

The Hidden Costs of War: How Armed Conflicts Reshape Women's Lives and Development in India

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Abstract:

The study investigates the impact of military expenditure, which represents armed conflicts, on women's social and economic well-being in India using annual time series data from 2000- 2021. An Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) modelling framework is employed to study the impact of military expenditure on female unemployment rate, female secondary school enrollment rate, female suicide mortality and the incidence of domestic violence. Moreover, GDP growth rate, CPI, Real Interest rate and of Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure serve as control variables. Stationarity is assessed using unit root testing, particularly the ADF, PP and KPSS test. The results indicate that military expenditure has a negative effect on female unemployment. These changes are however, not translated into subsequent periods, indicating only a short-term boost in employment. Further, the effect of military expenditure on education is negative. Military expenditure also showed a positive relationship with suicide rates and domestic violence. The findings suggest that the military expenditure has a detrimental impact of women's well-being. This highlights the need to balance defence spending with development policies.

Keywords: Military expenditure, women, India, social well-being

I. Introduction:

The destruction caused by armed conflicts, both in terms of economic consequences and increased number of fatalities is undeniable. The use of explosives and weapons has resulted in environmental degradation and the inevitable loss of human lives. Conflicts are associated with some of the most severe abuses, both physical and psychological and they often result in social and political unrest. However, one of the most overlooked consequences of war is its impact on the lives of women. Women are both direct and indirect victims of armed conflicts. They are subjected to sexual harassment and violence. The proportion of women killed in armed conflicts has doubled since 2022, accounting for 40 percent of all the deaths in war, while women constituted for 50 percent of conflict-related sexual violence victims ([United Nations, 2024](#)). Women also have to face economic deprivations due to the loss of their husbands, who were the primary earners in their family. As a result, women often have to take on leadership roles and financial responsibilities.

Armed conflicts also affect the maternal health of women. It was reported that around 500 women in conflict-affected countries die from complications related to pregnancy and childbirth. ([United Nations 2024](#)). Regardless of whether a country emerges victorious or devastated by war, the impact on civilians remains severe. The post-war consequences, such as the unavailability of basic resources and extreme

poverty, disproportionately affect women. India has experienced various conflicts since independence, including wars with Pakistan in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999, the Indo-China war of 1962 and ongoing insurgencies in the Kashmir region. It was reported that Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is prevalent among direct victims, with rates ranging from 49.81% among affected individuals to 3.76% in the overall population of Kashmir following armed conflicts.

Women have been amongst the most vulnerable groups, yet their post-traumatic stress is often neglected. They are subjected to war-related violence or psychological distress due to the loss of loved ones. They are directly targeted in war and also become economically vulnerable during and after the war. Armed conflicts disrupt the social order of the society. They severely affect infrastructure and lead to crowding-out of social expenditure ([Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State, 2012](#)). Women suffer the most due to these negative consequences of war. In a country like India, where male education is still preferred, a reduction in expenditure on education affects women the most. Despite facing significant hardships, women showed a higher post-traumatic growth, exhibiting remarkable resilience ([Sharma, et al. 2023](#)). Unfortunately, the implications of wars are not confined to the brutalities inflicted by the warring parties. Women also experience intimate partner violence during armed conflicts. ([MOBAYODE 2020](#)). Wars have devastating consequences for women, particularly in the form of conflict-related gender-based violence (GBV), including rape and child sexual abuse. As a result, women often become vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases like AIDS. Even though, women are not as likely to die in war as men, they face heightened vulnerabilities. Surviving the war doesn't make the situation any better for these women, as as many continue to suffer from severe psychological distress. This has contributed to a rising incidence of suicides among women.

This study analyses the impact of armed conflicts on the well-being of Indian women. Military expenditure is used to define armed conflicts. Military expenditure serves as a good proxy for armed conflicts as governments only increase defense expenditure when they want to carry out military operations or participate in armed conflicts. Even in the absence of wars, military expenditure may indicate a response to insurgencies or preparations for the same. Furthermore, prolonged armed conflicts often result in increased military expenditure. Therefore, military expenditure serves as a pragmatic variable to analyze the effect of wars on women.

II. Literature review:

Militarization, which refers to the increased military expenditure, affects women's private and public lives. Higher military spending widens income inequality and crowds out social expenditure, such as on education and health. This disproportionately affects women, who have a higher dependence on social expenditure [Elveren et al. \(2022\)](#). Armed conflicts tend to exacerbate gender disparities in life expectancy. The ratio of female to male life expectancy decreases during armed conflicts, as argued by [Plumper and Neumayer \(2006\)](#). Their findings suggest that while men are often the primary direct casualties of war, women suffer disproportionately in the long run. Wars severely impact health infrastructure and lead to underfunding and under-provision of both private and public health services [Plumper and Neumayer \(2006\)](#). The effects of war on health are severe for women and children than men. The spread of HIV may be increased through sexual violence and women are often at a higher risk of catching AIDS. This is due to displacement and increased likelihoods of being victims of sexual violence [Buvinic et al. \(2012\)](#).

It was demonstrated by [Canbay and Mercan \(2020\)](#) that military expenditure had no short run impact on unemployment rate in Turkey, however, military expenditure had a negative relationship with

unemployment rate in the long run. Further, an increase in military expenditure resulted in an increase in employment in the SAARC region [Azam et al. \(2016\)](#). Similarly, [Raifu et al. \(2025\)](#) showed that an increase in military expenditure was associated with a reduction in total and gender (male and female) unemployment in South Africa. However, certain studies showed a negative relationship between female employment opportunities and armed conflicts. For instance, [Elveren et al. \(2022\)](#) showed that since militarization reinforces patriarchal relations, it reduces job opportunities for women and therefore leads to lower female labour force participation. [Kousnar \(2010\)](#) examined the consequences of prolonged armed conflict in Kashmir, with a specific focus on its effects on women's health and education. The study highlighted the struggles of widows and half-widows—women whose husbands have disappeared due to conflict. Economic hardship was a common challenge, as many of these women lost their primary sources of financial support. The study also found that educational and employment opportunities for women remained significantly constrained. Further, genocide afflicted widows and their children face severe economic constraints because of the loss of economic resources tied to men ([Brück and Schindler \(2009\)](#) as cited in [Buvinic et al. \(2012\)](#)).

Manipur conflict also had severe implications for women, they were subjected to social and economic deprivations, exacerbating their already vulnerable positions [Satyabati \(2014\)](#).

[Plumper and Neumayer \(2006\)](#) argued that women become victims of sexual violence during wars. They are forced to endure forms of sexual slavery and become the victims of sex-trafficking during armed conflicts. [Kousnar \(2010\)](#) highlighted that women faced heightened risks of sexual harassment by both militants and security forces during armed conflict in Kashmir. [Satyabati \(2014\)](#) similarly argued that women employed in industries during the Manipur conflict were often subjected to sexual harassment by both militants and security forces. The July 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel severely impacted Lebanese women. [Usta, Farver and Zein \(2008\)](#) conducted a study and found that at 39% of Lebanese women reported at least one instance of violence perpetrated by soldiers, 27% experienced domestic abuse, and 89% were forced to leave their homes for safety during the conflict. It also underscored how war not only inflicts physical harm but also exacerbates psychological distress. Sexual Violence and domestic violence have become common during armed conflicts. These types of violence are direct weapons used for ethnic cleansing and punishing the opponents [Buvinic et al. \(2013\)](#). Violent conflicts can alter power dynamics within societies, potentially fostering an environment that tolerates Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). It may also occur if gender norms are militarised or patriarchal attitudes are amplified. On a broader societal level, the widespread acceptance of violence during conflict can lead to the normalisation of IPV. On an individual level, exposure to war-related trauma may result in psychological issues, which can manifest as increased aggression in men, thereby contributing to higher incidences of IPV [Svallfors \(2023\)](#).

Patriarchy and militarization have a negative impact on women's education. Together, they create a power structure where women are marginalised and deprived of access to education. This is because women's education is seen as a threat to the dominant culture of power and have the potential to upset the gendered hierarchy [Azhar \(2009\)](#). The Colombian armed conflict had a negative impact on the academic performance of children. There was damage to the physical infrastructure, restriction of educational resources, alteration of school calendars and increased risk and uncertainty on behalf of families, students and teachers [Ariza and Saldarriaga \(2023\)](#). In conflicted affected zones, children are twice as likely to be out of school than in other areas ([UNESCO \(2015\)](#) as cited in [Ariza and Saldarriaga \(2023\)](#)). It was argued by [Tai \(2025\)](#) armed conflicts in Africa particularly occurring within 25 kilometers can reduce a female

child's primary years of schooling by 0.4 years. Similarly, Roy and Singh (2016) showed that violent conflicts reduced the female school enrolment rates by 13 per cent in Assam. The rates were even lower for lower primary school girls studying in schools run by local and unaided private bodies. Armed conflicts had a negative impact on rural gender enrolment ratios as well. Armed conflicts have a negative impact on girls' enrolment in higher education, particularly secondary school enrolment rates Khan (2015).

Existing literature has primarily focused on the impact of military expenditure on macroeconomic indicators. While, these factors are important, the effects on women's social and psychological well-being have often been overlooked. This gap is significant as an increase in military expenditure can have profound consequences for women, including heightened risks to their social and mental well-being. The study addresses the gap by empirically analysing the impact of military expenditure on female suicide mortality rate and the incidence of domestic violence.

III. Methodology:

Variables and Data:

This study analyses the impact of quantitative variables like military expenditure (expressed in terms of percentage of GDP), which represents armed conflicts, on variables such as female unemployment rate (measured as percentage of female labour force), female secondary school enrollment rate (expressed on terms of gross percentage). Additionally, the study incorporates dependent variables such as female suicide mortality rate (per 100,000 female population) and the incidence of domestic violence, which is defined as cruelty by husband or relatives of husband. Moreover, GDP growth rate (annual percentage), CPI (annual percentage), Real Interest rate and Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure serve as control variables. The analysis focuses on India to illustrate the impact of increased conflicts on women's social and economic well-being. The period of study is 21 years, from 2000 to 2021.

Data on variables such as military expenditure, female secondary school enrolment, female suicide mortality, GDP growth rate, CPI and Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure is acquired from the World Bank. Data on the incidence of domestic violence is obtained from the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB).

Statistical Techniques:

The study uses an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model for the time series data. To check for unit roots in the series, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), the Philips-Perron (PP) and the Kwiatkowski- Philips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test were implemented. Further, the Akaike Selection Criteria (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) were used to find the optimal lag length for our model.

A. Unit-root testing

Prior to conducting regression analysis, it is essential to examine the stationarity properties of the series to avoid spurious results. Accordingly, the study employs three tests; the ADF, the PP and the KPSS test. The ADF and the PP test are based on the null hypothesis that the series possesses a unit root, that is it is not stationary. On the contrary, the KPSS test operates on the null hypothesis that the series is stationary. All the variables were tested in their level form. Table 1.1 presents the p-values from the three tests.

Results from Table 1.1 indicate that all the variables except GDP growth rate are non-stationary. Specifically, for these variables, both the ADF and PP tests failed to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (p-values >0.05). However, for variables like military expenditure, female unemployment rate, real interest rate and CPI, the KPSS test failed to reject the null of stationarity (p-value >0.05). Given that two of the three tests confirmed the presence of a unit root, the variables were deemed non-stationary and were

therefore differenced before proceeding with the analysis. However, for GDP growth, PP test rejected the null of a unit root and the KPSS failed to reject the null of stationarity. This confirmed that GDP growth was deemed stationary for the rest of the analysis.

Stationarity after First Differencing

Given that the majority of the variables were found to be non-stationary in their level form, first differencing was applied to induce stationarity. Following differencing, the unit root tests were re-applied to confirm whether the transformed series is stationary or not.

Table 1.2 presents p-values from the three tests after first differencing

Following first differencing all the variables were stationary except military expenditure (ADF p-value = 0.6324; PP p-value = 0.05039; KPSS p-value = 0.1) and Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure (ADF p-value = 0.9312; PP p-value = 0.01; KPSS p-value = 0.047). To address, the natural logarithm of military expenditure was taken. The log transformed series was then differenced, after which PP test and KPSS test confirmed stationarity for both the variables (For military expenditure; PP p-value = 0.04944; KPSS p-value = 0.1) (For Household and NPISHs expenditure; ADF p-value = 0.9744; PP p-value = 0.01; KPSS p-value = 0.1). This process ensured that all the variables were stationary, thus satisfying the requirements for time series modelling. Further, domestic violence was first log transformed and then differenced for stationarity. This was done to ensure a stable variance and to facilitate interpretation of coefficients in relative terms.

The optimal lag lengths were selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to ensure that the model is correctly specified.

B. Empirical Findings

Model 1: The impact of military expenditure on female unemployment rate

The first model investigates the impact of military expenditure on female unemployment rate. The control variables for the model are CPI and real interest rate. The empirical specification uses differenced and log transformed variables to ensure stationarity. The model selection criteria yielded same results, with AIC and BIC suggesting similar lag orders.

Estimation results indicate that military expenditure has a negative and statistically significant (estimate = -6.284; p-value = 0.0321) impact on female unemployment rate in the current period. This suggests that increased public spending stimulates demand for labour. Specifically, this effect may be due to the employment intensive nature of defence related public investments. However, the first and second lags are not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1954 and 0.3945 respectively), suggesting that the effect of military expenditure does not persist beyond the current period. This suggests that military expenditure has a short-term employment boost rather than contributing to structural changes.

The second lag of female unemployment is positive and significant (coefficient = 0.676; p = 0.0411), suggesting that increases in unemployment two periods earlier continue to influence current unemployment. The first lag, however is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.2351). The control variable, CPI has a statistically and positive effect (coefficient = 0.258; p-value = 0.0121) on female unemployment in the current period. This effect is due to the increase in labor costs, due to inflation, for the firms which results in reduction in employment.

The first lag of inflation is negative and statistically significant (p-value = 0.0438), while the second lag is positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.0486). The second lag of real interest rate has a significant and positive effect (coefficient = 0.1442; p-value = 0.0121) on female unemployment rate. This

is because a contractionary monetary policy reduces aggregate demand and thereby employment in the economy. However, the current period and first lagged real interest rate are statistically insignificant. Overall, the variables were jointly significant at 5 % significance level (p -value = 0.0293) indicating a combined effect of the variables on female unemployment rate. The R-squared value of 87.45% and an adjusted R-squared value of 67.73% suggested that the model explained a high proportion of variability in the dependent variable.

Table 2.1 presents the estimates and p -values of all the contemporaneous and lagged variables.

Model 2: The impact of military expenditure on secondary school enrollment rate, female

The model estimates the impact of military expenditure on female school enrollment rate. The control variables for the model are real interest rate and adolescent fertility rate taking Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure and CPI as control variables. The model selection criteria yielded same results, with AIC and BIC suggesting similar lag orders.

The results indicate a negative and marginally significant (coefficient = -21.94; p -value = 0.06) relationship between first lag of military expenditure and female secondary school enrollment. This suggests that increases in military expenditure are associated with a decrease in secondary school enrollment rate. This shows a reduction in spending on social sectors like education as highlighted by [Elveren et al. \(2022\)](#). The current period and second period lag of military expenditure are statistically insignificant

(p -value = 0.29 and 0.147 respectively).

The first lag of the dependent variable is negative and significant (coefficient = -0.4629; p -value = 0.04). However, the second lag is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.954 ; p -value = 0.006). Among the control variables, household and NPISH expenditure is negative and statistically significant in its current period (coefficient = -45.5117; p -value = 0.0305). The first lag is positive but statistically insignificant (p -value = 0.85), however, the second lag is negative and statistically significant (coefficient = -88.48; p -value = 0.0204). CPI, on the other hand, is negative and statistically significant in the current period (coefficient = -0.9137; p -value = 0.0154). However, the first period lag of CPI is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.827 ; p -value = 0.01). The second period lag was positive but statistically insignificant (p -value = 0.207).

Moreover, the variables were jointly significant at 5 % significance level (p value = 0.04). The R-squared value of 85.9% and an adjusted R-squared value of 63.96% suggested that the model explained a high proportion of variability in the dependent variable.

Table 2.2 presents the estimates and p -values of all the variables.

Model 3: The impact of military expenditure on suicide mortality rate, female

The model investigates the impact of military expenditure on female suicide mortality rate. The control variables for the model are GDP growth rate and CPI. The model selection criteria yielded same results, with AIC and BIC suggesting similar lag orders.

The results suggest that the contemporaneous and first lagged military expenditure has no statistically significant effect on female suicide mortality rate (p -value = 0.179 and 0.214 respectively), the estimate however, shows a negative sign and positive sign respectively (coefficient = -3.02 and 3.24 respectively). The second lag of military expenditure has a positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 8.16; p -value=0.005) effect on female suicide mortality rate. This suggests a delayed impact of military expenditure on female suicide mortality. From a theoretical perspective, an increase in military

expenditure may reduce public investments for social services like mental health or welfare programs. This could result in higher socio-economic pressures which could translate into higher suicide rates.

The current period GDP growth shows a positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.11; p-value = 0.003) impact on female suicide mortality. However, the first lag of GDP growth has a negative and marginally significant effect on female suicide mortality

(coefficient = -0.05 ; p-value = 0.051). CPI in the current period is positively associated with female suicide mortality (coefficient = 0.115) and the first lag of CPI is negatively associated with female suicide rate (coefficient = -0.118). Both the contemporaneous and lagged CPI are marginally significant (p-value = 0.09 and 0.050 respectively).

Overall, the current period and lagged variables are jointly significant at 10% significance level (p-value = 0.0619). The R-squared value of 74.6% and an adjusted R-squared value of 49.22% suggested that the model explained moderate proportion of variability in the dependent variable.

Table 2.3 presents estimates and p-values of all contemporaneous and lagged variables.

Model 4: The impact of military expenditure on domestic violence (defined as cruelty by husband or relatives of husband).

The model estimates the impact of military expenditure on domestic violence with GDP growth rate and CPI as control variables. The model selection criteria yielded same results, with AIC and BIC suggesting similar lag orders.

The results suggest that military expenditure has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on domestic violence (coefficient = 0.115; p-value = 0.783). This suggests that increased defence spending may not have an isolated effect on domestic violence. Nevertheless, a joint significance test of military expenditure and other variables yields a p-value of 0.0377, suggesting that the variables taken together significantly contributes to explaining variation in domestic violence.

The first lag if domestic violence has a negative and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.594; p-value = 0.028) effect on the dependent variable. Among the control variables, CPI in the current period is positive but not statistically significant (coefficient = 0.006 ; p-value = 0.578), suggesting no contemporaneous link to domestic violence. However, the first lag is positive and statistically significant (coefficient = 0.053 ; p-value = 0.0015), suggesting that increases in inflation is associated with an increase in domestic violence, due to delayed economic stress on households. Real interest rate in the current period has a positive and statistically significant impact on domestic violence (coefficient = 0.02; p-value = 0.026). The first lag is positive but statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.207). While, the second lag is negative and marginally significant (coefficient = -0.0159; p-value = 0.052).

Overall, the model explains a substantial proportion of the variation in domestic violence rates (R-squared = 0.677), with an adjusted R-squared of 0.472 after accounting for model complexity. These results collectively suggest that while military expenditure may not directly influence domestic violence in isolation, its effect in combination with other macroeconomic indicators is statistically significant.

Table 2.4 presents estimates and p-values of all the variables.

IV. Conclusion:

The results indicate that military expenditure has a negative impact on female unemployment rate in the current period. This suggests that increased public spending stimulates demand for labour. Specifically, this effect may be due to the employment intensive nature of defence related public investments. However, the first and second lags are not statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of military expenditure

does not persist beyond the current period. This suggests that military expenditure has a short-term employment boost rather than contributing to structural changes. Further, there is a negative relationship between first lag of military expenditure and female secondary school enrollment. This suggests that increases in military expenditure are associated with a decrease in secondary school enrollment rate. This shows a reduction in spending on social sectors like education as highlighted by [Elveren et al. \(2022\)](#).

The second lag of military expenditure has a positive effect on female suicide mortality rate. From a theoretical perspective, an increase in military expenditure may reduce public investments for social services like mental health or welfare programs. This could result in higher socio-economic pressures which could translate into higher suicide rates. Furthermore, military expenditure has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on domestic violence in the current period. This suggests that increased defence spending may not have an isolated effect on domestic violence. Nevertheless, a joint significance test of military expenditure and other variables suggest that the variables taken together significantly contributes to explaining variation in domestic violence.

In conclusion, the impact of armed conflicts on women's social and economic development is detrimental. Women may not be the direct victims of war, but they are significantly affected by them. They are subjected to economic vulnerability and are often victims of domestic and gender-based violence. It is imperative that we address the needs of women during wars and assess the damages caused by wars in broader terms.

V. Future Scope:

This study relies on data from the World Bank and the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB). The data for some variables from the World Bank is limited to 2021. Further, the data on domestic violence from the NCRB is available from 2000s only. As a result, the analysis reflects structural trends from that point but may not capture earlier developments. Future research can benefit significantly from updated datasets, which would allow for a more accurate and current evaluation of the impact of armed conflicts on the lives of Indian women

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Table 1.1 Unit Root Tests: Variables in Multivariate Models (2000-2021)

Test Variable	ADF value	p-value	PP value	p-value	KPSS value	p-value	Stationary at Level
Military Expenditure	0.5054		0.6755		0.1		No
Female Unemployment rate	0.99		0.9576		0.07023		No

Secondary Enrollment Rate, Female	0.9594	0.974	0.01	No
Domestic Violence	0.5636	0.5326	0.01	No
Suicide Mortality, Female	0.655	0.6537	0.01	No
GDP Growth Rate	0.4942	0.02141	0.1	yes
CPI	0.7688	0.8519	0.1	No
Real Interest Rate	0.4458	0.4907	0.1	No
Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure	0.7265	0.8858	0.01	No

Note: ADF and PP test null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary); KPSS test null hypothesis of stationary. All tests are evaluated at 5% significance level.

Table 1.2 Unit Root Tests: First Differences

Test Variable (Differenced)	ADF p-value	PP p-value	KPSS p-value	Stationary
Military Expenditure	0.6324	0.05039	0.1	No
Log of military expenditure	0.649	0.04944	0.1	Yes
Female Unemployment rate	0.95	0.01	0.07478	Yes
Secondary Enrollment Rate, Female	0.5433	0.01	0.08574	Yes
Domestic Violence	0.4883	0.01	0.1	Yes
Log of Domestic Violence	0.5353	0.01	0.1	Yes
Suicide Mortality, Female	0.01	0.0439	0.1	Yes
CPI	0.6306	0.04147	0.1	Yes
Real Interest Rate	0.4176	0.01	0.1	Yes
Household and NPISHs expenditure	0.9312	0.01	0.047	No
Log of Household and NPISHs expenditure	0.9744	0.01	0.1	Yes

Note: ADF and PP test null hypothesis of unit root (non-stationary); KPSS test null hypothesis of stationary. All tests are evaluated at 5% significance level.

Table 2.1 ARDL Regression results for Female Unemployment Rate

Dependent variable: Female Unemployment Rate

Variables	Estimate	Standard error	t-value	Pr (> t)
Intercept	-0.0416	0.0734	-0.566	0.5889
L(female unemployment, 1)	0.4158	0.3201	1.299	0.2351
L(female unemployment, 2)	0.676	0.2706	2.498	0.0411 *
Log of military expenditure	-6.2842	2.355	-2.668	0.0321 *
L(log of militaryexp, 1)	-3.6137	2.5247	-1.431	0.1954
L(log of militaryexp, 2)	4.0438	4.4577	0.907	0.3945
CPI	0.2580	0.0768	3.359	0.0121 *
L(CPI, 1)	-0.1846	0.0752	-2.455	0.0438 *
L(CPI, 2)	0.1636	0.0686	2.384	0.0486 *
Real Interest	-0.0091	0.0535	-0.171	0.8691
L(Real Interest, 1)	0.0175	0.0544	0.322	0.7568
L(Real Interest, 2)	0.1442	0.0429	3.358	0.0121 *

Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Multiple R-squared: 0.8745, Adjusted R- squared: 0.6773

F-statistic: 4.435 on 11 and 7 DF, p-value: 0.02934

Table 2.2 ARDL Regression results for Secondary School Enrollment, Female

Dependent variable: Female Secondary School enrollment rate

Variables	Estimate	Standard error	t-value	Pr (> t)
Intercept	8.72284	2.42541	3.5964	0.0087 **
L(Secondary enrollment, female, 1)	-0.4629	0.18466	-2.5071	0.0405 *
L(Secondary enrollment, female, 2)	0.954	0.24579	3.8814	0.006 **
Log of Military expenditure	12.937	11.378	1.137	0.2929
L(Log of Military expenditure, 1)	-21.9444	9.9308	-2.2097	0.06282 .
L(Log of Military expenditure, 2)	-18.4821	11.3636	-1.6264	0.14788
Log of Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure	-45.5117	16.8464	-2.7016	0.0305 *
L(Log of Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure, 1)	2.1729	11.698	0.1857	0.8579
L(Log of Household and NPISHs final consumption expenditure, 2)	-88.48	29.6796	-2.9812	0.0204 *
CPI	-0.9137	0.2876	-3.1809	0.0154 *

L(CPI, 1)	0.82796	0.25876	3.1997	0.0150 *
L(CPI, 2)	0.35078	0.25089	1.3981	0.2047

Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Multiple R-squared: 0.8598 , Adjusted R- squared: 0.6396; F-statistic: 3.9045 on 11 and 7 DF, p-value: 0.0408

Table 2.3 ARDL Regression results for Suicide Mortality Rate, Female

Dependent variable: Female Suicide Mortality Rate

Variables	Estimate	Standard error	t-value	Pr (> t)
Intercept	-1.2823	0.4586	-2.7959	0.0208 *
L(Female Suicide mortality, 1)	0.3578	0.2536	-1.410	0.1919
Log of military expenditure	-3.0255	2.0804	-1.4542	0.1798
L(Log of military expenditure, 1)	3.2428	2.4274	1.3359	0.2143
L(Log of military expenditure, 2)	8.1674	2.2581	3.6169	0.0055 **
GDP growth rate	0.1133	0.0282	4.0186	0.003 **
L(GDP growth rate, 1)	-0.059	0.0263	-2.245	0.0515 .
L(GDP growth rate, 2)	0.097	0.0583	1.6663	0.13
CPI	0.1150	0.062	1.8541	0.096 .
L(CPI, 1)	-0.1185	0.0526	-2.2501	0.050 .

Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Multiple R-squared: 0.74613, Adjusted R- squared: 0.49227; F-statistic: 2.9391 on 9 and 9 DF, p-value: 0.0619

Table 2.4 ARDL Regression results for Domestic Violence

Dependent variable: Domestic Violence

Variables	Estimate	Standard error	t-value	Pr (> t)
Intercept	0.081	0.0188	4.2958	0.00126 **
L(Log of Domestic Violence, 1)	-0.5943	0.2364	-2.5139	0.0287 *
Log of military expenditure	0.1159	0.4118	0.2816	0.7834
CPI	0.006	0.0118	0.5728	0.5782
L(CPI, 1)	0.053	0.0129	4.1611	0.00158 **
Real Interest Rate	0.0202	0.0078	2.5710	0.026 *
L(Real Interest Rate, 1)	0.0119	0.0089	1.34	0.2072
L(Real Interest Rate, 2)	-0.0159	0.0073	-2.1765	0.0521 .

Significant codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Multiple R-squared: 0.6776, Adjusted R- squared: 0.4725; F-statistic: 3.303689 on 7 and 11 DF, p-value: 0.0377