. With no final agreement signed yet, the interlocutor is the linchpin in pushing the process forward, building consensus, and ensuring the peace process remains inclusive. Whether the peace accord succeeds or falters will largely depend on the ability of the interlocutor to mediate a middle path—one that honors the dignity and identity of the Naga people while preserving the sovereignty and unity of India.

7. Contemporary Relevance

The significance of the Nagaland Peace Accord, particularly the 2015 Framework Agreement, is not confined to its historical context or the ambition to end a protracted insurgency. Its relevance has only deepened in contemporary times, as it intersects with evolving political, economic, and regional dynamics. While the framework was signed with an eye toward peace, its present-day importance lies in its impact on security, development, identity politics, governance, and the future of federalism in India. This section explores these dimensions in depth through three major lenses: geopolitical impact on the Northeast, socio-economic development, and the ongoing negotiation process post-2015.

7.1 Impact on Northeast India's Geopolitics

The geopolitical importance of Nagaland and the broader Northeast region is central to understanding the accord's continued significance. The Northeast is physically separated from mainland India by the narrow Siliguri Corridor (also known as the Chicken's Neck) and shares over 90% of its boundaries with foreign nations—Myanmar to the east, China to the north, and Bangladesh and Bhutan to the west and south. This unique geography has made the region a geopolitical hotspot vulnerable to both internal and external instability.

The Naga insurgency, active since the 1950s, has been a major destabilizing factor in this region. Militant factions such as the NSCN (IM) and NSCN (K), with their cross-border bases in Myanmar, have frequently disrupted security along India's eastern frontier. The demand for a Greater Nagalim, which seeks to unify all Naga-inhabited areas—including parts of Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh—poses a direct threat to the territorial integrity of these Indian states and has created long-standing inter-ethnic tensions.

The 2015 Framework Agreement is geopolitically relevant today because it provides a diplomatic space for reducing these tensions. It represents a shift from militaristic suppression to a negotiated political process, enhancing India's legitimacy in the region. A successful resolution of the Naga issue could reduce insurgency-related violence not only in Nagaland but across neighboring states, paving the way for greater regional stability.

Additionally, resolving the conflict has implications for India's "Act East Policy", which aims to enhance trade and strategic ties with Southeast Asia. Nagaland's proximity to the India-Myanmar border, and its historical and ethnic connections with communities across the border, make it a potential economic gateway. With peace, the region can be integrated into international connectivity projects like the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Project, both of which are critical to regional economic and strategic cooperation.

The accord also helps India in countering the strategic influence of China in the Northeast. Beijing has historically supported rebel factions in India's Northeast as part of its asymmetric strategy. A politically stable and economically integrated Nagaland could weaken the appeal of separatist ideologies and minimize foreign interference, especially from China and its proxies in the region.

7.2 Socio-Economic Development in Nagaland

Nagaland remains one of the least economically developed states in India, with a Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) that lags far behind national averages. Its economy is primarily agrarian, with a large percentage of the population engaged in subsistence farming, lacking access to formal employment, industrial infrastructure, or large-scale investment. The prolonged conflict has significantly hampered state-building and economic progress.

The relevance of the Peace Accord lies in its potential to transform Nagaland's socio-economic landscape. Political stability is a prerequisite for development, and the cessation of violence through a peace settlement creates an environment conducive to investment, employment generation, and better governance. Post-accord, government agencies and private players can engage more confidently in building infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and communication networks, which have historically been stunted due to insecurity and extortion by insurgent groups.

Moreover, the accord has the potential to empower tribal communities economically. Nagaland has a strong tradition of handicrafts, handlooms, and community-based agriculture. With peace, these traditional industries can be integrated into national and global supply chains. The state also holds potential for eco-tourism, horticulture, and organic farming, industries that align well with the region's geography and cultural practices.

There is also an increasing demand among the Naga youth for educational and employment opportunities. A stable political environment would enable the government to focus more on skill development, digital literacy, and entrepreneurship programs tailored to the unique demography of the state. International agencies and non-profits, often reluctant to operate in conflict zones, may also step in with capacity-building and sustainable development programs.

Another key feature of the peace accord is the strengthening of Article 371(A), which allows Nagaland to maintain autonomy over its religious, social, and customary practices. This constitutional guarantee ensures that socio-economic progress aligns with the cultural identity and community-based governance of the Nagas, making development inclusive and respectful of tribal customs.

7.3 Ongoing Peace Talks (2020–2023)

Although the 2015 Framework Agreement was hailed as a landmark achievement, it did not constitute a full and final settlement. Instead, it marked the beginning of a new and ongoing phase of dialogue. The period from 2020 to 2023 has been crucial in shaping the framework's implementation, but also revealing its limitations and the complexities involved.

The biggest point of contention between the Government of India and the NSCN (IM) has been the demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution. The NSCN (IM) considers these as non-negotiable

symbols of Naga identity and sovereignty. However, the Indian government, especially after the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu & Kashmir in 2019, has firmly stated that there can be no parallel constitution or official flag within the Indian Union.

These disagreements have stalled progress and delayed the signing of a final accord, despite intense negotiations mediated by interlocutors such as R.N. Ravi, and later, A.K. Mishra. The Indian government also engaged separately with the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs)—a conglomerate of various Naga outfits—in 2017, leading to an “Agreed Position.” This parallel negotiation has created a dual-track dialogue, complicating consensus and raising fears of future fragmentation or dissatisfaction among factions.

There are also logistical and structural hurdles. For example, questions remain on:

- How to merge or reconcile administrative structures between the traditional Naga system and modern institutions.
- Whether Naga-inhabited areas outside Nagaland will be given cultural autonomy or special status.
- How the armed cadres of NSCN (IM) will be demobilized and rehabilitated.
- What will happen to the existing framework of law and order and policing, particularly in remote districts.

Civil society and church groups, especially the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) and various tribal hohos (councils), continue to play a pivotal role in mediating peace and pressuring for resolution. These groups are instrumental in mobilizing public opinion and have increasingly demanded that all parties show flexibility and prioritize the future of the Naga people over ideological rigidity.

In the 2020s, there is also an observable shift in public sentiment, particularly among the youth. While older generations have lived through decades of violence and view sovereignty as a just cause, younger Nagas prioritize education, employment, and connectivity, signaling a generational shift toward pragmatism. This shift reinforces the urgency of translating the framework agreement into a tangible, actionable, and inclusive peace settlement.

8. Challenges to Implementation

The implementation of the Nagaland Peace Accord faces several hurdles rooted in political, ethnic, and constitutional complexities. A major challenge is the NSCN-IM’s demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution, which the Indian government views as unacceptable under the current constitutional framework. Additionally, the lack of unity among Naga groups, particularly between NSCN-IM and NNPGs, hampers a collective agreement. The proposed integration of Naga-inhabited areas into a Greater Nagalim has also triggered strong opposition from neighboring states like Manipur and Assam, further complicating the process. Distrust between negotiating parties, especially due to past tensions with government interlocutors, has stalled progress. Moreover, the secrecy surrounding the full contents of the 2015 Framework Agreement and the prolonged delay in signing a final accord have created uncertainty among the people. These issues continue to affect peace, governance, and development in the region, making the accord highly relevant in today’s efforts to stabilize and integrate the Northeast.

8.1 Fractional Rivalries (NSCN- IM, NSCN-K, NNPGs)

Fractional rivalries among Naga groups, particularly between NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, and the NNPGs, have been a major obstacle to the successful implementation of the Nagaland Peace Accord. The NSCN-IM, the primary signatory of the 2015 Framework Agreement, seeks a dominant role in the peace process and insists on demands like a separate flag and constitution. In contrast, the NSCN-K has

historically opposed talks and split further over time, with some factions becoming more militant or aligning with Myanmar-based interests. Meanwhile, the NNPGs, a coalition of various smaller groups, have shown willingness to accept a more pragmatic settlement within the Indian framework, creating tensions with NSCN-IM over representation and legitimacy. These internal divisions have fragmented the Naga political voice, weakened negotiations, and led to mistrust among the groups, making it difficult to present a united front. In contemporary times, such rivalries continue to delay a comprehensive peace accord, affecting regional stability and the prospects for long-term development in Nagaland and the wider Northeast.

8.2 Territorial Claims: Nagalim vs. State Boundaries

The demand for Greater Nagalim lies at the heart of the Naga political movement and has long stood as a core obstacle in finalizing a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government of India and Naga insurgent groups. While other aspects of the Naga peace process—such as the demand for a separate flag, a constitution, or enhanced autonomy—have seen periods of flexibility and negotiation, the issue of territorial claims remains far more rigid and contentious.

The Idea and Geography of Nagalim

The term “Nagalim” refers to the concept of a homeland for all Naga people, irrespective of current political or administrative divisions. Nagalim, as envisioned by groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), is not confined to the existing state of Nagaland. Instead, it is projected as a sovereign or semi-sovereign geopolitical unit that includes all contiguous areas inhabited by Naga tribes.

Geographically, the claimed Nagalim would incorporate:

- Nagaland – the core Naga homeland.
- Four districts of Manipur – Ukhrul, Senapati, Chandel, and Tamenglong, all Naga-majority hill districts.
- Portions of Assam – including parts of the Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills districts, where Naga tribes like the Zeme and Rongmei reside.
- Parts of Arunachal Pradesh – particularly the districts of Tirap, Changlang, and Longding.
- Naga-inhabited areas of Myanmar – where the Naga Self-Administered Zone exists, covering Lahe, Leshi, and Nanyun townships in the Sagaing Region.

The vision for Nagalim, therefore, cuts across established state and international boundaries, making it a highly explosive geopolitical proposition.

Historical Basis of the Demand

The demand for a unified Nagalim is rooted in the colonial and pre-colonial history of the Nagas. Under British rule, many Naga-inhabited regions were lumped together in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and administered as “Excluded Areas”, largely autonomous and outside the direct political structure of British India.

Post-Independence, the Government of India reorganized the Northeast along administrative lines without taking full account of ethnic and tribal loyalties, leading to the dispersion of Naga tribes across several newly formed states. Naga nationalists view this division as an artificial, imposed fragmentation of their traditional homeland.

The Naga Club (1918), Naga National Council (NNC) (formed in the 1940s), and later the NSCN (IM), have repeatedly argued that tribal, linguistic, and cultural unity must be matched by territorial unification.

This demand has since been carried forward not only in political terms but also in symbolic, spiritual, and emotional dimensions of Naga identity.

Resistance from Neighboring States

1. Manipur's Strongest Opposition

Manipur has historically mounted the most vehement opposition to the Greater Nagalim demand. This is primarily because:

- Almost 40% of Manipur's geographical area consists of Naga-dominated hill districts.
- The state has a delicate ethnic balance between Meiteis (in the valley) and tribal groups like Nagas and Kukis (in the hills).
- Any move to carve out Naga districts from Manipur is perceived by the Meitei population as an existential threat to Manipur's territorial integrity.

Manipur has witnessed large-scale protests, political turmoil, and even violent incidents in response to any indication that the Government of India might consider redrawing boundaries. The June 2001 uprising is a notable example, where violent protests erupted after the ceasefire between the Government and NSCN (IM) was extended to Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, leading to widespread destruction and deaths in Imphal. The incident deeply scarred public memory and has entrenched a zero-tolerance policy in Manipur toward any compromise on its borders.

2. Assam's Cautious but Firm Stance

Assam has consistently rejected the inclusion of Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao (North Cachar Hills) in any proposed Nagalim. These districts are already ethnically complex and have their own histories of tribal unrest and autonomy movements (such as the Karbi Anglong and Dimasa movements). Assam's leadership fears that conceding to Naga demands would trigger a cascade of similar ethnic demands and further destabilize the already volatile region.

Moreover, Assam is centrally positioned in the Northeast and serves as the logistical and administrative hub for the entire region. Any fragmentation is seen as a strategic and administrative loss for the state.

3. Arunachal Pradesh's Strategic and Tribal Concerns

Arunachal Pradesh, bordering both Nagaland and China, opposes any integration of its Naga-inhabited districts with Nagalim due to:

- Security concerns, given the state's proximity to the international border.
- Autonomy aspirations of local tribes who fear domination by more powerful Naga factions like the Tangkhuls or Aos.
- The possibility of ethnic subjugation and loss of traditional lands, which has generated considerable local resentment.

The government of Arunachal Pradesh has passed resolutions against territorial disintegration, emphasizing that inter-tribal harmony and regional stability could be jeopardized by any change in its boundaries.

Government of India's Constitutional Dilemma

India's Constitution provides mechanisms for the reorganization of states and alteration of boundaries, but these are politically fraught and legally complex. Under Article 3, the Parliament can alter state boundaries, but this process requires:

- A recommendation by the President of India,
- Consultation with the concerned state legislature (though not binding),
- And parliamentary approval.

In practical terms, the Government of India is not willing to override mass opposition from the northeastern states. Any such move would be seen as undemocratic and likely to spark inter-ethnic violence, political backlash, and even destabilization of the peace process itself.

Instead of redrawing boundaries, the government has proposed alternative administrative arrangements such as:

- Autonomous District Councils for Naga tribes in Assam, Manipur, and Arunachal Pradesh.
- Cultural councils or heritage zones to protect Naga customs outside Nagaland.
- Institutional linkages between Nagas across states without disrupting state structures.

These proposals aim to achieve functional unity and cultural consolidation without enforcing political integration.—

8.3 Civil Society Criticisms

While the Nagaland Peace Accord—especially the 2015 Framework Agreement—has been hailed by many as a historic step toward resolving India’s longest-running insurgency, it has also faced serious criticism and skepticism from various sections of civil society. These criticisms are not uniform but reflect a range of concerns involving transparency, inclusivity, political legitimacy, and the potential impact on democratic institutions and social cohesion in Nagaland and the wider Northeast.

1. Lack of Transparency and Public Consultation

One of the most persistent criticisms leveled against the 2015 Framework Agreement is the opaque nature of its negotiations and content. Although the agreement was signed between the Government of India and NSCN-IM in August 2015, its full text has never been made public.

- Civil society groups, local communities, and even state governments were not taken into confidence during the negotiation process.
- This top-down, elite-driven model of peacemaking created a perception that the accord is imposed rather than inclusive, leading to suspicion and alienation among the general populace.

The secrecy surrounding the content of the agreement undermines the democratic ethos and transparency expected in any policy or treaty that will affect the lives of millions of people. Civil society organizations argue that lasting peace cannot be built in the absence of participatory dialogue.

2. Exclusion of Other Naga Stakeholders

Another major criticism revolves around the selective engagement with insurgent groups. The Government of India’s main dialogue partner for years has been NSCN (IM), but the Naga society is highly fragmented, and numerous other factions and stakeholders exist:

- Groups like NSCN (K), NSCN (R), and the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) have often felt sidelined.
- Many tribal councils, women’s groups, student bodies (like Naga Students’ Federation), and church organizations have not been formally consulted.

This exclusivity has led to internal frictions, where some communities believe their voices and interests are being subsumed or ignored in favor of a single faction’s ideology and agenda. Civil society groups argue that any legitimate peace process must involve a broader cross-section of Naga society, not just armed insurgents or political elites.

3. Concerns Over the Role of NSCN-IM in Governance

Some civil society voices have expressed concerns over the potential formal integration of the NSCN-IM into administrative and political structures of Nagaland. If former insurgent leaders were to assume

governance roles without clear accountability, vetting, or democratic legitimacy, it could create:

- A parallel structure of power, undermining the elected state government.
- Increased militarization of governance, given the violent legacy and authoritarian tendencies of insurgent leadership.
- Fear among civilians of repression or favoritism based on loyalty to the group rather than merit or democratic process.

This fear is especially pronounced in areas where the NSCN-IM has allegedly exercised extrajudicial control or taxed civilians under threat. Human rights groups and local civil society networks warn that failing to draw a line between peacebuilding and political co-option could delegitimize the democratic apparatus.

4. Inadequate Role of Women and Youth in the Peace Process

Another important criticism is the marginalization of women and youth—both of whom have been crucial in sustaining peace at the grassroots level in Nagaland.

- Women's groups such as the Naga Mothers' Association (NMA) have played a significant role in conflict resolution, education, and reconciliation between warring factions. Yet, they have had little to no presence in formal peace talks.
- Similarly, young Nagas, who represent the future of the region and have grown up in a more globalized, post-conflict context, are often excluded from peacebuilding frameworks.

This exclusion not only limits the depth and representativeness of the process but also fails to tap into progressive energies that could transform the Naga political movement from a legacy of armed struggle to a participatory democratic future.

5. Fear of Cultural Homogenization

With the NSCN-IM often dominated by the Tangkhul Naga tribe (largely based in Manipur), there is a recurring fear among other Naga tribes—like the Ao, Sumi, Lotha, Angami, etc.—of tribal hegemony and cultural dominance if the peace accord leads to a centralized structure under one dominant group.

This has given rise to inter-tribal suspicion, weakening the internal unity of Naga society and creating grassroots-level resistance to some outcomes of the agreement.

Civil society organizations highlight the need to institutionalize mechanisms that protect tribal autonomy, ensure cultural pluralism, and prevent monopolization of political power by any one tribe.

6. Skepticism Toward “Peace without Justice”

Many community-based organizations and victims of violence question the idea of peace that is unaccompanied by accountability or truth-telling. They fear that the accord may end violence without addressing the wrongs committed during the decades of insurgency and counterinsurgency:

- Disappearances, torture, extrajudicial killings, and extortion remain unacknowledged.
- There is no clear roadmap for reconciliation, reparations, or justice mechanisms.
- The youth may view such peace as transactional, not transformational.

Civil society actors demand a truth and reconciliation process, or at least a symbolic acknowledgment of past sufferings, to make the peace accord morally grounded and widely respected.

9. Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion

The Nagaland Peace Accord, particularly the 2015 Framework Agreement, represents a significant juncture in India's long and complex history with insurgency and ethno-nationalist movements. Rooted

in decades of armed resistance, identity-based demands, and political alienation, the Naga conflict has long posed a challenge not only to the Indian state but to the socio-political fabric of the entire Northeast region.

The Accord marks a symbolic and procedural shift from a conflict-driven narrative to one focused on negotiation, reconciliation, and developmental integration. It acknowledges the unique history and identity of the Nagas while attempting to accommodate them within the framework of the Indian Constitution.

However, the process has been far from conclusive. The peace accord has yet to result in a final settlement acceptable to all major stakeholders. The opaque nature of the agreement, limited inclusivity, and persistent inter-factional divisions have weakened its legitimacy in the eyes of many. The expectations of civil society, tribal councils, and regional political actors remain partially addressed or entirely neglected.

The peace process also exposes a deeper truth about modern conflict resolution: sustainable peace is not merely a political event—it is a social transformation. While the accord may have brought about a significant reduction in violence and created a more stable dialogue platform, the deep-rooted grievances, identity anxieties, and structural inequalities continue to challenge long-term harmony.

The Accord's contemporary relevance lies in its ability to open doors to constructive dialogue and developmental engagement. Yet, relevance must translate into resolution, and resolution must be inclusive, participatory, and transformative.

Recommendations

To ensure the Nagaland Peace Accord transitions from a political framework to a living, sustainable peace process, the following recommendations are proposed:

Enhance Transparency and Public Engagement

- The full content of the Framework Agreement and any future pacts must be made public.
- Organize consultative forums across districts involving tribal bodies, student organizations, and civil society actors to build consensus and ownership over the process.
- Develop multilingual public information campaigns to counter misinformation and promote clarity.

Broaden Stakeholder Inclusion

- Future negotiations must formally include all major Naga groups, including the NSCN-K, NSCN-R, NNPGs, and non-insurgent stakeholders like traditional village councils, women's groups, and church networks.
- Ensure tribal representation is balanced to avoid perceptions of dominance by any single group.
- Institutionalize dialogue mechanisms like People's Assemblies or Reconciliation Forums that meet regularly to discuss the peace roadmap.

Strengthen Institutional Legitimacy

- Avoid creating parallel governance structures under insurgent leadership without accountability.
- Promote local governance reforms that blend traditional Naga practices with democratic principles.
- Establish conflict-sensitive institutions that are capable of managing tribal disputes, land rights, and cultural concerns.

Invest in Socio-Economic and Cultural Development

- Shift focus toward education, employment, entrepreneurship, and healthcare in underdeveloped districts of Nagaland and neighboring Naga-inhabited areas.

- Create special economic zones (SEZs) or autonomous development councils that reflect regional needs and aspirations.
- Fund cultural preservation programs that respect tribal identities while promoting unity.

Ensure Gender and Youth Inclusion

- Create quotas or affirmative mechanisms to ensure women and youth representation in peace and policy dialogues.
- Strengthen youth skill-building, civic education, and leadership initiatives to foster a new generation of peacebuilders.
- Support women-led mediation programs and advocacy networks that bridge community divides.

Establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

- Create an independent commission to document the history of violence, human rights abuses, and the cost of conflict on civilians.
- Offer symbolic redress, such as apologies or memorials, and practical reparations for victims of violence.
- This process can help bridge intergenerational mistrust and lay the moral groundwork for coexistence.

Maintain Political Will and Neutral Facilitation

- The role of the Government of India should remain consistent and credible; shifting interlocutors or changing narratives harm the trust process.
- International best practices suggest the value of neutral facilitators or observers—possibly from academic or conflict resolution bodies—to mediate stalled talks.

Integrate Peace Education and Media Advocacy

- Integrate peace education in schools across Nagaland to promote reconciliation, empathy, and coexistence.
 - Support independent media initiatives that focus on peace journalism and counter divisive narratives.
- The journey to a peaceful, just, and equitable Nagaland cannot rely on treaties alone—it must be built through mutual trust, inclusive politics, and a deep commitment to justice. The relevance of the Nagaland Peace Accord in contemporary times will ultimately be judged not by the agreement signed, but by the social harmony, political empowerment, and cultural dignity it delivers to the Naga people.

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