

# Catalysing Parity: The Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam (नारी शक्ति वंदन अधिनियम) and Its Projected Impact on India's Global Gender Indices

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## Abstract

India's rank of 131 out of 148 in the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) by the World Economic Forum (2025) indicates that there is political ineffectiveness rather than cultural differences behind the country's GGGI parity score of 64.1% and the continued downward trend of its female parliamentary representation at 13.8%, which is 30% below the worldwide standard for female representation in politics.

This paper contended that the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam 'नारी शक्ति वंदन अधिनियम' (NSVA), as articulated in the Constitution (106th Amendment) Act to the Constitution (2023), represents the most important policy option for India to reverse its declining trend across multiple gender-positive indices compared to other countries. The study applied a triangulated methodological framework consisting of: (a) decomposing sub-indices of the GGGI, the UNDP Gender Inequality Index (GII), and the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI); (b) conducting cross-national comparative research on quota-adopting states (Rwanda, Argentina, Bolivia, Nordic Bloc) and India's own 73rd Constitutional Amendment initiative relative to its democratic institutions of local governance (or Panchayati Raj Institutions) to support longitudinal evidence of a change in the standings of the Indian population if all components of the NSVA are implemented. In conclusion, the data-driven projections of India's future rankings in gender- and social-based comparisons with the world based upon the anticipated full implementation of the NSVA are outlined.

The paper shows that successful enactment of 33% parliamentary reservations in combination with appropriate legislative support structures has the ability to increase India's Political Empowerment sub-index score by about 28–35 percent points – an increase that is substantial enough to allow a move up of about 20–30 ranks within the GGGI as well as a reduction of the GII value by a substantial margin. The paper goes on to show how this 'ripple effect' translates into increased success for economic participation,

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health, and education these are the other three sub-indices in which India trails badly. Further results as increased political empowerment.

**Keywords:** Gender positive indices, Global Gender Gap Index, India, Gender Inequality Index, Nari Shakti Vandan Adhinyam, Ripple effect.

## Introduction

India is a unique case when it comes to the international development discourse. On one hand, it featured one female Prime Minister and is the world's fifth largest economy based on nominal GDP; while on the other hand, it is near the bottom of every major global gender parity index. In 2025, India was ranked at 131 of 148 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) with an average gender parity score below 65%. Furthermore, female representation in Parliament decreased from 14.7% in 2024 to 13.8% in 2025 thereby negatively affecting India's Political Empowerment index score and resulting in India's two-place drop to 129th position.

Therefore, this paper does not debate whether India has a gender gap since data shows clearly that there is one present. The question remains, what specific policy / policy level / mechanism can create the most structural change with measurable improvements in the shortest defensible period of time? The proposed answer with supporting quantitative evidence for this paper is the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhinyam (NSVA), or the Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023.

During the first general elections in India, held in 1951-52, more than 2.8 million women were disqualified from voting because they were identified on the voter lists by their male family members (e.g., "A's mother" or "B's wife"), rather than their own names. This initial loss of representation has preceded similar patterns of erasure throughout the political realm. Although the level of participation by women has evolved into something more normative over time, the level of descriptive representation in the legislature for women has not progressed similarly. Women represented just 4.5% (22 members) of the first Lok Sabha (i.e., lower house of Parliament). Since then, women have represented a minimal and slow increase to 10.9% (59 members elected) in 2009; 14.4% (78 members) in 2019, and a regression to 13.8% (74 members) in the 18th Lok Sabha, after the general elections held during 2024.

The passage of the NSVA provides a minimum of 33% of the total number of seats in the Lok Sabha, all State Legislative Assemblies, and the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall be reserved for women. While such a provision is historic in light of the 27-year history of legislative efforts to achieve this reform, the NSVA will also function to structurally accomplish a significant change in the political-representational structure of Indias. Thus, this paper will evaluate the NSVA as an objective measure and conceptual variable instead of a normative ideological position, from which the resulting effects of the Act on gender indices can be quantified, projected, and subsequently planned for.

## Literature Review

According to Drude Dahlerup (1988), females need a certain number (usually a minimum of 30%) in order for them to have any significant impact on influence such as policy decisions; otherwise they will tend to conform to the cultures that are dominated by men. This 'critical mass' model sets an objective number as opposed to any arbitrary reason for it, which will allow females in particular to be able to create coalitions as well as resist being marginalized, and provide for an avenue to develop agendas. Females can take advantage of having 33% representation within NSVA because it has been determined that there is

sufficient empirical evidence to support this figure based on the international standard set by the Beijing Platform for Action (1995).

Subsequent studies by Childs & Krook (2008) and Clayton & Zetterberg (2018) on the empirical extensions of the Critical Mass Theory have also indicated a so-called “Tipping Point” and have outlined that once the critical mass has been reached then there will no longer be any normative barriers to participating as females in political systems below this level; the behaviour of political parties will also begin to shift voluntarily, and create a self-perpetuating cycle of increased female candidate, success in elections, and the effect of role models. The examples from India’s Panchayati Raj Institutions discussed in section 7 provide one of the best natural experiments for testing the Critical Mass Theory internationally.

However, a further theoretical perspective on policy-making that is related yet distinctly separate from the above discussed theories is the theory of policy feedback (Pierson, 1993; Mettler and SoRelle, 2014). This perspective holds that policy not only reacts to certain socio-political realities but also shapes them. Once a policy measure comes into effect, it establishes its own interest group, becomes entrenched institutionally, and manifests itself in terms of second-order effects. Thus, once implemented, the NSVA will constitute a feedback instrument as well.

**India’s Underperformance and Auditing the Sub-Indices**

This part highlights how NVSA can be a game changer after proper analysis of three major gender indices and even segregating their sub-indices. This will identify the structural deficits that NVSA will address directly or through downstream mechanism.

**A. Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI) by WEF**

The World Economic Forum’s GGGI is designed on four sub-indices that measures gender parity and they are not absolute conditions. India’s performance across these sub-indices especially in 2025 reflects deeply uneven landscape:

Sub-Index	India Score (2025)	India Rank (2025)	Global Average	Top Performer
Economic Participation & Opportunity	40.7%	142nd	64.5%	Iceland (88.5%)
Educational Attainment	97.1%	112th	95.2%	Multiple (100%)
Health & Survival	~94.8%	142nd	97.4%	Multiple (98%)
Political Empowerment	~27.3%	65th	26.1%	Iceland (69.3%)
<b>COMPOSITE SCORE</b>	<b>64.1%</b>	<b>131st / 148</b>	<b>68.5%</b>	<b>Iceland (93.5%)</b>

*Source: WEF Global Gender Gap Report 2025. Scores represent degree of parity achieved (1 = full parity). Health rank reflects relative sex-ratio disadvantages. Political Empowerment rank benefits from historical female heads-of-state weighting.*

The numbers in Table 1 reveal a glaring disparity: India scores average or above average in Political Empowerment (65th) and near-parity in Educational Attainment; yet India scores disastrously low in Economic Participation (142nd) and Health & Survival (142nd). This apparent anomaly of being rated 65th in politics but 131st overall is explained by the fact that the Political Empowerment sub-index is highly sensitive to India's past experience of women heads of state, boosting the sub-index even when female parliamentary representation is lamentably poor at 13.8%.

More alarming, indeed, is the fact that there was actually a decline in women's representation in the parliament, from 14.7% in 2024 to 13.8% in 2025. Without effective intervention, therefore, the natural trend is not for improvement but deterioration. Note that the Political Empowerment sub-index has a weightage of 25%.

**B. Gender Inequality Index (GII) by UNDP**

The GII index by the UNDP measures gender inequality on three indicators, namely reproductive health (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent fertility rate), empowerment (political power, as indicated by female share in parliament, and education level), and economic participation. While the GII is a measure of absolute disadvantages as compared to the GGGI and therefore cannot be redundant, the fact that India ranks lower than the average global figure for women's representation in parliament at 13.8%, while the figure worldwide is above 27%, automatically skews its GII score (higher being less equal).

**C. Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) by OECD**

SIGI indicators of OECD assess discriminatory social institutions, such as laws, customs, and practices which limit the freedom and rights of women. India is ranked among medium to high discrimination SIGI sub-categories, where physical integrity, access to resources, and productive resources remain limited for women. In this case, the role of SIGI becomes relevant because women legislators in power have the ability to formulate favorable policies for women.

**D. Gaps where India Loses its Ranking points**

Disaggregating further within the Political Empowerment sub-index, India's specific vulnerabilities in 2024–25 are:

Indicator	India Value	Global Average	30% Parity Benchmark
Women in Parliament (Lok Sabha, 2025)	13.8%	27.0%	30%
Women in State Assemblies (avg, 2025)	~9.0%	n/a	30%
Women in Ministerial Positions	5.6%	22.8%	30%
Female Candidates Fielded (2024 LS)	9.5%	~25%	30%
Years with Female Head of State (50-yr)	15 years	~8 yrs	—

Sources: WEF GGGI 2025; IPU Parline Database 2025; ECI 2024 Lok Sabha Results; Ministry of Statistics, India 2025. Ministerial data reflects Union Cabinet composition.

## History of Legislative Struggle of Women's Political Representation

The notion of legislated quotas for females in India is not new, dating back to the 1932 report by the Indian Franchise Committee, but was ignored by the Constituent Assembly when debating the Constitution itself. After the enactment of the transformational 73rd and 74th amendments in 1992, providing for 1/3 of seats within Panchayati Raj institutions (local councils) and Urban Local bodies (established to facilitate democratic representation at the municipal level), there has been renewed energy behind a push to secure 1/3 of seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Parliament of India) for women. As of today, over 1.45 million women currently serve as elected representatives within the various tiers of local governance; surpassing the world average, and representing an enormous source of talent for future female leaders and role models. Unfortunately, however, this pipeline has been maliciously blocked at both state and national levels. The 81st Constitutional Amendment Bill was introduced in 1996 in order to reserve 1/3 of seats in the Lok Sabha for women. A Joint Parliamentary Committee led by Geeta Mukherjee reviewed the 1996 Bill and produced several recommendations including the proposed introduction of a 15-year sunset clause on women's reservation; and sub-reservations for Anglo-Indians.

However, these attempts were met with stiff resistance, and the bills died out after their respective Lok Sabhas got dissolved. In particular, the 2008 bill was sent to the Standing Committee on Law and Justice, whose inability to arrive at an agreement stemmed mainly from the demands of dissenting members for a sub-quota for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). This deadlock finally precipitated the adoption of the 106th amendment Bill in September 2023. The Rajya Sabha unanimously adopted the bill with 214 votes in its favor and zero against, mandating a 33 percent horizontal quota for women, with sub-quotas for SCs and STs. However, the victory has been predicated on a condition, viz. implementation subject to the next census and delimitation, which has set off a constitutional crisis.

Therefore, implementation of the NSVA scheme will occur only after the fulfillment of two preconditions which are: (i) the conclusion of the very first census carried out after the Act comes into force and the date is set as 1st March 2027, and (ii) the redrawing of the demarcations of parliamentary and state assembly constituencies following the results of the census.

For the index analysis, it is important to note that the effect of the NSVA on the value of the index will occur only after 2029, when the next Lok Sabha is elected.

## How Political Representation moves Other Indices

The sophisticated public policy analysis of the NSVA cannot be limited to the direct index effects, which are simply the increased parliamentary representation scores, and should extend to the indirect or second-order effects that comparative experience demonstrates will build up on all four indices. One can refer this as the "ripple architecture" of political representation.

### A. Political Representation influencing Economic Participation

The country with the highest economic opportunity and participation score, India ranks 142nd out of 148 in terms of total population and economic opportunity with an Economic Participation and Opportunity score of 40.7%, so it is one of the lowest ranked and most difficult countries globally. There are many ways in which political representation can affect economic participation and measurable outcomes.

Firstly, women legislators prioritizing policies on the legislative agenda that improve women's economic opportunities, evidenced through empirical data; (Bhalotra & Clots-Figueras, 2014) Twenty OECD countries investigating the increase of women within the legislature revealed that a 10% increase in women's legislative representation is correlated with an increase in female labour force participation over

a period of 5 years of 2.7%. Therefore, for India; if 33% of parliament is represented by female legislators, then based on OECD countries, one would expect this will result in measurable increases in labour force participation rates over 1 term of office for parliament.

The second is public expenditure structure: evidence from the state-level variation within India reveals that states which have a greater proportion of females in legislative positions spend more social expenditure on women's Self-Help Groups, MSME credit schemes, and training programs that boost their participation in the labor force (PRS Legislative Research, 2022).

The third one is minimum wages and equal pay enforcement by women legislators: countries around the world where there were high numbers of women representatives in the legislature showed better enforcement of equal pay for work of equal value legislation. India's wage inequality of earning only Rs. 39.8 for every Rs. 100 earned by men is the factor reducing Economic Participation sub-index score.

### ***B. Political Representation influencing Education Attainment***

India's impressive 97.1% educational attainment rate does not reflect the vast internal diversity that characterised the country. Consequently, while India has the highest secondary enrolment equality in the world (39), with many other countries scoring 59 or below. However, the country is ranked 105th for tertiary enrolment and leads 124th on its overall literacy rate globally. The pathways through which political representation influences educational outcomes follow: Women legislators are found to promote female tertiary education through public funding, where India exhibits an especially large fall for educational attainment results when compared with other nations. Internationally, cross-national data show that there is a negative correlation between a 10% increase in female parliamentary representation and a 1.2% decrease in the gap between female and male students in tertiary education within 10 years of female MPs being elected to parliament. Domestically, Beaman et al. (2012) conducted a randomised control experiment in West Bengal Gram Panchayats that indicates that female villagers in villages with reserved leader positions had greater aspirations for and achievement of education than their male counterparts when considering educational attainment and aspirations; i.e. they experience a role model effect with substantial educational outcome-associated benefits at scale.

### ***C. Political Representation influencing Health Statistics***

The structural problem for India is that of health and survival, ranked at 142, due to disparities in sex-ratio at birth and healthy life expectancy. There are however, clear legal avenues for change:

First, health and reproduction: female members of parliament are more likely to support health budgets. Research on Panchayati Raj institutions in India has found that there is a strong positive correlation between women being GP leaders and better immunisation coverage, delivery in hospital, and supplementing nutrition for pregnant women, which influence health indicators directly.

Second, female foeticide and the sex-ratio: focusing on legislation against foetal sex-selection during pregnancy has had greater impact when carried out by women politicians and targets the sex-ratio at birth directly, an indicator which continues to structurally impede India within the health category of the GGGI index.

In addition to the four sub-indices, there is an additional channel that has been proven to exist though difficult to measure, that of the "symbolic" effect, whereby the existence of women politicians brings about a shift in society's norms regarding women's agency. Experiments done in India's Panchayat system have revealed that within five to ten years after the introduction of the policy, there is a noticeable decrease in discrimination against women in positions of power – a shift that is replicated across all measures in the gender indices.

## Case Study Analysis of Quota Nations

The international experience of using legislative gender quotas in around 90 countries, which operate under different constitutions, cultures, and economic systems, serves as the best case study material for predicting India's future course after NSVA. This section examines four comparison groups.

### A. *The Case of Rwanda*

Rwanda is an excellent case study for examining the relationship between gender quotas in political representation and the ranking of countries by the Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI). The Genocide of 1994 resulted in massive loss of life and much of the number of women in Rwanda. As a measure to ensure a better future for women in Rwanda, the 2003 Constitution mandated that women be allocated a minimum of 30% of all positions in decision-making bodies. As of 2008, women represented 56% of members of the government's elected legislature (the highest percentage in the world), a number that has now risen to over 61% as of 2009.

As a result, Rwanda has made impressive strides in terms of improved ranking due to women in government: Its GGGI ranking (as of 2019) moved from outside the top 40 to the 5th highest internationally, and has maintained a position within the top 10 GGGI ranking (of 146 countries) every year since. The Political Empowerment sub-index (the GGGI score for countries based on female access to government) is also among the highest ranking by GGGI internationally. Rwanda has shown that implementing a quota for women in decision-making can result in a substantial upward movement in international rankings, with an upward movement of 30+ GGGI ranks within a 10-year period.

It is particularly interesting to compare Rwanda with India. The results of Rwanda's high ranking on the Political Empowerment sub-index have been driven mainly by the political sub-index scores, while its Economic Participation scores have been significantly lower than the GGGI Political Empowerment score. Thus, the data suggests that increases in political representation based on quotas will positively impact the improvement of the Political Empowerment sub-index in the short-term, but that improvements in the Economic and Health sub-indexes will lag from the effects of quota-driven improvements due to the architecture of ripple effects, by 5-15 years.

### B. *Latin Americas and their Parity Laws*

Colombia (rank in 21st GGGI 2024), Costa Rica (48th), and Honduras (42nd) enacted gender quotas by 2000. All three countries saw continuing improvement on the GGGI throughout multiple versions of the Index. Colombia and Costa Rica exceed 50% female representation in their legislatures (because of equality laws that exceed the 30% threshold).

The pattern that has emerged from these countries is that implementation of gender quotas resulted in an immediate and substantial increase in the Political Empowerment sub-index followed by smaller, incremental gains in Economic Participation over the course of 8-12 years.

Argentina provides an excellent example for how to motivate/implement similar systems in India. The 1991 Ley de Cupos (Quota Law) in Argentina mandated that each political party include a minimum of 30% of women on their candidate lists. Within two legislative cycles, this resulted in a 15% increase in the number of women in the national legislature, a corresponding increase in the Political Empowerment score on the GGGI, and, perhaps most importantly, the passage of critical female-initiated legislation, such as pay equity, maternity leave, and domestic violence, in order to improve their Economic Participation and Health scores.

### C. *Nordic Case of Voluntary Party Quotas*

The Nordics — Iceland (1st), Finland (2nd), Norway (3rd), Sweden (5th) — obtained their GGGI status

on account of a combination of voluntary quotas by political parties, high quality welfare states, and social norm development and not constitutional requirements. This fact often becomes an argument against the requirement of reservations. The response to India's situation is based on its structure – the Nordics succeeded in increasing their representation in a completely different social setting, where women had a completely different baseline for participating politically. In the Lok Sabha elections of 2024, only 9.5% of candidates were women.

Country	Quota Type	Female Parl. %	GGGI Rank	GGGI Trend
Rwanda	Constitutional (30%+)	61%	Top 5–10	↑ Dramatic
Bolivia	Parity Law (50%)	~55%	25th	↑ Strong
Argentina	Legislated Quota (30%)	~43%	41st	↑ Moderate
Iceland	Voluntary + Social Norms	~48%	1st	↑ Sustained
India (Current)	No national quota (yet)	13.8%	131st	↓ Declining
<b>India (Post-NSVA Projected)</b>	<b>Constitutional (33%)</b>	<b>33%+</b>	<b>100–110th (est.)</b>	<b>↑ Projected</b>

Sources: IPU Parline Database 2025; WEF GGGI 2024–2025; International IDEA Gender Quotas Database 2025. Projections for India

#### D. South Asian Benchmark: Bangladesh

Perhaps the sharpest example is that of Bangladesh, which was ranked at number 24 in the GGGI 2025, although its GDP per capita was even less than that of India. Bangladesh scores very highly on political empowerment because of the presence of parliamentary reservations and women in parliament, along with previous experience of female heads of governments. Bangladesh proves that a South Asian sociocultural environment is no obstacle to rising in the GGGI rankings due to female political empowerment; it is just India's problem, not fate.

#### Post-NSVA Index Trajectory for India

The projections that follow have been generated using a combination of methodologies: (i) mechanistic modeling for how the individual scores of the sub-indices are impacted by the GGGI sub-index weightage along with the parametric influence of representation in parliament; (ii) comparative analysis in relation to the quota paths followed in the case of Rwanda, Argentina, and Bangladesh; and (iii) internal calibration based on the data collected for the PRI project.

#### A. Direct Impact of Political Empowerment

The GGGI Political Empowerment sub-index uses three indicators to represent political empowerment for

women: (a) women in parliaments — weighted the most heavily; (b) women in ministerial positions; and (c) historical years (50-year average) where there has been a female head of state for a given country. India's sub-index score is predominantly based on (c) the historical experience of having female heads of state, while the indicators for (a) and (b) are dramatically lower.

As a result of NSVA being operationalised after the 2029 elections: Female representation in parliament would automatically increase from approximately ~13.8% to at least 33% (i.e. an increase by at least ~19 percentage points). That movement (assuming no other changes occur) would raise the parity score for the parliamentary indicator on the GGGI 0-1 scale from approximately 0.51 to approximately 0.82. Therefore, if female representation in parliament increased by 19% (keeping all independent variables constant), the Political Empowerment sub-index score would increase from approximately 28 to 35 percentage points (based only on this category); thus taking India out of its current ranking of approximately 65 (which includes the historical experiences of female heads of state) to an estimated top 40 - 50 globally, based only on the Political Empowerment sub-index.

**B. Composite Score and Rank Projection**

Scenario	Political Empowerment	Economic Part.	Composite Score	Est. GGGI Rank
Baseline (2025, No NSVA)	~27.3%	40.7%	<b>64.1%</b>	<b>131st</b>
Scenario A: NSVA Direct Effect Only (Post-2029)	~55–60%	40.7%	~67–68%	~105–115th
Scenario B: NSVA + Complementary Policies (5 yrs)	~55–60%	~45%	~69–71%	~95–105th
<b>Scenario C: NSVA + Full Ripple Realisation (10 yrs)</b>	~60%+	~50%+	~73–75%	~80–90th

*Note: Projections are model-based estimates using GGGI weighting methodology and comparative quota trajectory data. Actual outcomes depend on implementation quality, complementary policy measures, and structural economic conditions. Scenarios A–C do not modify Education or Health sub-index assumptions beyond natural trend continuation.*

From Table above, the projections show that even the most pessimistic scenario - direct impact from NSVA only, with no other policy actions complementing it - shows an expected rise in ranks to the level of 20+. If complemented by full supportive policies and if we allow for a 10-year period, 40-50 ranks should be easily achievable.

**Challenges and Counter Evidence**

A rigorous analysis must engage honestly with the evidential challenges to the paper's central argument. Many people argue against legislative gender quotas by claiming that reserved seats for women lead to the appointment of "token" representatives who simply toe the party line and do nothing to promote women's policy concerns. However, research has produced mixed results on this question. Looking

specifically at the experience of Indian Local government, it has been found that although proxy and token representatives are generally found during the first term of reserved seat incumbents, they decrease significantly over subsequent terms. Observational studies conducted in multiple countries show that women legislators in reserved seat systems consistently introduce and vote for more women's related legislation than their male counterparts, regardless of whether they are formally aligned with a party (IPU, 2019). Therefore, there are still overall recommended policies for improving women's legislative ability, not abolishing the reservation legislation.

The problem with such a conditionally dependent model as the NSVA is that delays in the census and delimitation process will lead to a delay in implementing the NSVA provisions. Specifically, should either of the census and delimitation processes get delayed past 2027 or 2028, then the 2029 implementation period shall have passed, resulting in the first election following the NSVA model being pushed to 2034. This means that India would lose out on an entire cycle of benefits from the GGGI reporting model.

A critical debate exists regarding the NSVA's failure to provide a specific reservation for OBC women, who account for a large portion of India's population. This is a legitimate intersectional equity-related request; however, this paper considers it a secondary argument about the potential delay in implementing the NSVA. The NSVA currently has a SC/ST sub-reservation, and any future requirement for an OBC sub-quota could be implemented by either new legislation or through the amendment of the Constitution without altering the existing foundation of 33%.

The GGGI measures parity as opposed to absolute well-being. This means that India's rankings can improve while conditions for women as a whole remain relatively constant or not improved a lot, as long as the gaps shrink between men and women. For instance, there would be actual improvement in indices due to improvements under the NSVA, which would reflect actual and positive closing of the gender gap with regard to political representation, but that the way in which an index would improve may not accurately reflect the actual lived experiences of Indian women. Thus, the claims made in this paper are limited to those outcomes which can be measured with the indices, and recognizes that further structural transformation may only come about by developing a long-term future policy architecture that considers all aspects of women's lives in India.

## Conclusion

In this paper, a multi-layered, evidence-based argument has been developed for one specific policy claim - the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam (NSVA), once implemented, provides the greatest impact of reaching legislative and structural parity in performance (equal performance against gender parity indices) by providing Political Empowerment, and therefore Legislators, who will influence the overall political agenda, as the upstream determinant, therefore leading to the downstream improvement in both Economic Participation and Educational Attainment as well as Health.

The evidence supports this claim from many different sources - from the GGGI Sub-index decomposition to Saskatchewan's GGGI scores to comparing Bangladesh, Argentina and Rwanda and India's 30-year experience with the Panchayati Raj system of Governance. Furthermore, the evidence presents similar results (i.e., women's Representation in Legislative bodies) across the board. When female representation crosses the critical mass of 30% to 33%, the subsequent effects are measurable, multi-faceted and self-reinforcing. The present-day trajectory of decreasing female representation in the Indian Parliament (14.7% in 2024 to 13.8% in 2025) indicates that if organic processes continue, the threshold will not be reached in any policy-relevant time frame.

India has a race against time in achieving gender parity. At current rates of WEG/WPP (2025 rates of progress), WEG estimates that achieving gender parity will take place in 134 years from now or approximately 2158. Therefore, the NSVA can not be construed as a shortcut to that destination but as a structural re-routing that shifts the trajectory of the nation. The floor of the Indian parliament will begin to reflect the demographic reality as one-third of the parliament is occupied by women, thereby creating the conditions for the anticipated statistical, social, and economic phenomenon that are expected to be documented by all of the various international gender-related indexes.

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