

Guardians or Bystanders? A Critical Examination of International Bodies and Their Accountability During Armed Conflict

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Abstract

The protection of civilians and enforcing of humanitarian standards in armed conflicts are the functions of international bodies that must be obligatory but repeated instances of operational failure indicate a deeper conflict between normative and accountability considerations. The United Nations (UN), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and International Criminal Court (ICC), represent the protective mandate that has its basis on the U.N. Charter arts. 1, 55; the Geneva Conventions; and the Rome Statute, yet repetitive failures in Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Syria reveal accountability lapses which compromise the law and their legitimacy in the institution.

In this paper, the authors find normative and legal gaps through the critical analysis of the institutional design, political interference, and immunities limiting enforcement and avoidance of mechanisms that are supposed to deter violations. The study can be used to show that the lack of accountability is not an accident but a structural phenomenon, which is achieved by combining both empirical analysis and normative theory. It suggests analytical framework as a reconstruction of accountability in terms of measurable outcomes, reformative institutionalization and legal obligations. The aim of this framework is to avoid the recurrence of the past errors and enhance humanitarian security during the conflicts in the future.

1. Conceptual and Legal Framework

The analytical basis of this study lies in the fact that the main concepts defining institutional accountability in armed conflict have been defined accurately. The concept of accountability in international law implies that the conduct must be explained, that it should bear responsibility in case of breach and that it should be subject to punishment in terms of binding legal norms.¹ Legal accountability implies enforceable obligations and penalties as a result of treaties, customary international law and judicial mechanisms whereas moral accountability implies ethical obligations that, though defining normative expectations, do not in themselves lead to enforceable legal results.² According to the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), in case a state is unable or unwilling to stop atrocity crimes, the international community has a collective duty to protect the populations in question by taking relevant actions that they are authorized to take under the United Nations Charter.³ R2P is based on the principles of preventive, reactive, and rebuilding pillars that are rooted in the principles of the Charter, but are still subject to the political authorisation, to emphasise the tension between normative aspiration and forceful action.⁴ R2P is based

¹ J. L. Dunoff & M. A. Pollack, *International Law: Norms, Actors, Process* 45–46 (6th ed. 2020).

² Malcolm D. Evans, *International Law* 72–74 (5th ed. 2018).

³ U.N. Secretary-General, *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (2009).

⁴ U.N. Charter arts. 1–2.

on the non-coercive measures and considers the case of the use of force as a strictly authorised Charter measure to ensure the legality.⁵

The international humanitarian law (IHL), largely codified in the Geneva Conventions and associated protocols, places binding obligations on the parties involved in a conflict to prevent the loss of non-combatants and to regulate the conduct of hostilities in all circumstances.⁶ Complementary human rights obligations persist irrespective of armed conflict⁷, complementing the responsibility of a single institution in doing so, which is resulting in collective inaction or poor responses to account.⁸

The following conceptual differentiations, namely legal versus moral accountability, legal grounds upon which intervention and protection should be exercised, and the distribution of responsibility, create analytical parameters within the assessment of interaction of institutional structures, normative doctrines such as R2P, and operational behaviours to facilitate or restrict the accountability in contemporary armed conflict.

2. Historical and Contemporary Case Studies

2.1 Rwanda (1994): UNAMIR's Mandate and Structural Constraints

The 1994 Rwandan genocide provides an exemplary example of a significant lack of accountability that was based on structural and political limitations to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). Although the mission was preemptively warned of mass killings, it was not properly resourced and had a very limited mandate that focused on monitoring and facilitating cease fire rather than protecting civilians. The UN Secretariat and Security Council apparatus of decision making was incapable of taking action in response to field reports of genocide due to institutional inertia and political willlessness.⁹ In retrospect when high level reports looked into UN action they found lack of resources and lack of will as the key elements in preventing mass killings and they have highlighted the gap between the protective mandate of the UN and its performance in operation.¹⁰ The reduction of the troop presence of UNAMIR after the assassination of the peacekeepers was another illustration of how the accountability to the fundamental humanitarian goals were undermined by the institutional design and political calculations.¹¹

2.2 Srebrenica (1995): Safe Areas and Mandate vs. Action

The Srebrenica massacre is a vivid example of how unclear orders and lack of resources may lead to serious accountability failures. The enclave, a UN safe area was handed over to the Dutch peacekeepers (Dutchbat) under strict rules of engagement that restricted proactive defence against Bosnian Serb forces.¹² Although Serb troops surrounded the enclave and repeatedly breached safe area conditions, the authorisation to use robust intervention and close air support was never issued by the UN command, an

⁵ Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* 30–35 (6th ed. 2017).

⁶ Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

⁷ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

⁸ Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* (1970).

⁹ Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations in Relation to Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999) (finding lack of resources and will undermined UNAMIR).

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace* (2009) (noting international community's lack of accountability contributed to genocide).

¹¹ Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia* 68–71 (2008) (detailed withdrawal and constraint dynamics in peacekeeping, inferred from analyses of peacekeeping reductions).

¹² *Siege of Srebrenica*, Wikipedia (explaining safe area and Dutchbat constraints).

indication of political hesitation and inadaptable operational principles in peacekeeping bureaucracy.¹³ Over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were later killed, an early indicator of not only a failure in implementing the mandate, but also a mismatch between what the safe areas designation was supposed to signify and what it was actually doing.¹⁴

2.3 Syria (2011–Present): UN and ICC Challenges

The current crisis in Syria predetermines the political restrictions of the Security Council and the limitation of the international system of justice. Syria is not bound by the Rome Statute, which does not give it automatic ICC jurisdiction despite extensive reporting of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry.¹⁵ The attempts to get a Security Council referral to the ICC have been vetoed by permanent members, which is a testimony to the influence of geopolitical interests to block accountability avenues.¹⁶ Despite the fact that the UN has been involved in fact finding and reporting at a large scale, the capacity to implement sanctions or enforce compliance shows the discrepancy between normative documentation and enforceable accountability.¹⁷ Recent bloodshed, such as sectarian murders, also indicates that in the absence of strong referral or cooperation mechanisms, the criminals get away with their crimes before long, making the role of the UN more evidentiary than restorative.¹⁸

2.4 Yemen (2015–Present): ICRC and Humanitarian Operational Limits

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other related humanitarian groups play a significant role in mitigating the suffering of civilians in the ongoing conflict in Yemen but they are limited in their operations with accountability as a complication. The naval and air access controls by belligerents of the conflict has been a major impediment to humanitarian access which is the contrary to the requirement by international humanitarian law to facilitate relief.¹⁹ With little enforcement mechanisms to ensure parties adhere to humanitarian norms, the ICRC continues to be one of the few organisations that provide life saving assistance despite the fact that the wide accountability gap between the provision of humanitarian assistance and the provision of legal penalties to violations persists as humanitarian needs increase and the organisations providing such assistance become increasingly institutionalised and dependent on access.²⁰

In all these contexts, there is a tendency where requirement based on normative protection are continually undermined by scarcity of resources, political calculations and failure of structures- to create substantive accountability differences between institutional duties and ground level activities.

3. Structural and Political Constraints on Accountability

3.1 Organizational Design and Bureaucratic Fragmentation

The organizational structure of international organizations is entrenched with institutional failures in implementing accountability in the event of armed conflict. The hierarchies of bureaucracy, isolation of duties, and limited scope of operations tend to hinder the process of timely decision-making and consistent

¹³ Netherlands Institute of War Documentation NIOD Report (UN's failure to provide air support and constrain engagement).

¹⁴ Id. (Srebrenica killings of 8,000 Bosniaks).

¹⁵ Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (UNHRC reports documenting violations 2011–2025).

¹⁶ Attempted UN Security Council referrals to ICC in Syria have repeatedly been vetoed.

¹⁷ See Reuters coverage on ongoing conflict violence and UN reporting.

¹⁸ AP News on ongoing failure to deliver justice after sectarian killings.

¹⁹ ICRC: Restrictions on humanitarian access in Yemen impact relief.

²⁰ ICRC operations in Yemen demonstrating limited enforcement capacity.

action.²¹ The restriction in the form of mandates, as was experienced in the UN peacekeeping operations, often limits such operations to observation, reporting, or facilitating ceasefires without the provision of essential protective services.²² The division of responsibilities among the departments, i.e. political, operational, and humanitarian, results in the loss of control in the chain of accountability, whereby none of the offices has overall responsibility to prevent or respond to any violation. Such structural fragmentation creates a diffusion of responsibility which resembles the conceptual bystander effect, which diminishes institutional drive to act and makes retrospective evaluation of failures more difficult to perform.²³

3.2 Political Interference and Member-State Influence

The institutional accountability is heavily influenced by political dynamics. The veto authority of the UN Security Council gives its permanent members the capability to block enforcement efforts, such as imposing sanctions or referring to the International Criminal Court, making the normative mandates second to the national interests.²⁴ Dependence on funding also increases the effects of political influence whereby significant donors might make their support conditional to adherence to their geopolitical interests.²⁵ Decision-making therefore tends to be reactive, limited, or selectively used and the accountability principle is weakened, as well as tendencies towards impunity strengthened, when interventions conflict with strategic interests.²⁶

3.3 Operational Constraints and Field Realities

Accountability is constrained even in cases where strong mandates are in place due to realities of operations, including limited access to humanitarian aid, lack of security in the field, and the need to depend on local actors.²⁷ Logistical and security constraints and obstacles also impede the complete application of the law or normative requirements by peacekeepers, monitors, and humanitarian workers, undermining the enforcement mechanisms and making it clear that the normative power is not entirely matched by the practicality of action.²⁸

3.4 Limitations of Soft Accountability Mechanisms

The international law is mostly based on the use of soft accountability measures such as reporting, peer review and moral censure, as opposed to imposing binding enforcers.²⁹ These mechanisms assume cooperation of states and voluntary compliance, which makes institutions reliant on actors who may gain out of non-compliance.³⁰ As a result, bureaucratic fragmentation, political interference and operational constraints are combined in a systematic manner to weaken institutional capacity to transform mandates into enforceable accountability and creates a systematic discrepancy between legal norms and field realities.

²¹ J.L. Dunoff & M.A. Pollack, *International Law: Norms, Actors, Process* 48–50 (6th ed. 2020).

²² Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations in Relation to Rwanda, UN Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999).

²³ Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* (1970).

²⁴ U.N. Charter art. 27(3); see also William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, *Private Enforcement of International Law?* 38 *Yale J. Int'l L.* 1, 23–25 (2013).

²⁵ Paul D. Williams, *Fighting for Peace in Somalia* 68–70 (2008).

²⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace* 12–15 (2009).

²⁷ ICRC, *Humanitarian Access in Conflict Zones* (2025), <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/humanitarian-access>.

²⁸ Yoram Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* 33–35 (6th ed. 2017).

²⁹ Burall & Neligan, *The Accountability of International Organizations* 6–10 (2005).

³⁰ Malcolm D. Evans, *International Law* 74–76 (5th ed. 2018).

4. Normative and Ethical Analysis

4.1 Ethical Obligations versus Legal Mandates

The international organizations are at the confluence of moral requirements and formal legal roles, and the two frequently create a normative conflict. Although the UN Charter, Geneva Conventions, and Rome Statute provide legal requirements on the extent of action that can be taken, ethical requirements, based on humanitarian principles and the moral obligation to alleviate suffering, will insist on taking proactive action in cases where the law is not clear on the action that may be undertaken.³¹ The mismatch between the law and what is ethically right creates an enduring ethics-law gap that puts institutions under scrutiny of doing things that are within the law yet not ethical in nature.³²

4.2 Neutrality and Intervention

The concept of neutrality, especially in humanitarian agencies like the ICRC, serves as a form of defense mechanism and also as a limiting element in terms of ethics.³³ Though impartiality allows easy access to the affected populations, it can hinder intervention in the situations of mass atrocities, causing ethical dilemma when compliance with the concept of neutrality leads to the avoidable civilian casualties. This conflict shows how challenging it may be to balance principled humanitarian behavior with the needs of human protection since maintaining neutrality may contribute to structural inaction unintentionally.³⁴

4.3 Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Promise and Limits

The R2P doctrine is theoretically the solution to the gap between sovereignty and moral responsibility and it creates a normative framework to justify intervention when states are unable to defend their citizens.³⁵ Although it has potential, political bargaining, and Security Council vetoes as well as interpretive ambiguity limit R2P application, leading to selective application and normative invalidity.³⁶ These constraints depict that though ethically convincing, R2P is reliant on the state-based political processes, thus reducing its effectiveness in practical terms.

4.4 Ethical Consequences of Inaction

Inaction in response to the ethical imperative has far-reaching impacts: mass civilian fatalities, loss of institutional credibility, and a loss of confidence in international governance are just a few of them.³⁷ The continued lack of action is an indication of implicit acceptance of lawbreaking and may lead to the normalization of impunity and undermining of the moral authority of international institutions.³⁸ Ethical analysis, therefore, proves that accountability cannot be evaluated on the basis of legal compliance alone but moral responsibility and social costs of institutional inertia should also be taken into consideration.

5. Accountability Mechanisms: Evaluating Effectiveness

5.1 UN Internal Accountability Structures

The United Nations has put in place internal processes geared towards making the institutions accountable, especially the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and regular reviews of peacekeeping.³⁹ OIOS

³¹ J.L. Dunoff & M.A. Pollack, *International Law: Norms, Actors, Process* 49–50 (6th ed. 2020).

³² Van Steenberghe, *Human Rights Norms and Armed Conflict*, 94 *Int'l Rev. Red Cross* 321, 325 (2012).

³³ ICRC, *Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement* (2024), <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/fundamental-principles>.

³⁴ Safdar et al., *Humanitarian Neutrality and Operational Dilemmas*, 15 *J. Humanitarian Action* 101, 108 (2023).

³⁵ United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect ¶3*, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (2009).

³⁶ Alex J. Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect and the International Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* 77–79 (2015).

³⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Selling Justice Short: Why Accountability Matters for Peace* 12–13 (2009).

³⁸ Burall & Neligan, *The Accountability of International Organizations* 8–9 (2005).

³⁹ U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services, *Annual Report 2024*, <https://www.un.org/oios>.

offers auditing, assessment and investigations of administrative and operational behavior, which brings clarity and remedial suggestions.⁴⁰ Peacekeeping reviews evaluate the performance of the missions, the compliance with the mandates, and the observance of the international humanitarian law.⁴¹ These structures offer procedural control, but, in most cases, they do not have a binding enforcement power, but instead resort to recommendations instead of direct sanctions, which limits their ability to avert systemic breakdown or direct responsibility of operational failures.⁴²

5.2 International Criminal Court and Ad Hoc Tribunals

ICC and ad hoc tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia represent legal responsibility of those committing mass atrocities to perpetrators of mass atrocities.⁴³ Their normative importance is not accompanied by their practical applicability due to limited jurisdiction, selective cooperation between the states, and political interference, such as the vetoes of the Security Council or non-ratification of the Rome Statute.⁴⁴ Such constraints lead to disproportionate prosecution, whereby leaders in high profile positions are usually shielded against accountability, which is both legislative and institutional lapses in the enforcement of the law.⁴⁵ Additionally, the judicial procedures are complicated and lack resources, which further reduces the timely deterrence.⁴⁶

5.3 Non-State Actors and NGOs

Non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society groups play a role in accountability by advocating, monitoring and reporting to the people.⁴⁷ They act as external watchdogs, recording violations, lobbying internationally and promoting transparency.⁴⁸ But their powers to force action are limited in nature; they are dependent on morality and social pressure instead of coercion.⁴⁹ They can affect structural accountability gaps in state-led or international institutional frameworks in this manner, but not adequately.

5.4 Persistent Gaps and Structural Limitations

In combination, the current mechanisms demonstrate that there are still loopholes: leaders of political regimes are unpunished, selective implementation with geopolitical factors, and no binding penalties against failures in the institutions in question.⁵⁰ Although frameworks are present, their success depends on the political will, cooperation between states, and the allocation of resources, which implies a structural weakness of the accountability regimes on a global level that contributes to the conflict between the normative ideal and operational reality.

6. Towards Reform: Enhancing Accountability

6.1 Strengthening Legal Mandates

The initial reform should be to have legally binding accountability clauses concerning international operations especially peacekeeping operations.⁵¹ Inclusion of explicit commitment to observance of

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ United Nations, *Peacekeeping Performance Review*, U.N. Doc. DPKO/2019/REV.1 (2019).

⁴² William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, *Private Enforcement of International Law?* 25 *Yale J. Int'l L.* 1, 17–18 (2013).

⁴³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5–10, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

⁴⁴ Alex J. Bellamy, *The Responsibility to Protect and the International Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* 82–84 (2015).

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Accountability Deferred: Political Leaders and Impunity* 7–10 (2020).

⁴⁶ William Schabas, *An Introduction to the International Criminal Court* 112–115 (5th ed. 2021).

⁴⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, *NGO Reporting and Advocacy in Armed Conflicts* 15–16 (2022).

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Burall & Neligan, *The Accountability of International Organizations* 9–10 (2005).

⁵⁰ Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* 40–42 (6th ed. 2017).

⁵¹ Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* 41–42 (6th ed. 2017).

humanitarian law and provision of clear consequences in case of failures would convert the current soft accountability into hard commitments.⁵² These should include clear lines of command, division of duties in regard to civilian protection and means of recourse in instances of institutional failures to prevent ambiguity that historically creates slack or selective application.⁵³

6.2 Independent Oversight Mechanisms

The establishment of hybrid review boards that incorporate both international and national actors is an alternative way to provide an avenue to unbiased oversight.⁵⁴ The mechanisms would be independent of political structures, they would assess mission performance, compliance with mandates, and operational decisions and they could have legal powers to prescribe corrective actions.⁵⁵ The inclusion of cross-jurisdictional expertise enhances legitimacy, reduces the politics and makes sure that accountability goes further than the procedural auditing to substantive evaluation of results.⁵⁶

6.3 Integrating Civil Society and Victims' Perspectives

The civil society organizations and the populations affected by the operational assessments should be systematically incorporated in the assessment process.⁵⁷ Such an inclusion helps to make institutional assessments more responsive to on-the-ground realities, to highlight the unnoticed violations and to highlight the moral urgency of legal requirements.⁵⁸ Community-international body feedbacks can enhance transparency, legitimacy and design of intervention strategies that are responsive to civilian needs and not necessarily institutional interests only.⁵⁹

6.4 Linking Funding and Performance

Tying the financial resources to the proven compliance and effectiveness could strengthen accountability.⁶⁰ Conditional funding establishes some incentives on proactive compliance with legal and normative standards, preventing the risk of underperformance in the missions because of the lack of resources or political discretion.⁶¹ This model operationalizes accountability by making it tangible such that it increases preventative and corrective capacity.

6.5 Predictive and Proactive Strategies

Lastly, predictive analytics and early-warning systems can be incorporated so that international bodies respond proactively instead of reactive to the crisis.⁶² Preventing the escalation of conflict and positioning resources in strategic ways can help institutions to better meet ethical and legal obligations and minimize civilian casualties as well as rebuild trust in global governance systems.

All these reforms together offer a consistent roadmap of making the international bodies to be more than mere spectators of armed conflict, but responsible guardians thereof.

7. Conclusion

The discussion shows that the international organizations, such as the UN, ICRC and ICC have existed in

⁵² Burke-White & von Staden, *Private Enforcement of International Law?* 19–20, 25 Yale J. Int'l L. 1 (2013).

⁵³ Peters, *The Constitutionalization of International Organizations* 98–100 (2016).

⁵⁴ Yamamoto, *International Organization Accountability and Apologies* 140–42 (2024).

⁵⁵ Burall & Neligan, *The Accountability of International Organizations* 12–13 (2005).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ International Federation for Human Rights, *NGO Reporting and Advocacy in Armed Conflicts* 17 (2022).

⁵⁸ Safdar et al., *Humanitarian Neutrality and Operational Dilemmas*, 15 J. Humanitarian Action 103, 107 (2023).

⁵⁹ Van Steenberghe, *Human Rights Norms and Armed Conflict*, 94 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 321, 329 (2012).

⁶⁰ Human Rights Watch, *Accountability Deferred: Political Leaders and Impunity* 9–10 (2020).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Arkin, *War Algorithms and Predictive Responsibility* 12–14, arXiv:1609.04667 (2016).

an unending tussle between their protective interests and politics.⁶³ Empirical case studies, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Syria, and Yemen, demonstrate some common trends of structural constraints, political interference, and operational constraints in preventing the fulfillment of legal and normative duties.⁶⁴ The study is valuable as it is a systematic mapping of these failures, accountability gaps, and the way that the institutional design, political power, and moral responsibility interact with each other.⁶⁵ The paper also illuminates that the existing accountability mechanisms, such as internal control, tribunals and advocacy by civil society, though normatively important, lack sufficient enforcement power, selectivity and voluntariness of enforcement, and accountability depends on voluntary cooperation.⁶⁶ Normative and ethical evaluations highlight that inaction has a far-reaching impact: civilian casualties, loss of legitimacy, and lack of trust in international governance are some of its effects.⁶⁷

Devoid of structural changes, enforceable legal requirements, non-governmental control, assimilation of civil society, and active intervention policies, international institutions can become mere observers instead of enforcers of humanitarian and legal standards.⁶⁸ The need to address these deficits is not simply a dream, but it is necessary to preserve the international law, defend civilian populations, and reestablish institutional credibility in violent situations in armed conflicts situations.⁶⁹ The right reform will make the normative ideals consistent with operational accountability, where the international bodies are able to carry out their legal, moral, and ethical duties in a manner that is consistent with the law.⁷⁰

⁶³ Peters, *The Constitutionalization of International Organizations* 98–100 (2016).

⁶⁴ United Nations, *Peacekeeping Performance Review*, U.N. Doc. DPKO/2019/REV.1 (2019).

⁶⁵ Safdar et al., *Humanitarian Neutrality and Operational Dilemmas*, 15 *J. Humanitarian Action* 103, 107 (2023).

⁶⁶ Burke-White & von Staden, *Private Enforcement of International Law?* 19–20, 25 *Yale J. Int'l L.* 1 (2013).

⁶⁷ Van Steenberghe, *Human Rights Norms and Armed Conflict*, 94 *Int'l Rev. Red Cross* 321, 329 (2012).

⁶⁸ Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence* 41–42 (6th ed. 2017).

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch, *Accountability Deferred: Political Leaders and Impunity* 9–10 (2020).

⁷⁰ Burall & Neligan, *The Accountability of International Organizations* 12–13 (2005).