

Policy and Strategy Advisory for Transforming the SPLM into an Admired, Self-sustaining, and Resilient Political Party

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Abstract

The political condition of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as one of the major ruling party under the Unity government in South Sudan over the last five (5) years and as the ruling party before the 2013 political crisis that brought about the unity government has given rise to widespread literature of negative intra-party inclinations such as factionalism, the manipulation of internal democratic processes, the pursuit of individual wealth, internal disorder, and increasing tensions within itself and internal sub-groupings ('camps') that Balkanize the party. Such trends, along with growing levels of popular protest (open and silent) and public disapproval, suggests a decline in the party's glory as liberator and legitimacy as trusted party to lead the government in the eyes of many citizens and professionals. Overwhelmingly, predominant paradigms of the SPLM as a national liberation movement; as a party that has fallen victim and rise from its internal divisions; as a dominant post-independence party; and as a supposed vehicle of 'neo-governance model' – are all informative, yet concurrently embed key weaknesses in analysis, focusing upon over-arching narratives rather than encouraging careful analysis of causal practices in action. The benefit of doubt could be accorded to the fact that many analysts lack practical and instinctive knowledge of the SPLM's institutional life, setup, complexity and informal networks. However, to the look of affairs of the party, its reputation is declining due to growing and repeated break-aways (factionalism), defections, internal divisions, blurry direction and program and punch to internal democratic values. The sustainability of its continuity is in purge live alone appealing development program to the citizen to regain trust and loyalty. This advisory article seeks to spot-out some of the issues, suggest viable solutions that are related to the SPLM's development, sustainability, and relevance in the face of present politically tensed situation.

Keywords: Sustainability, Resilience, Investment Avenues, Factionalism, Neo-Governance model, Reputation, Loyalty, Democratic Values, Development Program, Balkanize

INTRODUCTION

The people of South Sudan know the SPLM is the liberator that has brought about the sovereign State of South Sudan and is the safeguard for its development. What is required of our mighty Party is innovative transformation into a self-financing political entity to guarantee its growth and development to stay relevant in the political game, and lead this country for decades to come. Overwhelmingly, the

predominant public believe on the SPLM as a national liberation movement; as a party that has fallen victim and risen from its internal divisions during independence struggles; as a dominant post-independence party; and as a supposed trusted vehicle for ‘neo-governance model’ in South Sudan after independence – are all informative -but, concurrently evade key weaknesses in analysis, focusing upon over-arching narratives rather than encouraging careful analysis of causal practices in action. The benefit of doubt could be accorded to the fact that many analysts lack practical and instinctive knowledge of the SPLM’s institutional life, setup, complexity and informal networks. However, to the look of affairs of the party, its reputation is declining due to growing and repeated breake-aways (factionalism), defections, internal divisions, blurry direction and program and punch to internal democratic values. The sustainability of its continuity is in peril, live alone appealing development program(s)for the citizen to regain trust and loyalty.

The SPLM structures need to be re-engineered to suit the ever-evolving situations with new young men and women who only heard about it but never believed it served them a big deal during the country’s liberation. Agility is required of the management Cadres, especially at the levels of the State Secretariats. Innovation, investment, and service to communities are paramount in the current context where there emerged numerous political parties most of which are led by our former Cadres. The reunification of members’ agenda should be considered paramount at this juncture by the leadership, but has to be done carefully and *innovatively*. The key to it should involve a forward-looking strategy that supports the sustainable existence of the party and its viability in going the extra mile to support communities in need, besides the government. This advisory article seeks to spot-out some if the issues, suggest viable solutions that are related to the SPLM’s development, sustainability, and relevance in the face of present politically tensed situation.

PRE-SPLM ERA

This Advisory article seeks to analyze development and transitional trends of select revolutionary movements, like the SPLM/A, in the region and beyond, spot insights of their struggles and provides a few fundamental and innovative approaches to transforming the mighty SPLM Party to become resilient and self-sustaining while serving the people of South Sudan. Elements under consideration include re-engineering structures and ideology, introducing investment avenues, advancing research and innovation, and accountability, among others, which require reforms in policies and strategies that can preserve the Party’s identity, re-engineered development program (post-independence direction), to regain loyalty, trust and preferences of our citizens and members.

● The SPLM BACKGROUND

The SPLM was established in May 1983 as a Marxist-Leninist, socialist rebel movement after the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement signed between the government of Sudan, then headed by Gaafar Nimeiry and the Anyanya Movement leader Joseph Lagu, resulting from the government's walk away from the 1972 accord. The perpetual governance crisis in the then Sudan, of which the civil war in the South, west, and other parts were indicators, pushed the SPLM leadership at the time to search for a genuine and lasting peace and consideration of the Southerners in the development program of the Sudan government of the time. Its quest for recognition and consideration of marginalized groups and parts of the Sudan gave birth to the concept of the ‘New Sudanism’ or New Sudan program of the

SPLM/A. The abandoning of the Addis Ababa Agreement by the regime at the time triggered doubt on the government's intentions and pushed the SPLM/A leaders to rethink peace approaches with the government. Marginalization in all its forms, discrimination, injustice, and subordination, were thought to cause extreme resurgence of the conflict that cannot be addressed in a fragmentary fashion through dishing out handouts and concessions to the disgruntled and rebellious groups whenever a conflict erupted in a particular region. Those are some grounds the SPLM/A was initially established and pushed harder in its struggles. It was founded on a solid ground backed by the past experiences of the National Congress Party (NCP) among other ruling parties in the then Sudan governance structures and practices. Its foundation was established in a way that corrects the negative governance norms of the oppressive regimes in the Sudan at the time. The 2008 constitution of the SPLM was a profound foundation of the party that transformed it into a modern political party. The founding principles or characters include: -

- 1) Democracy and open membership to the party
- 2) Accountability to its membership and in accordance to the constitution and policies
- 3) Non-discriminative party i.e. non-racial, non-sexist, anti-racist and against any form of institutionalized tribalism, exclusivism, or ethnic chauvinism.
- 4) Unity of purpose and functioning, the SPLM, in principle, respects the linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of its members.
- 5) Inclusivity and equity where all men and women have opportunities to participate in decision making processes
- 6) Freedom of speech, expression and free circulation of ideas and information within the Party

Chapter II of the party's 2008 constitution detailed good guiding principles and objectives of the party that has made many South Sudanese and well-wishers support the party, join it and associate with it. Section 6 (Aims and Objectives) address the issues of pain Southerners undergone through the Khartoum regimes before independence. It was a hope-line for the Southerners on the party to be liberated from those pains and lingering wounds. The Southern part of the then Sudan was marginalized with poor development and basic service delivery to the population. The question that comes to any person's mind is, why was it the case for a government to maltreat its own citizen? Well, in my opinion, the fundamental issue seems to rest on Religion (Islamism) that influence system of governance in the Sudan. The Northern part of Sudan is predominantly Muslim and Southerners were Christian. Although many analysts believe beyond religion, issues of the Sudan land ownership, migration, 'islamization' of faith etc are associated with the maltreatment of the southerners as outcasts. The northern part of the Sudan being predominantly Arabs and belief in Islamic faith, principles and norms while the Southern parts of the Sudan were predominantly Christian and Pagan religious groups created a social divide among the people, yet, the Arabs dominate power in government. Sudan has never been ruled by non-Arab leader, the Arab leaders want to impose their faith on the native Sudanese who have their own beliefs and this acts pushed the SPLA/M fight for a social system of governance that embraces all. Part of the SPLA/M original objectives were "to wage a protracted armed struggle in order to establish a Socialist system in the whole Sudan, beginning in the south and extending northwards to end up in the capture of Khartoum and (2) to provide a consistent social democratic solution to the nationality question in the Sudan by establishing Socialism in the whole country and according autonomous status

to various regions within the context of a United Socialist Sudan, nota United Arab Sudan.” (Philippa Scott, 1985)

● PRE & POST-INDEPENDENCE SPLM ENCOUNTERS

The growing governance crisis within the SPLM lead Unity government has raised increasing fears about the ability of the Party to govern effectively. Government technical Parastatal and public service appointments are increasingly politicized, others see it ‘tribalized’ on ethnic lines while other belief it is for elite comrades and their friends. The Party deployments into government seems to have not been structural and meritocratic base. The party seems to have not orient clear transitional path towards managing affairs of a sovereign state rather than applying its expertise in handling liberation movement struggle. Governance, economic and unity programs were not pretty much clear from the beginning of our sovereign state and delayed holding of party conventions and low frequency of the Liberation Councils’ meetings caused a lot of challenge to the movement to establish a clear path and addressing upcoming ideological issues of state governance timely. Meanwhile, the frequency and intensity of low service delivery arguments and outcry from citizen, civil society, and professionals suggests that the ability of the movement to retain legitimacy on the basis of performance may be fading. As the leading party of unity government, the SPLM has found itself unable to advance coherent economic and developmental policies, and the movement’s leaders often appear in oblivion and divided about the proper relationship between the state and its citizen and the fundamentals of the liberation movement. The UNDP believed that *“among the challenges facing Southern Sudan’s leaders was the challenge too of building trust and legitimacy during a period of transition out of conflict to peace”* (UNDP, 2010).the UNDP also believed that SPLM is *“Not doing more to heal divisions within the south and promote inter-communal reconciliation; Not acting effectively to stem growing corruption and build public confidence in the government’s fiscal management; and Not leading a consistent strategy to produce major tangible peace dividends and infrastructural improvements”*. This 2010 analysis proved convincing given trends of factionalism within the Party and the slide to repeated civil wars created from within or by itself and its factions in the proceeding years after Independence. Dr. Mehari Taddele Maru echoed similar sentiments that the SPLM’S diminishing performance legitimacy and leading to a failed state was a result of lack of genuine effort in the provision of basic public services and in the face of rampant corruption (Mehari Taddele Maru, 2016). he further blamed some of the failures of the SPLM led government to constitutional reforms. Those analysis, too, lights sense in many people, the rushed transitional constitution has got lots of flaws to be corrected in a collectively inclusive and participatory new constitution making. The transitional constitution was rushed into to enable South Sudan fulfil requirement of a being a sovereign state at the time, it was not an inclusive process in developing it. However, it should have been given a short lifetime to transition the SPLM/A government into a civilian government where Military officials are only contained in the security sector and not spread throughout government structures, except, when relinquish Military role and declared a civilian.

The likes of Kuir ë Garang, among other scholars and analysts believed that the downward descent of South Sudan, then, resulted from the “marginalization of people from national affairs, militarization of the governance, ‘tribalization’ of the security sector and the lack of any well-defined inclusive socio-political, and socioeconomic ideology that would have informed political change and economic growth”. he further believed that the “constitution was observed capriciously, the media was regularly censored

and intimidated, and the country was governed as a nation of a *single opinion* with absolute loyalty to the only man who made decisions: the president, citing example after parliament rejected the president's ministerial choice for the ministry of justice, MPs were threatened with dismissals and dissolution of parliament if they didn't approve his choice" (Kuir ë Garang, 2019). Such analysis from experts and professionals, with the gross challenges the country is facing including economic challenges, upward inflation, insecurity, etc, provokes loyalty of the citizen and some of the Party Cadres from continuing with the SPLM to chant a path to Justice, Freedoms, and prosperity of the country and its citizen. To some extent, members' believes and trust from the party got eroded, other defect to a sister faction or establish their own Party as a breakaway.

The widely shared but loosely specified sentiment that the SPLM is failing to put itself together and provide much needed leadership in government has generated a significant meditative literary study. Many people including SPLM Cadres and members are failing to explain how the SPLM is continuing to lead the unity government even when the country's situation can be felt bad by its leadership, yet, there seems to be unclear path to rebuilding trust and redirecting energy to stabilizing the country and its political environment. The birth of "Factionalism" from within the SPLM and the civilian populations turning into military formations is spreading swiftly with limited hopes of fading off soon. New factions and movements are arising, a sign of bad situation that the giant Party need to take note of and work fast to deliberately re-engineer its revert to normalcy as factions reunite into the mother Party (SPLM). The causes and implacable quality of the SPLM's degeneration both remain controversial. It is possible to track many of the historical events that have contributed to the growing disarray within the SPLM. The movement has always been infused with personalized and dynastic or ethnic politics and shaped by powerful networks of key leaders within the movement. During the liberation struggle, there seems to be little harmony on the ideology to pursue, this has led to the emergence of the factionalism due to ideological differences amongst the movement's key figures. There seems to be no space to dialogue freely to agree on a common ideology that the movement can follow, where all programs, policies and other fundamental documents are built from it. The SPLM-Nasir Faction, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (SSIM/A of April 1997), which broke away from the SPLA later became United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF), the SPLM North (factions under Agar, Arman, and al-Hilu), SPLM-DC (Democratic Change), SPLM-IG (In Government, 2013–present), SPLM-IO (In-Opposition), SPLM-FD (Former Detainees) Real-SPLM are among factions of the SPLM. Some of its liberation commanders breakaway and established new movements not affiliated to the SPLM name including the National Salvation Front (NASF), National Movement for Change (SSNMS) led by Gen. Thomas Cirilo, South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army (SSPM/A), led by Costello Garang Ring, Federal Democratic Party/South Sudan Armed Forces (FDP/SSAF), led by Gabriel Changson Chang, South Sudan United Movement/Army (SSUM/A), led by Peter Gadet Yak, South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A) led by Paul Malong Awan, United Democratic Republican Alliance (UDRA), led by Gatweth K. Thich, SPLM (Democratic Change) formerly led by Gen. Lam Akol, National Democratic Movement (NDM) led by Gen. Lam Akol Ajawin among others. Those factions that chose to associate themselves with the SPLM felt the original ideals of the party during its establishment are good enough to pursue however, in different approaches and each one of the factions suggested different approaches to achieving those ideals and aspirations of the founding fathers. On the other hand, they felt, it is the only way to rally

other like-minded senior members of the SPLM/A to join their factions (*a relevance and mobilization concern*).

The country's unique history of diversity necessitated urgent interventions to empower marginalized groups and communities and create opportunities for all to thrive in the formal governance structures and the economy from which they had been excluded. Politicizing the Public service sector (employment and service delivery opportunities) characterize the existing trends in government whether with or without knowledge of the leadership of the leading ruling party (the SPLM). The uncontrolled involvement of 'non-deployed' party Cadres in government affairs of the country especially in the economic and security sectors for self-motivated interests blew away the trust and loyalty of other members and citizen from the SPLM.

Conclusively; I think the issues of the SPLM are complex, some of which includes lack of common ideological framework, political betrayals during and after the liberation struggle, ethnic driven governance, nepotism, struggle for self-enrichment leading to corruption, disrespect for or ignoring democratic and Party values, intrusion of non-movement members into government structures as 'deployees' under SPLM ticket in critical dockets supposed to be controlled by our Cadres or principled/integral members, poor placements of leaders in terms of capacity, exploitation of weak accountability systems that SPLM 'deployees' to government take advantage of deliberately, etc. These has caused the deteriorating condition of this mighty SPLM Party in terms of losing public trust, loyalty of members, poor service delivery, cause of factions and breakaways, and the economic and governance crisis we see at present and administration, where many South Sudanese and experts believe is purging democratic norms. However, there still exists an opportunity to fix things back and regain the lost glory of liberation, but with utmost care, commitment to the cause, re-engineering initiatives (policies, programs/strategies, post-independence ideology, etc), with some suggestions later in this article/advisory.

BENCHMARKS FROM REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS TURNED RULING PARTIES

There are particular lessons to be drawn from the experiences of dominant parties from other countries in Africa that has gone through similar crises and obliged to negotiate the same kinds of political challenges. Socioeconomic, governance and developmental factors, on this analysis, are crucial for framing relevant comparisons and advice. South Sudan is a low but rapidly growing economy in Africa with a long history of poverty and underdevelopment amidst enormous natural endowment. The country's unpleasing history introduces compelling reasons to compare her economic and political development to that of other developing income countries that were led by revolutionary movements turned governing political parties. Three of these revolutionary movements and ruling parties include the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) of Uganda and the Chama Cha Mpindusi (CCM) of Tanzania.

1. The African National Congress (ANC)

● Brief Background and challenges

The ANC was established as a formal revolutionary movement in the 1912. however, its thoughts were generated as early as 1911 when wars of resistance ended with the defeat of Bambata's rebellion and the

Africans had to find new ways to fight for their land and their freedom as the next cause of liberation struggle. In 1911, Pixley ka Isaka Seme urged Africans to unite in one mission as a united organization. He proposed that *"We are one people. these divisions, these jealousies, are the cause of all our woes today."* (Masilela, 2013). On January 8th 1912, chiefs, representatives of people's and church organizations, and other prominent individuals gathered in Bloemfontein and formed the African National Congress. The ANC declared its aim to bring all Africans together as one people to defend their rights and freedoms. The movement came at a time when the country's economy was growing faster given discovery and exploitation of Diamonds and gold in 1867 and 1886 respectively. (SAUNDERS, 2012). The government of the time enacted Laws and taxes were designed to force people to leave their land. The most severe law was the 1913 land Act, which prevented Africans from buying, renting or using land, except in the reserves. This law in particular angered the revolution leaders and native people. The Land Act caused overcrowding, land hunger, poverty and starvation, this made the ANC later in the 1950s to turn into a mass movement. The growing attacks on the rights of black people and the rise of extreme Afrikaner nationalism created the need for a more militant response from the ANC. Rough racism also brought greater co-operation between the organizations of Africans, Coloreds and Indians. In 1947, the ANC and the Indian Congresses signed a pact stating full support for one another's campaigns and militant operations began to grow. The ANC Youth League was formed in 1944 and among the young leaders include late Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo who are African nationalism idealists. They believed "Africans would be freed only by their own efforts". The Youth League aimed to involve the masses of people in militant struggles and this gained tremendous support of youth in cities and rural areas alike. The Youth League then drew a new Programme of Action calling for strikes, boycotts and defiance. It was adopted by the ANC in 1949, the year after the National party came to power. The Programme of Action led to the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s. challenges erupted later in the 1950s, factionalism arose from within, the Pan-African Congress (PAC) broke away from the ANC. Later in 1960s the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which had broken away from the ANC in 1959, started massive demonstrations against the pass laws during which police killed 69 unarmed demonstrators at Sharpeville (south of Johannesburg). At this point the government banned, both the ANC and the PAC. This pushed the ANC to re-organize itself outside South Africa for a serious guerrilla warfare. In 1961 an ANC military organization, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation"), headed by Nelson Mandela to carry out acts of sabotage as part of its campaign against apartheid. Mandela and other ANC leaders were later arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1964 (the Rivonia Trial). despite being weak militant group at the time, ANC cadres kept the organization alive in Tanzania and Zambia under Tambo's leadership. The ANC began to regroup inside South Africa toward the end of the 1970s, following the Soweto uprising in 1976, when the police and army killed more than 600 native South Africans, many of them children. About 1980 the banned black, green, and gold tricolor flag of the ANC began to re-appear inside South Africa, and the country descended into a serious practical civil war during the 1980s. the ANC was established on foot of five basic pillars: "..."

- 1) to build and strengthen the ANC as a movement that organizes and leads the people in the task of social transformation;
- 2) to deepen our democracy and culture of human rights and mobilize the people to take active part in changing their lives for the better;
- 3) to strengthen the hold of the democratic movement on state power, and transform the state machinery to serve the cause of social change;

- 4) to pursue economic growth, development and redistribution in such a way as to improve the people's quality of life; and
- 5) to work with progressive forces throughout the world to promote and defend our transformation, advance Africa's renaissance and build a new world order.

Challenges continued, disagreements within Cadres grew and signs of distrust began to appear within the ANC elites at later years when leadership of the country under their (ANCs') comrade Thabo Mbeki who dismissed his Deputy Jacob Zuma in 2005 on grounds of corruption and was seeking for third term in office. The ANC Leadership noticed the power wrangles amongst its leaders and quickly organized the party's 2007 national conference in preparation for 2009 Presidential election, where the next president of the ANC was to be selected and to be nominee of the Party to the Presidential elections. Mbeki's bid for leadership of the ANC, as he continued pushing for the separation of the positions of ANC president and that of the state president, was challenged by Jacob Zuma, who was charged of rape but later acquitted on the charges in 2006 and the corruption charges were dropped by court in 2007. Zuma was selected to lead the ANC and later became the President.

Later, during Zuma's Presidency, he was accused of having close ties with the South African Communist Party and to the Congress of South African Trade Unions. Although both organizations had long been allies of the ANC, there was growing concern among many ANC members that those groups were exerting too much influence on the ANC under Zuma's leadership than the Party itself and that the President seem to be getting out of context and pursuit of the ANC. The tension grew leading to High-ranking members and Mbeki supporters Mbhazima Shilowa, Mluleki George, and Mosiuoa Lekota to broke away from the ANC and established a new party, Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008. The new party pledged to reach out to minorities and women and attracted members from the ANC as well as other organizations. Despite the challenge from COPE and other parties, the ANC was victorious in the 2009 general election, finishing far ahead of its competitors, with almost 66 percent of the national vote. The party maintained control of all provinces except the Western Cape, which was won by the Democratic Alliance (DA).

Again, as the ANC's 2012 national conference close, signs of discontent within the party were observed, partly because of corruption scandals plaguing Zuma and the ANC-led government, as well as dissatisfaction with the general pace of progress being made in the country. Many Cadres spil beans against the President (Zuma) including Julius Malema who was a prominent Youth leader of the ANC at the time. Hhowever, Zuma still appeared to have a majority of support of the ANC mambers though later he was challenged by Kgalema Motlanthe. Julius Malema among others were expelled from the party on charges of disrespecting the Party leaders and principles (calling the President a Dictator, supporting removal of government in Botswana, and creating disunity in the ANC. This gave rise to the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in 2013 led by Julius Malema, the fiery former ANC Youth League leader who had been expelled from the ANC in 2012. Bantu Holomisa was also expelled from ANC earlier in September 1996 on charges of disrespect to ANC thus, bringing the party into disrepute simply because he questioned corruption issues within the Party. Holomisa later formed his own political party, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) as a breakaway from the ANC. Since then, he became MP under UDM ticket. These expulsions happen under Zuma's leadership of the Party

(as Deputy and later President of the ANC). Zuma was later expelled from the ANC in 2024 on grounds of Corruption and prejudicing the integrity of the party by joining uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in 2023. In 2014, the Public Protector found that Zuma had improperly benefited from state expenditure on upgrades to his Nkandla homestead, and in 2016, the Constitutional Court ruled that Zuma had failed to uphold the Constitution, leading to calls for his resignation and a failed impeachment attempt in the National Assembly. Zuma's allegations and expulsion reasons were proofed true when he later led the MK party after expulsion from ANC. Intra-Party issues including greed to self wealth accumulation, loss of direction of the party by leaders, process accountability/integrity, poor performance, disrespect to Party values are among challenges that seemed to have caused factionalism/splits, disunity and defections or expulsion of ANC members.

● **How did the ANC emerged victorious despite all these hurdles?**

This question requires us to look back to programs of the ANC. The Party take credit to having consistent conferences to maintain strong connection with the mass population as it continues to address challenges confronting it. Well, lets look at the National Elections Manifesto of May 1999 and that of 2024 respectively to determine how far they have come from and what they have achieved:

● **The 1999 Manifesto**

The NCA laid a solid goal building a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. This goal guided its actions since establishment. The 1999 manifesto identified fundamental objectives to achieving this goal including (1) establishing a 5 Years of Accelerated Change within ANC approaches to nation and state building including provision of services; to build on what was achieved over time and make a bigger impact on the daily lives of the people of South Africa. They rise to tackle issues of laziness, wastage and lack of focus and ensuring the government it led becomes more effective, more focused on spearheading development and delivery of services, and more user-friendly. (2) establishing a 5-years of Partnership with the People of South Africa to confront challenges facing the country I.e. resource and talent mobilization to induce development, create jobs, improve education and health services and fight crime among others together. (3) establishing 5 Years of building a New Patriotism i.e. strengthening devotion to common agenda of improving living condition of all between the government and the people of South Africa. This was approached by confronting racial divisions of the past and pursuing freedoms and responsibility to building the country together. (4) establishing a 5 Years of Working for a Better Africa and a Better World. This was a black-move concept that Africans must seize the opportunity of working together to liberate themselves from imported distress, mistreatment and intolerance to their cultures by external or imposed rulers. The ANC hold the notion that South Africa will only succeed this cause, of realizing democracy (in the context of Africa) and rapid social and economic development, if it works with its neighbors to safe the continent.

To assess the performance of the ANC 1999 Manifesto, it will be good to look at the next manifesto of 2004 which focused on the following areas: (1) growing the economy; (2) development of a Sustainable livelihoods; (3) ensuring Access to services; (4) establish a comprehensive social security; (5) fighting Crime and corruption; (6) Constitutional rights and governance; and (7) Africa and the world. Similarly the 2009 Manifesto promise focused on five priority areas including (1) Creation of decent work and sustainable livelihoods; (2) Education; (3) Health; (4) Rural development, food security and land reform;

and (5) The fight against crime and corruption. These focuses are linked to previous promises, this tells us that the Party has not been doing well to meeting its promise in the 1999 Manifesto and the proceeding one. It took advantage of being the monopoly Party of the Umbrella Movement where small factions broke from it and were at development stage to less competitive challenge to it.

● The 2024 Manifesto

The 2024 manifesto objectives were focused on (1) transforming the economy to serve the people, elements of jobs creation, investing in the economy for inclusive growth, localized industrialization, innovation, digital and data revolution, broadening ownership in the economy, sustainable and radical land reform, addressing monopolies and the structure of the economy, supporting small business, co-operatives and township and village economies, transforming and diversifying the financial sector, macro-economic framework to support socioeconomic transformation (2) advance social transformation through education and training, health services, comprehensive social security, housing, human settlements and public transport, water and sanitation, (3) build safer communities through combating gender-based violence, preventing crime (4) fight corruption and promote integrity (5) strengthen governance and public institutions by renewing a capable and developmental state (6) building national unity and embracing diversity.

We can analyze performance of the 2019 Manifesto by an alternative look at the priorities of the 2024 Manifesto which laid six objectives which are centered into transforming the economy and creating jobs; these include (1) Put South Africa to work, that is creating more jobs for South African growing youth population (2) Build industries to achieve an inclusive economy by expanding and modernizing industrial capacity and investing in infrastructure to transform the financial sector to support employment and industrialization (3) Tackle the high cost of living by strengthening comprehensive social security etc (4) Invest in people that is ensuring capacity building for local government to deliver basic services like clean water for all, improving public transport and roads, improve education and skills as well as health care for all etc (5) Defend democracy and advance freedom by keeping homes and streets safe, protecting borders, supporting the military veterans, fighting corruption, building social cohesion and Transformation to be delivered by Honest, Dedicated and Capable Leaders etc and (6) Building a better Africa and World. We can conclude that there has been some progress made, the later Manifesto advanced the quest for order and discipline within the ANC and improving well-being of the people through intensifying in manufacturing and creating more jobs although elements of corruption, delivery of clean water and transport are still a lingering concern. The “*big-fishes*” i.e. Governance and land are no longer serious issues of concern as a progressively being managed, nearly 18 million of the most vulnerable citizens receive social grants and over 6 million workers’ lives improved after introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 2019. This shows that the ANC managed to recover its glory under the leadership of President Cyril Ramaphosa.

2. The National Resistance Movement (NRM)

“..”Before the British arrived and mapped the territory that came to be known as Uganda, there were four kingdoms (Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro and Tooro) and communities/ chiefdoms located in Acholi, Bugisu, Bukedi, Busoga, Karamoja, Kigezi, Lango, Madi, Sebei, Teso and West Nile. With all their differences — cultural and political — these were later weaved together into the nation called Uganda.

After independence in 1962, Uganda's customary practices were officially prohibited and British cultures were promoted but were later legally recognized during the NRM rule (Quinn, 2014). In the late 1950s, most African population focused on achieving self-government due to poor treatment by the colonial powers. In Uganda, the kingdom of Buganda intermittently pressed for independence from the so called British protectorate status. This led to the 1961 London conference which subsequently resulted in self-government in 1962. Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Roman Catholic Ganda became the first prime minister, but shortly, in the same year, succeeded by Milton Obote, a Lango (Langi) who headed the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) party backed by native Buganda and the Democratic Party (DP) led by Kiwanuka, conservative Ganda and Kabaka Yekka (KY) the king. The British later allowed Uganda to exercise administrative autonomy within a federal relationship. Despite political differences among the parties (UPC, DP and KY) that took regional backing, the unity of purpose gained Uganda its Independence in October 1962 with Obote heading the government. The DP remained in opposition after independence. Obote appointed Mutesa II the President to relief tension and keep unity among members of KY, this again sparked problem amongst the UPC cadres coupled with the fact that each representative in Parliament kept allegiance to their ethnic community than the Party and were pressed by their constituencies on imbalances in resource distribution after independence. Tensions grew, hostility emerged in Buganda and Obote arrested five of his Ministers and suspended constitution in 1966. The act attracted attention of the Ganda leaders who ordered him to remove his government from the Kingdom. Obote responded by sending troops under the leadership of Colonel Idi Amin to arrest the *kabaka*, but he escaped to England, where he later died in 1969. Obote later imposed a new republican constitution—appointing himself executive president, abolishing all the kingdoms, and dividing Buganda into administrative districts. This act made him lost the support of the peoples of southwestern Uganda. Again nurturing another friction which later intensified, fostered by mutual suspicion between the rival groups, by assassination attempts against the president, and by the increasingly oppressive methods employed by the government to silence its critics.

Obote trusted loyalty of Amin, but Amin was ambitious to lead too and had been building support for himself within the army by recruiting from his own Kakwa ethnic group in the northwest. *The army, which had previously been composed of Acholi and their neighbors, Obote's own Lango people, now became sharply divided. Simultaneously, a rift developed between Obote and Amin, and in January 1971 Amin took advantage of the president's absence from the country to seize power.* Although Amin's coup was widely welcomed with locals hoping for unity of the country and Western countries, including Britain relieved its fears that Uganda, Under Obote, would become a Communist state. With little western education and administrative training, Amin resorted to arbitrary violence in order to maintain his position. He dismantled Obote's center and eliminated numerous senior army officers loyal to Obote. Factionalism emerged within the UPC, a united front was established comprising many opposition groups including Museveni's Popular Resistance Movement (PRA) which was earlier Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) forming the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and its political wing, the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) headed by Paulo Muwanga and deputized by Yuweri Museveni, Amin was faced with brutal overthrow where Museveni participated in support of Amin's oust alongside the Tanzanian forces (Apter, 1995). Museveni had served as state minister for defence under the Yusuf Lule government of 68-days, and later State minister for Regional Cooperation under Godfrey Binaisa (former Attorney General of Uganda under Obote fall foe) who was ousted by

the UNLF under Paulo and Museveni. Museveni had little military muscle and political constituency. The return of Obote and the rigging of elections pushed Museveni and others out of government. Museveni established the Popular Resistance Army (PRA) and merged with Yusuf's Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) to form an opposition alliance, hence, the birth of "National Resistance Movement (NRM) with a 10-points program including (1) Promotion of democracy (2) Promotion of security for all people and their property to eliminate state instigated violence (3) Consolidation of national unity and elimination of all forms of sectarianism (4) Defending and consolidating national independence in order to determine the future of our economic policies, culture and diplomacy (5) Building an independent, integrated and self sustaining national economy through diversifying agriculture, building industries in the import substitution sector, aggressive industrialization, construction of basic industries, acquiring computer technology, avoidance of the dependence on others (6) Restoration and improvement of social services and rehabilitation of the war ravaged areas (7) Elimination of corruption and misuse of power (8) Redressing errors that have resulted into the dislocation of sections of the population and improvement of others through settling people that have been displaced by ill thought development projects or sheer illegal land grabbing, settling the Karamojong, relieving the plight of salary earners (9) Co-operation with other African countries in defending human and democratic rights of our brothers in other parts of Africa and (10) Following an economic strategy of the mixed economy. In 1980, the UPC won the Parliament in a controversial elections highly disputed with Several opposition groups claimed the elections were rigged. Obote became the President of Uganda but due to disagreement on the electoral results, Obote feared insurgency and immediately launched a campaign of political repression. It forced opposition to respond, on 6 February 1981, hostilities began in the south with a PRA attack on the Kabamba Military Barracks in the central Mubende District but Obote took advantage of dominance in the Army (UNLA) and another coup was impossible, so the opposition instead launched armed rebellions against Obote's government: Museveni's followers created the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), Yusuf Lule formed the Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF), Andrew Kayiira established the Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), and the Communist "Gang of Four" organized an armed group known as the Uganda National Liberation Front – Anti-Dictatorship (UNLF-AD). However, by November 1982, the National Resistance Army, Uganda Freedom Movement, Uganda National Rescue Front, and the Nile Regiment had formed an alliance, called the "Uganda Popular Front" (UPF), supported by Yugoslavia until Josip Broz Tito's death. Godfrey Binaisa, while in exile, was appointed head of the UPF with aim to topple Obote. In June 1983, the Obote government launched "*Operation Bonanza*, an extensive military expedition utilizing up to half of the UNLA forces led by a new Chief of Staff Opon Acaka after death of former Chief of Staff Oyite-Ojok who died under suspicious circumstances of a plane crash in December, 1983, alienating the Acholi-dominated officer corps, including the military leaders like Lieutenant General Bazilio Olara-Okello and General Tito Okello; . These tragedies changed affairs of the UNLA attacks on rebel groups. Oyite-Ojok's loyal troops, mostly from the Acholi, the People's Militia and National Youth Army responded by carrying out revenge killings against suspected rebel supporters. After one week, however, rumours spread among the military that Obote had arranged the death of his chief of staff due to developing rifts between them and this damaged Obote's reputation among the military. An increasing number of Acholi soldiers believed that Obote was using them as guards to power, while filling the country's leadership with Langi. This led to the 1985, army brigade of the UNLA commanded by Olara-Okello, and composed mostly of Acholi troops, staging a coup d'état against Milton Obote's government and seized power." (Golooba, 2008). At

the same time, the NRA became more successful at spreading its propaganda, and attracting dissatisfied Acholi army officers to their cause, Foreign support for Obote had also diminished. A movement which literally started as a split within the army itself took a vengeance path and later led to Obote's overthrow and exile in 1985 and to the seizure of power by an Acholi general, Tito Okello. Okello formed a coalition government consisting of his followers and several armed opposition groups, which agreed to a peace deal. In contrast, the NRA refused to compromise with the government, and continued in opposition with a different ideology. The NRM conquered much of western and southern Uganda in a number of offensives in 1985. (US Institute of Peace, 2023) It continued to besiege and capture the crucial Masaka and Mbararagarrisons greatly weakening the UNLA, Gulu and Kitgum was captured in March 1986 and the defeated Acholi soldiers retreat to villages. In December 1985, Tito Okello's government signed a peace deal, the Nairobi Agreement, with the NRA. However, the ceasefire broke down almost immediately, and in January 1986, Salim Saleh commanded NRA's assault on Kampala, The UNLA was overpowered by the NRA in 1986 with Museveni becoming president. (Otunnu, 1998). NRA became the national army, and was renamed Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF). (PRUNIER, 2017).

Therefore, in general, the NRM started in a student movement of 1960's as anti-colonial struggles and a baby of the old parties (Uganda People's Congress – UPC, Democratic Party – DP and Kabaka Yekka - KY), it was at a time when Uganda was facing disaster on grounds of pseudo-ideology of sectarianism, suppression and marginalization. The NRM (an allied force of PRA and UFF) waged a successful protracted people's struggle that liberated Uganda from fascist and dictatorial regimes. It was a product of the protracted struggles for freedom, justice and equity. After the overthrow of Idi Amin's military regime by the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) in 1979 with help of the Tanzanian Army/government, an electoral commission led by Kosiya M.S. Kikira as Chairperson and with Vincent Sekkono as the Secretary was established and mandated to organize and conduct General Elections in the next year (1980). In 1980 electoral preparations were made and four (4) political parties submitted candidates for presidential position including the Conservative Party (CP), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) and the Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC). The UPC was eventually declared winner of the elections but the results were disputed by DP and UPM resulting to insurgency involving several fighting groups opposed to the UPC government led by Apollo Milton Obote. A government Museveni participated in it after return of Obote for second time.

After Museveni took over power in 1986 and ruled without elections for close to a decade, his administration later established a Commission for the Constituent Assembly (CCA) led by Stephen Akabway as Commissioner in 1993 for the purpose of organizing elections of delegates to the Constituent Assembly (CA) and initiate drafting of permanent constitution. Later in 1994, CA elections were held and the draft constitution was debated and passed in 1995. The new Constitution provided for establishment of a permanent Electoral Commission (EC) with a mandate of organizing, conducting and supervising regular elections and referendum. In 1996, the NRM Administration established an Interim Electoral Commission (IEC) led by Stephen Akabway as Chairperson to organize for the 1996 General Elections. (Oloka-Onyango, 1995). NRM was later declared winner of the first election conducted after 10 years of NRM took over power from the UPC. The NRM maintained a strategy for single party dominance in affairs of governance, restraining activities of other political parties, until 2005 when a referendum was held to change political system for a multiparty system of governance and later a

Political Parties and Organizations Act, 2005 was enacted and permanent EC body was fully constituted and the law was entrusted to the EC. Thereafter, several other political parties participated in regular elections although the NRM still emerged winner of all elections since it took power in 1986. (Makara, 2010).

● **What next happened? NRM's strategies and manifestos after the interim period (1986-1995)**

The initial cause of rebellion, which was the Mission of NRM is to transform Uganda from a poor peasant society into a modern, industrial, united and prosperous society.

NRM became a national, broad based, inclusive, democratic, non-sectarian, multi-ideological, multi-interest and progressive mass organization. In pursuit of its aims and objectives, NRM has been guided by, but not limited to, the following principles:

1. Pursuit of peace;
2. Democracy and good governance;
3. National unity and non-sectarianism;
4. Affirmative action
5. Equal opportunities
6. Socio-economic transformation and modernization
7. Patriotism
8. Pan-Africanism

It is evident that any revolutionary movement, upon seizing power, would want to have time to put itself in order. Graduating from a guerrilla movement, the NRM military administration, then, need time to re-engineer itself to the new reality of leading/governing a country. It laid program for transformation into future democratic government within 10-years. The first initiatives were to ensure that; Peace and stability is one of the key priorities of the NRM government and its first decade in power was used to fight insecurity. That has become a success as can be witnessed today. After a short time in power, the NRM government began working on comprehensive reforms based on the broad vision of fundamental change enshrined in its 1984 agreed 10-Points Program. Economic reform strategy of liberalization and privatization was adopted, decentralization and introduction of grassroots-democracy which was tailored on resistance councils, at present, the local councils from the village to the district. Local systems were restored. The government attracted massive support from the international and regional communities due to the reform programs, this led to the drafting of the new 1995 Constitution which later initiated path for the 1996 elections in which the NRM won with a landslide victory (74.2% votes). (Kjær, & Katusiimeh, 2012).

● **Initial Development and transformation programs/manifestos (1996-2015).**

The NRM government, thereafter winning the 1996 elections, introduced Universal Primary Education in 1997, a move cherished by majority of Ugandans as all Ugandan children will get a free Elementary Education which was geared towards reducing the high literacy levels in the country. The status of HIV/AIDs was skyrocketing, the NRM government took bold step to fight it by rolling out treatments (introduced free access to Antiretroviral Drugs) and preventive mechanisms, that was too successful, the prevalence of the pandemic reduced dramatically. To boost Investment, the Namanve Industrial Park was created by an Act of Parliament. It was targeted at attracting both foreign and domestic Investors

and several factories set up which created many jobs for Ugandan youth and general population. The NRM government further introduced the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) in 2001 to facilitate efficient and effective delivery of agricultural advisory services for enhanced production and productivity. Farmers were able to add more value to their produce, earn a living and abandon the subsistence method of farming to a more commercial farming practices. This improved livelihoods of the people. In the NRM's ten-point Programme, Multi-party Politics and Democracy was one of its government's priorities, it was restored in 2005 and many Ugandans can form Political parties and vie for any elected position including that of President, this has been evident by conduct of several elections participated by many political parties. This particular program, that revert restrictions on one-party organization, was informed or pressed by the fact that most sub-Saharan countries (44 out of 48), which emerged from revolutionary movements as independent states, between 1980-1989 organized multiparty elections although majority were not upholding democratic norms and are characterized by dictatorship. (Svåsand, et al., 2009). Another move was to Professionalize the Army (Uganda people's Defense Forces), it was handled by tightening the entry requirements for army recruits, establishment of a military academy, the Uganda Senior Command and Staff College which was established in 2003. later in 2007, the NRM government introduced the Universal Secondary Education to improve the literacy rates in the country especially in high-school level. In 2006, due to insurgency in the northwest by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), the NRM government pursued peace in the region and later struck a truce (peace deal) with the LRA rebels to end the insurgence in Northern region, although the deal didn't last long, the LRA continued operations but at a weaker position and mostly out of Ugandan territories (DRC, CAR and South Sudan). Also, an Act of Parliament was enacted in 2010 to fight prevalence of domestic violence. The subsequent Manifestos pushed harder towards development and industrialization including reduction in "under-five" mortality from 137 to 69 between 2010 and 2015, establishment of Six sugar Factories; kaliro, Mayuge, Luzinga, Kamuli, Ssezibwa, GM were opened during this five-year period, establishment of the joint Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and Tanzania "Northern Corridor Integration Projects" in 2013 and the subsequent outcome of the Standard Gauge Railway launched in 2014 and continued in 2022 after a temporary stall, Under Kiira Motors Corporation, Uganda developed its first electric vehicle in 2011, the first hybrid car in 2014 and first solar electric bus in 2016. the NRM government launched the first Public University in West Nile, Muni University is located in Arua district, in 2013, Tourism sector improved drastically .

● The NRM Manifesto 2016-2021

The theme for this next NRM government term was focused on *"Infrastructure development" under a Theme: "Taking Uganda into modernity through job creation and inclusive development"*. NRM, in its next government, pledged to create Value-addition, ensure Mechanization of agriculture, improve animal breeding and seed production, Promote the usage of fertilizers and manure to increase yields and productivity, ensure water for production at individual and communal levels. The government set initiatives for infrastructure development including; to complete most of the projects that were initiated during the previous term within this term and start several new projects as well; Road Networks increased from 3981km in FY 2014/2015 to 4551km in FY 2017/2018; Entebbe-Kampala express highway was completed and commissioned in June 2018. Also, "...the Kampala- Nansana- Busunju (55km), Kampala- Mpigi Expressway (33km), Kampala-Bujjuko dual carriage (35km), Kampala outer beltway (Ggaba-Seeta-Matugga-Wakiso-Nsangi Road 64km) were all completed by 2019; The new Nile

Bridge was completed and commissioned in 2018 replacing the old which was constructed in 1954; Government began works to expand and modernize the Entebbe International Airport and 75% of the expansion project had been completed by January 2021. Physical works for the Kabale international Airport Phase commenced; The National carrier, Uganda Airlines was revived and by April, 2019, two of the four bombardier aircrafts arrived at Entebbe International Airport; The East African Aviation Academy in Soroti was revitalized and re-equipped; The Arua, Gulu, Jinja, Kasese airfields were upgraded; Isimba dam which increased capacity by 183MW of electricity on the grid was completed and commissioned in 2019; Karuma Dam which added 600MW on the electricity grid which was at 80% completion in April 2019. These progress on its infrastructure program earned the NRM government reputation from the population compared to its predecessor regimes, it proved NRM is accountable to its programs for the country and its people.

The coming in of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) to power has industrialized the economy, Improved infrastructure and increased production and productivity. Between 1990 to 2006, Ugandans witnessed a period of sustained economic growth of about 7 percent annually, political and national stability, macro-economic stability, low inflation, and sustainable peace and 31% decline in Poverty rate between 1991 and 2010.(Kjær, & Katusiimeh, 2012). Agriculture and Industry are rapidly picking up and new cities created.

3. Chama Cha Mpindusi (CCM)

The Tanganyika African Association (TAA) was formed in 1929 as a social organization for African government servants in Dar-es-Salaam and Zanzibar. It laid the ground works for a national movement that later transformed into the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), as a recognized Political Party in 1954 under leadership of Julius Nyerere, with the goal of achieving self-government and independence. (McHENRY, 1973). It drew its revolutionary ideals from previous struggles that led to the formation of the Maji Maji Resistance, a movement against forced labour for a cotton scheme, of 1905–1907. (Sunseri, 2000). Tanzania became independent in 1961, as the national liberation movement, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) forced the departure of the British and self-autonomy in main-land (Tanganyika) and Island (Zanzibar) who later became fully independent was secured but with separate leaderships. TANU was a revolutionary movement whose mission was to dismantle class and racial differences and to unite and transform Tanganyika into a one-party state. The formation of this revolutionary movement was triggered by the state's pro-capitalist approach to economic development that led to an increase in inequality while failing to raise living standards for the majority. (Saul, 1974). However, after 1961 victory, the status-quo seems lingering around the new government, that led to the Dar Mutiny of 1964 when the Tanganyika Rifles almost over-run the government but rescued by the British army brought by Julius Nyerere. This mutiny led to a crackdown on trade unions and civil society organisations (Shivji, 2012 and Bernstein, 2014). Tanzania was a result of a merger of the then Tanganyika (main land) and Zanzibar, an Indian Ocean archipelago comprising Unguja, the main island, Pemba, Mafia and other small islands, gained independence in 1963, forming the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar (present Tanzania) in 1977. (Ringisai C. and Omar R, 2020).

Between 1961-1966, the post-independence period in Africa was generally riotous, countries that just got independence were unstable facing enormous problems of ideology sellout and nation development. In the era of 1960s and 1990s, there were numerous military coups including the one that overthrew Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Nyong'o 1998, p. 78) the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the out break of violence and chaos, army mutinies in all three East African countries (one in Tanganyika almost overthrew Nyerere who went into hiding for a week but rescued by the British military). (Shivji, 2012). After that incident, he unbanded the colonial force and start rebuilding a new one, recruiting youth. There starts the revolution in Zanzibar, which overthrew the newly independent government led by a coalition of the Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), a splinter of ASP and the Shirazi-dominated Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (PPP). Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah Al Said and Prime Minister Shamte Hamadi of Zanzibar were overthrown in a rebellion led by John Okello of the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) early 1964. The ASP, provided diplomatic recognition and assistance from Uganda and Kenya, established a revolutionary council in Zanzibar with Abeid Amani Karume as president and Abdullah Kassim Hanga as prime minister of the People's Republic of Zanzibar and Pemba.

The Umma party, also a breakaway faction of the ZNP/ASP, founded in 1963 as a left-wing party led by Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu who earlier prevented a massive revolt that took a racial trajectory between native African and Arabs in Zanzibar in 1964, and whose leader served as Minister under Nyerere's unity government after the merger but later imprisoned for charges of planning to overthrow government, initiated a massive riots and criticisms against the government after his release from jail, he was advocating for fundamental economic change, promoting socialism in African context. Babu was opposed to Nyerere's model of African socialism, blaming it for failing to address Tanzania's reliance on raw material exports which to him was a colonial legacy; for replicating rural orthodox policies that could not fit conditions of the people under the guise of 'Ujamaa' radicalism; and for irresponsible and unsustainable nationalization especially of small businesses, often owned by the Indian minority. This attracted attention and Nyerere was pressed by the Western powers due to the growing threat of the communist revolution in the region, he negotiated a deal with Zanzibar leadership and formed union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, although his ambitions was to have a one united East Africa as a single state as East Africa Federation aligning with his ideology of Pan-Africanism and he deliberately delayed independence of Tanganyika with motives of having a united East Africa until when Uganda pulled out and subsequent refusal of Uganda and Kenya, when he moved with Zanzibar to establish the Republic of Tanzania. Tronvoll, K. (2018). The reasons for this purported unity was driven by fear of political storms from the colonial powers and intended to secure political survival amidst Cold War rivalries to push for Pan-Africanism, a path already tested by West and East Germans over aid issues linked to establishment of Embassy in Zanzibar by East Germans which later was renamed Consulate after the Union, he refused West Germans to dictate on who should be Tanzania's enemy. The *Articles of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar of 1964* is the main foundation of the Constitutions of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government of 1984 establishing the United Republic of Tanzania. This Articles were signed by the Founders of the Union, Julius Nyerere and Abeid Amani Karume. Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) controlled the mainland, and the Zanzibar Afro-Shirazi Party (ZASP or ASP) controlled Zanzibar. Nyerere promised to hold on to the Union. (Hartmann, 1985)

In 1967 Arusha Declaration opened new era for the ruling party, TANU to adopt a policy of Socialism and Self-reliance which provided a vision for Tanzania. (Hartmann, 1985) It unveiled a direction for TANU led government and resulted to the vision of Ujamaa whose core ideology is centered on socialism, self-reliance and democracy. Nyerere's thoughts on socialism was inferred from the pre-colonial era where native people coexisted selflessly together in order and supporting each other. The Declaration was immediately followed spread of nationalization, "from banks to import-export houses, and the later implementation of a leadership code (Mwongozo) which sought to limit wealth accumulation among the political elite". Also, a focus on rigorous rural development was promoted at a large-scale through a policy on village development that sought to reorganise the countryside into Ujamaa villages – *units of collective economic and social reproduction*. During this period of rapid rural-development focus, Grassroots movements emerged across the country in response to Nyerere's socialist policies including one that restarted at the UDSM informed by the western education that mainly focused on '*capitalistic democratization*' ideas. On the other hand, another group sought to radicalize western academics to consider socio-political condition of Tanzania at the time, exploiting opportunities presented by the Arusha Declaration. The movement (Group of Nine) efforts pushed for the creation of "*Marxism-Leninism*" as a discipline of thought within the UDSM and were hunted down by the TANU government. the government responded to the tensions among youth by creating the National Service to serve as a political and paramilitary organization for the nation's with the purpose of instilling patriotism. The approach was poor and unbearable, it made the move undesirable by the youth but the government at the time made it compulsory for all university graduates which again provoked the students and triggered a prolonged confrontation between the students and political elites, creating a generational conflict in the National Service Crisis of 1966. (Shivji, 2012). Although the crackdown didn't save TANU's government but instead attracted bitter response and creating a generational conflict in the National Service Crisis of 1966. the government responded to the mutiny and tensions among youth by creating the National Service to serve as a political and paramilitary organization for the nation's with the purpose of instilling patriotism. However, the approach was poor and unbearable, it made the move undesirable by the youth but the government at the time made it compulsory for all university graduates which again provoked the students and triggered a prolonged confrontation between the students and political elites.

Nyerere's Pan-Africanism and 'African socialism' ideas attracted affinity from many people including academia from within and abroad. It was at this ground that the USARF was founded to improve and continue Nyerere's quest and debate for African socialism in the East African Universities, the USARF advocacy went beyond student politics and resulted to the TANU. The Tanzanian Youth League (TYL), a pro-Ujamaa's ideals among the youth, lacked political orientation and was only open to Tanzanian nationals at the time; it decided to radicalize by on-boarding non-Tanzanians from all race and religion, Ugandans, Kenyans, Malawians, were welcomed to be part of the USARF and keep away from TANU so as to exist as a left-wing movement. It quickly grew into a political and ideological force on campus pushing for self-education and the development of revolutionary theory through ideological classes oriented around the Leninist maxim seeking workforce for Tanzania that can carry-on common (socialist) development. "USARF also had extensive access to Marxist classics from the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean embassies, and obtained modern publications from the Monthly Review Press. A key activity

was organizing seminars and public lectures by visiting academics and activists such as identifying and disarming students' defiant to Ujamaa concept to Utopian Socialism (Shivji, 2012).

In brief, in 1977 Julius Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) merged with Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) to form Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) which is today the long serving ruling party in Tanzania. The CCM, after amending the constitution in 1992, created a multi-party state, overhauling a one-party norm established by the TANU in the then Tanganyika and after the union of the two forming the United Republic of Tanzania. The CCM dominated government with unclear demarcation between the party and government for over 30 years until 1995 when the country's first multi-party elections were conducted after its independence. (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012). The CCM won the elections and continued ruling the unity government.

Since its formation in 1964, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party has grown to be a center of Tanzania's development and governance. As the ruling party, CCM has continually evolved its strategic plans to address the country's economic, social, and political challenges and has been in power for longer than any other political party on the African continent. (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012). The "Overlapping factions of the CCM, along with factions in the bureaucracy and military, make up the ruling coalition. This integration of factions is a key feature of the ruling coalition and an important explanation for its power" (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012). Many scholars including Therkildsen, & Bourgooin believed that the strength of the CCM as a long serving ruling party is based on three complementary factors including (1) strong and institutionalized party organization that reaches down to the lowest level of society; (2) close links to the government (especially its Bureaucrats) and (3) the continuing legitimacy and legacy of the CCM. The Party's Power is centred in the party chairman with technical and administrative support of the national secretariat.

Today, CCM garnered varied membership from many different state and non-state elites, including members of the police, army and state intelligence including the citizen (many ethnicity and religions). However, after the 2010 elections, conflicts arise over the use and access to rents and the control of the party properties, counter criticism occurred as many Cadres criticize on poor performance and key figures like the Secretary General, Yusuf Makambaat, resigned and the Chairman who was the President has to form a new team at the Secretariat, transform the Party and instil discipline on cadres/members. The former Prime Minister Edward Lowasa, Igunga MP Rostam Azizwas, Bariadi West MP Andrew Chengeamong, other powerful elites were dropped from active members at the Secretariat, some were dropped due to corruption charges against them. However, the conflicts at the HQs did not affect the lower-levels, the CCM was doing well and gaining more influence at the district and village councils. Previously, CCM candidates for parliament are nominated by the lower levels of the party – subject to screening by higher level organs, and assisted by members of the intelligence service – before they can contest the elections as party candidates but prior to the 2010 elections, the Party leadership under Kikwete changed its nomination rules and allowed lower levels to vote for a nominee so as to check corruption/bribes, it made it difficult for a contestant to bribe all the voters, this introduced hygiene in to its discipline and democracy. It created a balance between wealthy politicians and average to all have equal opportunity to serve. Although, at last, more fake voters intrude the process due to removal of the identity card requirement, a poor work done by Yusuf Makamba who was then Secretary

General but removed from the post later after elections. It could be due to influence from the wealthy elites pushing or probably bribing him to do so. a lot of fake ID Cards of the party were produced at the time and might have affected election results. However, the CCM receives positive support from the Tanzanian population, the corruption scandals implicating key officials of the CCM and government have affected the party's reputation significantly either at the time. the economy was generally not bad though many are still struggling with livelihood but stability in the economy laid a foundation for its steady growth in the 2010s. Bureaucratic appointment powers still vests on the Chairman and President and can delegate other duties, this helped the CCM and government to have absolute respect for authority. (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012).

Since the 1964 Military union of the TANU and ZASP, the military staff has been integrated into the CCM and the bureaucracy, that means they can be appointed cabinet ministers and elected to parliament. Therkildsen, & Bourgooin believed "In 1982, more than 30 percent of all regional party secretaries were military personnel, though by 1987 this figure had fallen slightly to 24 percent. Similarly, in 1982 some 15 percent of District Commissioners were army officers, this percentage rose to 20 percent in 2000 and now is around 25 percent. The CCM has an arrangement that allows intelligence officers to have influence in vetting politicians regardless whether the intelligence office is commissioned or non-commissioned or retired, they got the admission to vet candidates vying for political office whether in cabinet or parliament. this keeps them relevant and influential in affairs of the party even after retirement. Prior to independence, the CCM laid a policy on Education as a fundamental tool for classifying party cadres. It still continues to be central for processes of elite formation and the party expanded educational opportunities for primary and secondary level education with support of donors and partners. This was prioritized in order to meet manpower needs. Access quotas and affirmative action have been used to create an inclusive and balanced education and assignment. also, since the establishment of the national service in 1965, a lot of relationship was forged between the CCM and the people especially Youth. Today the administrative-political elite is relatively well educated. (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012).

The political economy implications of how the CCM is being financed since 1964 has been complex. On one hand, CCM is financed by public revenues to build and strengthen the ruling coalition and to win elections. It receives subsidies from government upon approval by the parliament which was majorly controlled by the CCM. However, the government regulated party funding today by introduction of the Political Parties Act. It states that any party winning 'at least five per cent of the total votes cast in the presidential elections and a seat in parliament' qualifies for government subsidy. Since the CCM wins elections by a large margin, Section 3.1 of the Law grants it the favor to secure subsidies from the government. also, another source of funding is membership fees charged on member subscription, the CCM have its own investments in the private sector including real estates (office buildings, storehouses and factor buildings), the SUKITA company and an oil company at the time (2000s) that earns it additional resources to finance its activities and private contributions or donations/grants to it by individuals, affiliate bodies and supporting entities (national or international). these funds are shared between the national secretariat and district and village councils through a formula and culculated on basis of actual staffing and activities. (Therkildsen, & Bourgooin, 2012)

Economically, Tanzania's political status in terms of public and political governance is generally stable since its independence and Union of the two states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, this contributed to a stable and progressive economy. Thus, the general configuration of the factions making up the ruling coalition, the CCM, the bureaucracy and the military, has not changed significantly since the union time, although important crises have caused some internal re-configurations“(in particular the mutiny in 1964, the economic crisis of the 1980s and the CCM's legitimacy crisis, leading to political liberalisation in the 1990s).there were intra-party conflicts resulting from un-harmonized ideological vision especially on the market and reform agendas, conflict between elders and youth members over participation in decision making power or political offices, conflict between the party political elite on control of the party and 'polit-structural' arrangement between the Zanzibar and mainland wings of the party.(Therkildsen, & Bourgoignie, 2012). over time the Tanzanian ruling coalition has moved slowly from a '(weak) dominant party' towards 'competitive clientelism' where lower levels of the ruling coalition have gained strength over time. These key features of Tanzania's political stability help to explain why the CCM did not make significant structural changes in the economy, all seems progressing well with manageable challenges on demands to improve on agriculture, infrastructure and manufacturing, which are also progressing in a positive lane at present. Although the CCM has been able to set the policy direction, it has much less control over the implementation process as many actors with independent decision making have influence over the outcome. The challenge of controlling rent recipients is fundamental in explaining why state initiatives on advancing productive-sector capacity have been slow in the country. Also, on a positive lane, there has not been any capitalistic control especially from foreign firms, predominantly Asian, who dominates key economic sectors in other neighbouring countries, seen in Tanzania, the credit goes to the nationalization of the economy by the government derived from the CCM ideology. This supports local entrepreneurs to thrive and make genuine business deals with foreign firms and subsequently improves the overall economy, although it slows down industrialization process in the country. The good news is that there has been good relationship between the CCM and other capitalistic states and entrepreneurs who are helping the party to move its economic transformation agenda. The CCM has been winning elections since 1995 to this till 2020. (Chikohomero & Mjenga, 2020)

Table 2: Voters' turnout and the results of the last four multiparty elections

ELECTION YEAR	VOTER TURNOUT	PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED VOTERS	RULING PARTY VICTORY
1995	8 928 826	77%	61%
2000	10 088 484	84.4%	71%
2005	9 123 952	72.4%	80%
2010	8 398 394	42.84%	62%
2015	15 242 500	67%	58%

Table Source: Ringisai C. and Omar R. (2020)

The margins of winning elections decreased in 2015 during Chairmanship of Magufuli. He was re-elected with a landslide victory (85%) in 2020 polls. Though he died before completing his second term, the Party is yet to witness its performance under Samia Suluhu in the upcoming 2025 polls. This takes us to its Manifestos which we shall look into select (2020 and 2024) manifestos:

- **Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Manifesto of 2020**

The 2020 Manifesto, under CCM Chairman John Magufuli and Deputy Samia Suluhu who later continued the mantle after his tragic death, outlined four key elements including (1) the Economy - focused on making Tanzania a middle income state by making more economic reforms, build an economy which is both inclusive and competitive by creating and implementing a National Development Plan 2021/22- 2025/26, aimed to grow the economy by an average of 8 percent annually, develop and implement strategies that strengthens economic stability by maintaining manageable inflation rates, increase budget independence by strengthening internal revenue collection systems including identifying or creating new sources of revenue, increase VAS, advance the service sector, increase the spectrum of funding for development projects through Public Private Partnership (PPP), reduce national debt, and tackle climate change through regional and international engagements (2) Development of Social Services - focusing on improving and advancing education, health, social welfare and water and environment (3) Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation - focusing on advancing political and economic diplomacy, EAC, AU, UN, Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth and (4) Improve Tourism - focusing advancing tourism in Zanzibar especially implement the ISAP and BIG-Z plan to create value addition in Zanzibar's tourism sector, promote Pemba islands as a tourist destination and improve cruise tourism and increase the number of ships visiting Zanzibar from 6 to 40 among other priorities of the manifesto.

- **Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) Manifesto of 2015.**

The 2015 Manifesto under Chairman Jakaya Kikwete focused mainly on constitution review which includes formation of a constitution review commission (CRC) that almost took whole term collecting data throughout the country for the review. the Manifesto considered the national development vision 2025 and the CCM's 2010-2020 policies on securing sustainable development for Tanzanians. Its focus, other than the constitutional review, include four key elements; (1) reducing youth unemployment through establishing more industries to create more jobs for youth (2) poverty reduction through improving agricultural productivity under 'Kilimo Kwanza Initiative', creating space for SMEs to thrive in business with aim to formalize their businesses, demarcate land so that rural people can have land titles to ease loan access to boost their production/investments (3) fight corruption through strengthening anti-corruption institutions and justice systems such as special tribunals to handle corruption or economic related cases and (4) guarantee peace and security for Tanzanians through protection of vulnerable groups and modernizing and empowering defense and security Agencies with equipment and resources.

- **The 2015 and 2020 Manifestos' outcome/performance.**

The year 2015 witnessed a peaceful transition from President Jakaya Kikwete's reign to to 'fifth government under new CCM Chairman and President John Pombe Magufuli. Tanzania has is a footprint for democratic transition where leaders respect Presidential Term limits, unlike in the region where they over stay in power against will of their people and the consitution. Other leaders do influence consitutional reviews in their favor by scraping agreed upon term-limits e.g. Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan among others. Jakaya's term sought to establish a new constitution before its end but failed due to the 2015 IPTL/Escrow scandal which caused public outrage. The 'Escrow' and the aborted Zanzibar elections which led to widespread condemnation both at home and abroad were still major talking points.

Also, his reign was characterized by complaints of police harassment and sometimes violence targeting opposition leaders and supporters, including the ‘roughing up’ of CUF Chairman Professor Ibrahim Lipumba and his arrest for ‘incitement’ and poor corruption control mechanisms. (Ewald, & Wohlgemuth, 2012). However, during this term, lost were achieved including the constitution review process initiation and data collection, Introduced free primary education, increasing school enrollment across Tanzania, Signed a \$698 million agreement with the U.S. to improve infrastructure and reduce poverty, Energy Sector Reforms Focused on addressing power shortages and expanding access to electricity in rural areas, Advocated for deeper East African Community (EAC) integration, boosting regional cooperation, Launched a program to fast-track development in education, agriculture, and infrastructure (Kitila A.K. Mkumbo, 2017).

There were existing positive economic growth in Tanzania since Julius Nyerere, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin Mkapa, and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. The economy was on an upward trajectory with key economic growth indicators. Before the Magufuli administration came to power, the CCM was characterized of corrupt Cadres, patronage and increased poverty levels among Tanzanians was growing and conclusions were being made by individuals that the party is failing Tanzanians. Magufuli (also known as Bulldozer) rose to prominence on integrity and anti-corruption with the CCM ranks, an integrity he maintained. The 2015 Manifesto headed by ‘Bulldozer’ Magufuli bald-faced corrupt officials, took aim at government extravagance and unchecked unnecessary spendings which fall as a new beginning for most Tanzanians (*it is how he was nick-named Bulldozer*) this scared corrupt officials and entities. This action dramatically improved Tanzania’s economy by far compared to other EAC and SADC countries. His 5-year development plan enshrined/derived from the Manifesto anchored the country’s growth on human development, effectiveness in service delivery and industrialization. His government continued the upward economic trajectory it inherited from former president Jakaya Kikwete’s years in power. The country’s growth increased by 6.8%, until the arrival of Covid-19 that disrupted economic activities, and termed one of the fastest growing economies in Africa at the time.

The CCM government this time around rationalize government spending, fight corruption and increase employment opportunities for Tanzanians through increased industrialization. It introduced policies that favors local investments and ensure a win-win contracts between Tanzania and multinational corporations. The idea of taking Tanzania to middle-income economy by 2025 has been driving the CCM’s administration under Bulldozer. Several capital intensive projects such as bridge and road construction, power generation dam, the revival of the national carrier Air Tanzania and the construction of a new international airport in the capital city Dodoma we initiated and being implemented at the time before his death, however, later achieved under guidance of Suluhu. This, cumulatively, brought the CCM’s government close to have achieved more than 10% reduction in poverty between the period of 2007 to 2018 through its poverty reduction strategy (PRSP), investment inflows and new business opportunities in the country have been on the rise. (Spanger & Wolff, 2003). However, much, yet, are needed to be done. These include ICT infrastructure development in the country since the adoption rate and competitiveness was low. Despite the challenges it faced, the CCM government established connection with the citizen, it created new laws over the period to sanitize political plurality, freedom of speech and guarantee basic civil liberties such as the Police and Auxiliary Services Act, the Cyber Crime Act (2015), the Statistics Act (2015), Electronics and Postal Communication (2010), the

Prevention of Terrorism (2002) and the Media Services Act (2016). All these laws are being established to control the activities of political parties including propagation, dissemination and mobilization among others.

WHAT WE LEARNED FROM ALL THESE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS - TURNED INTO POLITICAL PARTIES (ANALYSIS):

- 1) The ANC, CCM, NRM and the SPLM were liberation movements that fought for either independence of their countries or to liberate their people from poor governance and marginalization.
- 2) All these movements took time in governing, over decade, for some, after securing independence or government to reorganize themselves into a new liberation of their people from poverty and guarantee national stability and development except for SPLM that split and fighting each other on grounds of governance issues (scramble for power) and national stability and development.
- 3) The state governance was literally a single party regime which later transformed into multiparty system after a decade or so (examples of the CCM and NRM).
- 4) All these revolutionary movements had setbacks including splits (factions) during the course of their struggles due to ideological differences or power issues.
- 5) All these movements were able to conduct elections but controlled power or government, winning all elections after securing government till today except for SPLM which is controlling power but never had elections since securing independence of the country in 2011.
- 6) The CCM was a newly created coalition after two revolutionary movements merged to form a union of states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. they we TANU and ASP/ZASP before establishing Tanzania after the union. Meaning their original brands, ideologies and programs were re-engineered to suit the later situation.
- 7) The NRM was a product of a union of two movements. The two under leaderships of Museveni and Lule respectively, established NRM under Chairmanship of Lule and pushed to overthrow government and established a new Administration under Museveni, a year after Lule died in London in 1985 due to kidney failure. Museveni become the first NRM president in 1986 and ruled for a decade without elections until 1996 when elections were conducted in Uganda under NRM administration.
- 8) Most of these revolutionary movements are able to learn from their past mistakes, adjust and adapt to a new reality by revisiting their core ideals to suit the current situation they face but the fundamental goal of “freedom and prosperity” remains a bedrock for them except for SPLM whose resilience, transformation, adjustment and adaptation to new realities is still in test at moment.
- 9) Most of these movements stabilized their states after victory within 5 years despite challenges within the party/movement that comes along with them during their struggles. They are able to stabilize the political system and ensure honor of their party norms except for the SPLM that still struggles to stabilize its political systems to swiftly impact positively on governance of the state to guarantee political stability, freedoms and prosperity.

PROBABLE REMEDIES TO THE SPLM ISSUES AND RECOVERY OF ITS SUFFERING GLORY:

1. The SPLM leadership need to think of revising its name and color band. I think, in the past, our Party was fighting a “Red” fight, the fight of liberation of its people and land. This fight can be

described as a “physio-military fight”, meaning a predominantly military-composed approach that involves physical confrontation and takeovers of our territories by our gallant forces from the oppressing regime in Khartoum at the time. The Movement was in “Red attire” and must be responsive all the time with strategies that support Military approaches or wins with targeted diplomatic relations. I suggest that, as the cause of the re fight is over with victory in achieving our sovereign state, the current fight is that of State and nation building. This fight requires our Party to *re-strategize* and *rebrand* itself to meet the new phenomena and challenges confronting our relevance in leading our hard-earned country. This new phenomenon requires SPLM to attract trust of the citizen, summon loyalty of members and sell a program that not only educates the young one green about the struggles but creates opportunities for all to thrive in the new country and above all, building a nationhood where our people, regardless of tribes, or ethnicities sees themselves of same people of one family wearing different clothes and colors with diverse thinking capacities i.e. “*United Cultures*”. SPLM needs to think of changing the “Red attire” to a color that suits the new era of struggle. I suggest a “Sky-blue” (*sky is the limit*) or “Green” (*nature provides*) attire while maintaining all other brand features. This suits us to the cause of the new struggle for development that requires “soft-fight” involving critical thinking and diplomatic approaches to all matters of development, including securing our sovereign borders (defense and security), economic progress, and united cultures, as well as capacity development and discipline in the party.

2. Equally, the SPLM was established as a Movement and Army during the united Sudan. Now that we secure our independence and become a sovereign State, it is about time for us as a Party to sit and deliberate on the new mandate of fighting for South Sudanese well-being, liberating them from poverty, diseases, illiteracy, violence of all forms, etc and guaranteeing development for the people and the state. I suggest we think around South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SSPLM), People’s Liberation Movement (PLM) or National People’s Liberation Movement (NPLM), we can keep other features to ensure flow and connection to the liberation struggle. This will transform our understanding to a new purpose and shall inform our new policies, strategies and principles as a transformed or re-born Party with new mandate or cause to pursue. I understand many will disagree on the ground that many other revolutionary parties kept their brand names without changing, but, let us try to be unique of them. Also, we got to consider connections of their names e.g. the ANC was not connected to any specific country, the NRM was not linked to any country. These selected movements held several conferences and reshaped their principles and strategies etc after becoming ruling parties. The SPLM is not exceptional in changing its brand name, just like we did with the national army (separating it from the movement/party to be a national Army with different name) the issue is that our Party’s name is associated with Sudan which is no longer our concern since we separated from it as a sovereign state. Our Party’s name should now bear name that connects to the sovereign state and its diverse people.
3. Urgent need for a general conference to exhaustively deliberate on party’s rejuvenation program including the review structures, strategies, policies related to the economic recovery, reunification, peace building, international relations (security, economic and political),

investment, Policy for Cadres' deployment to government, Party-to-government development program, etc. The CCM and ANC were able to resolve most of the intra-party issues through conference. For CCM, a clear program for the ANC-led government drawn from every conference detailing its position on economic, national security, foreign relations, etc. It helped strengthened its position as leading party in the South African political space. A general conference is necessary at this point in time for the SPLM to re-draw a new and clear direction and programs for its party-led government. The NRM model may not help our situation because the liberation head monopolized political system in a democratic era. The principle of term-limited is not respected with the NRM case, this will not help the SPLM because the SPLM is composed of veteran Anyanya figures, ideologists within the movement, etc who may need a chance to lead the SPLM and its-led government, so monopolizing power may not help in our situation. Equally, power transfer to a choice of the Chairman outside the SPLM systems and procedures will neither help the situation.

4. The SPLM need to convene Liberation Council and Political Bureau meetings to deliberate on reunification of its senior Cadres that broke-away due to inconsistencies within the party leadership and less-attention to its principles. These two meetings should be able to constitute senior Cadres who summon respect and influence over the brake-aways to lobby return of their disgruntle members who have either established new movements or settle not to engage in any political matters resulting from mistrust or hopelessness on the newly established system within the Party. This High-level committee should be able to collect views of the brake-aways and individuals on possibility reunification and propose a model for re-unification incorporating their views. This model has to be discussed in NLC and PB meetings and endorsed to convinced the SPLM hold-outs to return. Thereafter, a general conference shall be convened with all members to revert to the original principles of the SPLM with a modifications on programs and policies to suit the situation. The Youth are not seriously considered in the decision-making of the Party and its led-government. It is paramount that this time around, this population, which constitute the largest portion of the population, should be meaningfully considered in decision-making of the Party and SPLM-led government. The Youth Leagues (National and States) must have a significant portion (probably 40%) of the leadership positions within the Party and its-led government. This will empower them, summon youth representation and loyalty and reduce youth being used for political games by few elites in the leadership roles. Youth should trust in the system that they are represented and have a say in any decision reached by the party or its-led government. Their representatives understand their issues and shall contribute towards shaping policies that are pro-youth development and opportunity creation. Youth involvement in politics has been a big challenge to revolutionary movements in Africa. In Tanzania, However, their participation in politics in Africa is often contentious. This is made worse by the fact that African societies, including Tanzania, gerontocracy, an idea from Plato that *"it is for the elder man to rule and for the younger to submit"*, has been the norm with the CCM though the country has seen fairly young leaders compared to others in the EAC & SADC regions, this has not translated to active youth participation in the national political process. This portion of the population (youth) are the backbone or defense and economic foot of the country with over 60% of the population below age of 30. South Sudan has similar fraction of the population (majority) are youthful

age. The SPLM need to embrace them into political offices and other senior roles within the Party and its led-government to prepare them to continue the leadership in the future.

5. The National Secretariat and States' Secretariats need to be economic oriented in a manner that they look deeper into ensuring party sustainability through investments. The ANC and CCM has got great party investments and do not highly rely on government subsidies to run their operations. It is important that each level of the Secretariat invest to keep itself running and providing additional services to the people as a Party. However, a deliberate policy on Party investments and regulations on managing its resources be established to curb corruption, a case, the ANC and CCM faced especially on management of rental revenues among others. SPLM leadership need to spot investment areas that shall guarantee a short, mid and long-term returns to ensure liquidity and or cash-flow for their operations and service delivery to the people. Investment is areas like real-estate (apartments, shopping malls, offices, residential), financial markets (if available), manufacturing, high-tier transportation, Agriculture corporation (*to boost agribusiness and cooperative societies at State levels to create more jobs for youth*), tourism and mining among others are essential for the SPLM to look into and invest to guarantee its viability and competitiveness in the long-run.
6. The SPLM need to review its recruitment and remuneration structures both at the Secretariat and SPLM-led government. This has been one of the key factors for promoting corruption. a lot of ghost names appeared in payrolls due to low pay-structures. Again, at the Secretariat, it is difficult to attract or maintain creative minds due to low remuneration. Its time the SPLM review the pay structures to suit the economic conditions so that it can attract more members as well as retain productive ones. This will reduce focus on corruption in the form of compromising integrity with bribes for survival. Within the government, the pay structure is way below the cost of living, this encourages corruption by those in decision making at expense of the majority under them. The amounts corrupted by few elites, if assessed, could be enough to improve the pay structures of all government workforce. Hygiene and integrity could be nurtured within the system. Recruitment with merit should be fundamental drive is choosing government *deployees* from the SPLM or even for positions within the Party. A proper criteria should be laid that regulates promotions within the Party and that should be replicated or moved into the SPLM-led government. Constitutional post holders should be allowed to come with minimum number, say 2 (a driver and an office manager), Secretaries and other support staff must be civil servants assigned to the office by the accounting officer when necessary and there should be no structural changes imposed on to the accounting officer or institution without proper engagement with key officials and consensus drawn to effect changes, unless, stated in his/her vetted offer. Recruitment corruption will reduce and ghost names will disappear, better contract negotiations shall be achieved for government and more revenues will be gathered for development.
7. *Political deployees* from the Party to Government must be based on certain established criteria or policy e.g. vetted within the party, proposed appointees or nominees should express interest and what they intend to offer in the docket thwy are nominated to be appointed into government, their offers are analyzed and best candidate recommended for appointment by the President in a

government led by the SPLM. This will reduce unnecessary back-door lobbying by cadres. Even SPLM sympathizers and normal citizen whom the party deem fit for a political office under SPLM ticket must undergo such criteria through the Secretariat to give weight and honor to the Party. The so called bribes for appointments will reduce to a negligible levels and eligible candidates, who can deliver and earn the party good reputation, are deployed or recommended for appointment into SPLM-led government. Corruption may be minimized too.

8. A deliberate policy and regulations for managing corruption and punishing corrupt elements should be established by the SPLM and replicated in SPLM-led government. Our government has been characterized of high corruption, this is not because every official is corrupt or do those corrupt officials wants to be corrupt. Circumstances/conditions pushed others to be corrupt while other took advantage of weak systems that holds accountable corrupt officials. Unfortunately, it has become a lucrative business to trade in corruption e.g. power brokers who only lobby for elites with wealth/good bribes to get into power regardless of what they can deliver to the nation. Such people who sometimes close to appointing authorities of accounting officers grew powerful and influential because they are listened to, entertained and trusted, yet, some of them are not even officials. Another group of people are '*propagandist*' and social media warriors, these people are being sponsored by a few elites to influence decisions in the favor of their '*bribers*' even if they know the information they publish are defamatory or false, their interest is making money and do not care about the impact on the society and country. These people and their promoters are not traced and punished by the system. Corruption on the land is the worst one, it creates unfinished silent war among communities. The SPLM need to come-out clear on this issue. Some elites believe land belongs to the people while others believe land belongs to the community. Among the elites, there are those who believe the "land belongs to the people" has instituted during the liberation but was not welcomed and the "land belongs to the communities" found in the area was welcomed. This two versions must be cleared carefully by the SPLM because it could be another source to drive-away of people from the Party. Wisdom need to be applied and that can be secured from an inclusive convention (SPLM conference) after reunification. Corruption on the land needs a careful approach from the Party and the outcome must be applicable throughout the country.
9. The SPLM already have got a huge number of veterans. Most of these veterans who are above age limit of 65 (pensionable) are still active either in the Party, Army or the SPLM-led Government as party *deployees*. These are Cadres who are tired and must be honored by giving them rest, but the challenge is that they need to survive. The little and previously untimely pay with arrears already damaged their dreams for the future they wished to witness. Most of them are unable to make any meaningful investment, except for elites in decision-making political positions. They need to be retired to rest and be given a retirement package as an honor for their remaining time, however, the key ones can be kept at the Party as Advisory and decision making contributors in NLC or PB meetings. The CCM maintained their retired Cadres to participate in PB/LC meetings, this is to maintain momentum, transfer history and act as bedrock for which young Cadres hold onto. The SPLM should device a mechanism of borrowing for this particular package and paid to them periodically. The borrowed pension amount shall be invested in key

businesses to regenerate as they are paid quarterly or annual packages until the whole amount is complete. The package should be paid within a period of atleast 10 years and on either Quarterly or Annual basis. Within the package, there should be a portion for housing, medical allowances and transportation, depending on the rank of the official (whether in Government, Army or the Party). all other lower grade personnel who are pensionable should be paid off their package in a shorter period (maybe >5yrs) and encouraged to invest. Part of their money can be put into the Party's Investment avenues so that they become shareholders who shall receive annual dividends in return of their investments (it could be made compulsory policy so that they do not waste it within a short period). it is upto the SPLM to establish deliberate policy and influence government to secure "loan for pension" or "oil-for-pension" strategy to create more investments resulting from retirees funds as well as open opportunities for young and fresh-minds in leadership and management of the affairs of the Party, Government and the Army. It is time for *logic-test* to liberate this country from poverty and under-development, this requires lots of mind-work, research and technology which most of our Senior Comrades lack for this new revolution. SPLM need to stay-fit in the new game just as we were vividly fit during the liberation war-game. We got to free our Veterans from this new revolution but keep them around us at the Party to guide the inheriting new-blood in the system so that we do not lose track from history.

10. Economic orientation is paramount at this critical moment. The SPLM need to establish a deliberate program on economic awareness for our Cadres. This should be replicated in the government too. Our independence came with a rushed policy documents because we direly need it. One fundamental element was civic education of the SPLM Cadres and our citizen on how to do anything with economic mind i.e. with the concept that our demands are enormous but resources are limited and hence, we got to be rational and optimize use of our personal resources. This must be a wholesale program for the national, state and local government as well as SPLM structures at all levels to do. Our people have over-depended on their few bread-winners and the bread-winners tolerate/normalize it simply because they are not very-much economically oriented. Our animals, land titles accumulation, cash in the bank, farm produce etc are used for prestige or earn communal respect and followers instead of transforming them into economic factors/investment. We (those with money) are too quick to promote laziness by dashing money anyhow even if just to be wasted on un-useful spending, this denotes lack of economic orientation. The poor are relaxed because they can get aid from their loved ones who 'haves', even parents transfer responsibilities of educating and treating children to their 'haves' loved ones etc. All these contributed to our slow economic growth, fueled violence and conflicts and further contributed to insurgencies because there are no meaningful economic engagements that the people/youth are in and shall be scared to destruction of their economic activities. They actually lose nothing and willing to be used by wealthy military-politicians in armed insurgencies for just a rank or little token of appreciation while forgetting their future in their children (to be) unfortunately. Rapid and massive economic orientation program must be carried out so that our Cadres as well as the citizen are informed on dangers of unnecessary (irrational) spending and being un-productive in the society, especially what future awaits them at their old age etc.

11. Furthermore, there is need to review the PB and LC structures and the members' roles therein. PB and LC members at all levels should be grouped into task-teams e.g. a Working Group (WG) on economic research and advisory, another on defense and security research and advisory, agriculture, health, education, social welfare etc or according to existing clusters of the Party/Government. This will make these members more active than now or before. They shall be engaged in meaningful studies and provide useful guidance/advisory to the Party leadership as WG with a team lead and Secretary General or his/her delegate as secretary. These working groups shall have routine meetings (maybe quarterly) to discuss matters related to their tasks including evaluating performance of the relevant SPLM department and SPLM-led government Institutions that falls within their purview. These meetings can be attended by the relevant senior cadres including the Secretary General (SG) at the Secretariat and those deployed as post holders to the government. Their official reports and proposals shall be shared during LC/PB meetings and discussed to draw resolutions that shall be passed for implementation by the Secretariat and or the government as a policy position of directives of the Party. Doing so, the Party shall reduce the scramble (lobbying) for membership to the LC/PB as those who shall be there must be able to deliver on the tasks within their WG. The senior cadres who are retired shall be grouped in an High-level Oversight Council (HOC) both at PB and LC while those with the required abilities should be placed in WGs.
12. Finally, it is important to instil self-discipline in our cadres in the Party and Army (which is now under transformation into a modern National Army) on the notion of "we-liberate" or "participation during liberation struggles" and "extreme community allegiance when dealing with national matters". The Party need to acknowledge contributions of all South Sudanese directly during war-fare or indirectly through material support and manpower including prayers and the last shot of voting for independence. These are collective contributions that does not live-out any South Sudanese and community. It is good to embrace all when dealing with national matters as historic SPLM Cadre and patriot. Some families lost their dear-ones who might have saved a colleague living today, others treated a soldier living today, others provided food and shelter to soldiers in dire hunger situation living today, others prayed for a battle success for soldiers living today etc. These are community or family contributions from all South Sudanese to secure this success of an independent state and must be acknowledged without down-looking other individuals or communities. This has been another factor that affects trust in the SPLM by some individuals or communities who know their contributions during the struggle. SPLM, as a historic revolutionary movement need to educate the upcoming Cadres of the historic contributions of South Sudanese leading to this great hard-won achievement of a sovereign State. The Bible "Moses" and "Joshua" actors during Israelite's struggles are the Anyanya and SPLM of our revolution struggles and has to be connected and acknowledged too. Also, the Moses and Joshua within the SPLM i.e. (Cde. Garang De-Mabior) and (Cde. Kirr Mayardit) must be cherished and blessed for leading our people to this final destination called the Republic of South Sudan. As SPLM prepares to move on with continueing their mantle to another leader, wisdom must be exerted in the identification of that leader, a choice of Charismatic, humble, humane, patriotic, discipline, and diplomatic Cadre as our future Party leader who can summon attention of all

members of the Party and influence our foreign policy to attract support from international community.

CONCLUSION

The struggle and sacrifices of our people over the past decades have presented our generation with the unique opportunity to take South Sudan into the new millennium. The SPLA/M, as a revolutionary movement, took the mantle from the Anyanya to continue the struggles for political and social transformation, democracy, freedom and prosperity for its people in Southern Sudan. The SPLM managed, through the participation of all Southern Sudanese in a referendum, to get us an independent state, South Sudan. The struggle for independence phase is over for a decade now, today we are faced with new challenges that calls for a redefined mission geared towards “nation and state building”. This phase required us (SPLM) to re-engineer our approach and relevance to the new call. The SPLM is fortunate that most of its viable competing factions were once from the movement or SPLA/M and ideological difference after independence pushed them out of the Party. This article sheds light on revolutionary movements in the region and Africa and pin-point good areas where the SPLM can learn and re-engineer its strategies to gain viability, become admired Party and resilient to any political shocks its way to winning future elections. It is time to back-track, re-engage with those factions to reunite with the mother Party (SPLM) so that its revolutionary spirit is regained and might sustained and patriotic glory remembered by the Cadres and people of South Sudan. Chances are high that the too many factions may not survive all to compete with the SPLM and they may be compelled to return but under a win-win negotiated arrangement for their return. We got to embrace them back because there are patriots who actively participated in the long struggle for our independence within our structures, some were founding fathers. A full SPLM Conference has to be held immediately after reunification to chart a new path for this mighty Party.

Discipline and respect to our democratic systems should always prevail to keep SPLM flourishing and admired by the people to lead that country. However, SPLM need to explore investment avenues to reduce reliance on government funding/subsidies, it must be able to sustain itself, pay its personnel well to attract and retain good minds and offer public services as a party out of their own resources. SPLM need to embark on massive economic orientation to its Cadres and so do its led-government to instil mindset of rationality and being productive to save the economy. The high level decision making bodies (PB and LC) need to be put into Working Groups so that they are actively contributing towards ensuring the SPLM policies are being implemented whether within the Secretariat or SPLM-led government. Deliberate policies and regulations need to be established to curb corruption and development programs to guide the government the SPLM leads so that much needed services are provided to the people and development initiatives are being implemented.

Author's key notes:

*This article is an extract from a **BOOK: “WISDOM IN LEARNING - The SPLM Governance & Revival Tragedy”**, yet to be launched soon. It is intended to be an opinion or advisory piece to those*

who maybe concern and interested in the SPLM growth. We shall explore more in the book once launched.

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