International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR)
E-ISSN: 2582-2160 ● Website: www.ijfmr.com ● Email: editor@ijfmr.com

The Global South in the Emerging World Order: India's Leadership, Aspirations and Challenges

Mitrabhanu Sahu

Ph.D. Research Scholar, P.G Dept. of Political Science and Public Administration, Sambalpur University, Odisha

Abstract:
The 'Global South' phrase is now at the forefront of diplomatic practice rather than on the periphery of development studies. A variety of governments are looking for a collective voice, and some are vying for it as power spreads throughout the international system and the institutions established after 1945 find it difficult to reflect this diffusion. India's claim to that position is examined in this article. It traces the intellectual origins of the Global South concept, India's historical and current instruments of leadership (the Voice of the Global South Summits, the 2023 G20 presidency, the 2026 BRICS chair ship, the International Solar Alliance and the development partnership program), and the strategic logic of 'multi-alignment' that underpins them. It does this by drawing on peer-reviewed scholarship, edited volumes, policy research, and official records. The structural barriers to Indian leadership are then examined, including the growing trade imbalance with China, the ongoing discrepancy between development promises and actual results, the lack of involvement in Southeast Asia, competing claimants in the South, and the challenge of assembling a group characterized more by shared grievances than shared interests. The article makes the case that India's leadership will be assessed on delivery rather than declaration and that its comparative advantage is found in agenda-setting, convening, and bridging rather than material power.

Keywords: Global South: Multi-Alignment; Strategic Autonomy, G20, BRICS, South-South Cooperation, Multipolarity and Development Partnership

1. Introduction:

The global order of the mid-2020s is being negotiated rather than inherited. The post-war settlement no longer accurately represents the worldwide distribution of population, output, and political agency because of its permanent seats, voting shares, and unwritten agenda-setting regulations. Over the past 10 years, this mismatch has given rise to a language of grievances and aspirations, with the term 'Global South' playing a disproportionate role. It is employed in debt restructuring talks, climate talks, G20 and BRICS gatherings, and speeches by leaders who may not agree on almost anything else. This vocabulary is cantered on India. It is the most populated nation in the world, one of the top five economies in the world (Bava, 2026), a former leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, and a state that maintains its status as a developing nation while using the diplomatic clout of a rising superpower. Regardless of their political stance, successive administrations have linked India's interests to those of developing nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and claimed to advocate for them (Bajpai, 2026). By holding three Voice of the Global South Summits since 2023, securing permanent membership for the African Union through its G20

presidency, and chairing BRICS in 2026 with a declared focus on developing-country priorities, the current government has made this claim more explicit than its predecessors.

However, the assertion is disputed. Many smaller governments are leery of any organization in which a single capital presumes to speak for a group of well over a hundred countries, China rejects it, and other large southern states pursue their own leadership ambitions. Given the diversity of the nations it encompasses, academics have questioned whether 'leadership of the Global South' is a useful term at all (Dados & Connell, 2012). There are seven more parts in this article. The idea is explained in Section 2. India's current policy is placed within a broader historical context in Section 3. Its main tools are examined in Section 4. The strategic goals that underlie them are examined in Section 5. The primary difficulties are assessed in Section 6. An analytical evaluation is provided in Section 7, and policy implications are discussed in Section 8.

2. Conceptualising the Global South

2.1 From 'Third World' to 'Global South'

The phrase 'Global South' refers to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Oceania in general. It is part of a family of terms, such as 'Third World' and 'periphery,' that designate areas that have historically been marginalized in the global economy (Dados & Connell, 2012). As the Cold War came to an end, North-South terminology proliferated in development studies, political science, and international relations, in part as a substitute for the homogenizing language of globalization. According to Dados and Connell, the word denotes a shift away from a limited focus on cultural differences or development levels and toward the geopolitical power relations that uphold disparities in life expectancy, living standards, and resource access. The distinction made by Anne Garland Mahler is complimentary. According to Mahler, the term 'Global South' serves as a critical concept with multiple meanings, such as a marker of areas damaged by capitalist globalization, a transnational political subjectivity created when various 'South's' acknowledge that their circumstances are shared, and, in its more critical usage, a field of analysis focused on racialization and power (Mahler, 2017). The distinction is important in the Indian context since state-led interpretations of the term tend to emphasize the first meaning (shared disadvantage within institutions) while ignoring the second (a solidarity that transcends state boundaries and may be critical of governments themselves).

2.2 A Category of Convenience

The term's suppleness is what makes it appealing from a foreign policy perspective. It avoids the paternalism of 'developing countries' and the ideological baggage of non-alignment, and it has neither official membership nor treaty duties. According to a recent analysis (Tran & Tran, 2026), India intentionally employs the phrase to highlight economic differences between the North and South without adopting a strong ideological stance. The same flexibility makes analysis challenging. Based on a global-average threshold of approximately $13,000 per person, one observer calculated that the Global South included approximately 120 countries with a wide range of production structures, security conditions, and political systems (Bajpai, 2026). Energy importers and exporters, creditors and debtors, and democracies and autocracies are all included in this broad group. Therefore, it is not so much an interest bloc as it is a coalition of complaints about allocation, representation, and process. This is a crucial premise for all that follows: leading a coalition of complaints is not the same as leading an alliance, and it demands different resources.

3. From Bandung to Delhi: The Historical Lineage:

India's current diplomacy is rooted in a long history. After gaining independence in 1947, anti-colonialism, sovereignty, and non-alignment melded its foreign policy identity. The Non-Aligned Movement provided India a moral influence in the developing world that surpassed its material capabilities (Zakharov, 2024). During that time, numerous Asian and African nations developed enduring goodwill as a result of Indian technical help and expert training for recently independent states (Bava, 2026). India's focus switched to relationships with big powers during a quieter time following the end of the Cold War and the liberalization of the Indian economy. Beginning in the middle of the 2000s, strategists argued about whether a more active stance should replace non-alignment, which detractors described as a passive avoidance of important global processes. This dispute is traced by Zakharov (2024), who demonstrates how the idea of 'multi-alignment' involving all major nations to extract influence from East Africa to the Pacific gradually replaced non-alignment as the operational definition of Indian conduct. The change was more than just rhetorical. It represented a conclusion that, in a multipolar world, India benefits more by adaptable interaction with rival centres of power than from isolation from them.

One way to interpret the current resurgence of Global South discourse is as a fusion of these two traditions. It operates through the pragmatic multi-alignment of the twenty-first century while using the normative rhetoric of the post-colonial era (equity, dignity, self-determination). The shift from the moral voice of non-alignment to a multi-aligned strategy that engages Asia, Africa, and Latin America equally is described in a recent study of India's evolution in this arena (Kumar, 2025). In the meanwhile, India's government has used language from earlier civilizations to frame the initiative, most notably the notion of the globe as one family, which was a key component of the 2023 G20 presidency's branding (Sahu, 2024). One should not exaggerate the continuity. With its own summits, secretariat, and common political agenda, the Non-Aligned Movement was an assembly. These are non-existent in the modern Global South, and India exercises its leadership through a patchwork of bilateral initiatives, plurilateral organizations, and summits rather than through an institution it can legitimately claim. Many of the problems discussed in Section 6 stem from this fundamental disparity.

4. Instruments of Leadership

4.1 The Voice of the Global South Summits:

The Voice of the Global South Summit (VOGSS) is the most notable invention from India. 125 developing nations attended the first, which took place virtually on January 12-13, 2023, with the aim of gathering the South's priorities prior to India's G20 leadership. The summit allowed India to introduce a Global South-oriented agenda into the G20 while proving that its standing among developing nations remained intact despite a perception of drift toward the West, according to Rajiv Bhatia of Gateway House. China and Pakistan were not invited (Bhatia, 2023). In order to disseminate the results of the G20 summit, a second virtual edition took place in November 2023. A third edition took place in New Delhi in August 2024, and 21 heads of state, 34 foreign ministers, and 118 ministers attended (Bajpai, 2026). India presented a 'Global Development Compact' at the 2024 edition that addressed concessional financing, commerce, and capacity creation (Drishti IAS, 2025).

The summits demonstrate the Indian approach's strengths as well as its limitations. Their ability to bring people together is their greatest asset; no other developing nation has brought together a similar group of individuals on a solely southern agenda. The fact that they are consultative rather than institutional limits them. Although politically understandable, the forum's omission of China means it cannot claim to

represent the South as a whole. They issue statements of goals rather than legally binding commitments or standing organs. The conference did not result in Indian leadership acquiescence, according to 'Bjor Foundation' experts, because China interpreted its non-invitation as a calculated move to limit its own leadership claims (Bava, 2026).

4.2 The 2023 G20 Presidency and the African Union:

India's most significant platform was during its G20 chairmanship. The African Union was officially welcomed as a permanent member of the G20 in the New Delhi Leaders' Declaration, which also acknowledged the presidency for making this possible (IANS, 2023). According to an evaluation by the European Parliament research service, the subjects selected by the Indian presidency and this choice demonstrated the increasing importance that G20 nations place on the Global South (Jutten, 2023). It was challenging to defend the continent's underrepresentation because, up until that point, South Africa was the only African member of the forum. There were several criticisms about the record. Even though India positioned itself as the voice of the Global South, the term itself did not appear in the leader's proclamation, according to a widely read editorial that considered the consensus document as less of a victory than official sources implied (Sinharay, 2023). The criticism serves as a helpful reminder that rhetoric and textual results might differ and that diplomatic consensus frequently has to be diluted. Nevertheless, the African Union ruling is a tangible institutional benefit and the best illustration of how Indian agenda-setting results in a long-lasting shift in global governance.

4.3 The 2026 BRICS Chair ship:

In 2026, India's fourth BRICS chairmanship provided a second stage with a different challenge. Large emerging economies make up BRICS, which is now an expanded eleven-member organization with more challenging internal politics than the G20, which consists of the established Western countries. The September leaders' summit was a test of whether heads of state could maintain a position that their ministers could not, because the foreign ministers conference in New Delhi in May 2026 ended without the unified proclamation that chairs typically seek (Choudhury, 2026). Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the eighteenth summit, which took place in New Delhi on September 12–13, 2026, and concluded with the unanimous approval of the New Delhi Declaration. Leaders from Uruguay, South Africa, and other nations applauded India's ability to forge consensus, and the Declaration hailed India's chairmanship (Akashvani News, 2026).

Instead of portraying BRICS as an overtly anti-Western bloc, India's stated objective was to show it as a forum for Global South representation and useful collaboration (Gupta, 2026). The fundamental dilemma was articulated in commentary on the chair ship: can India advocate for a more powerful voice for emerging countries without allowing the Global South agenda to solidify into a rivalry between China and the US (BRICS Summit, 2026)? The summit's conclusion indicates that India can handle such drafting balance. It remains to be seen if it can accomplish this in practice and if China's 2027 chairmanship will change the group's focus.

4.4 Development Partnership, Energy and Health Diplomacy

India provides a range of useful tools in addition to summitry. The Export-Import Bank of India's concessional line of credit (LoC) serves as the primary financial instrument. According to research by the 'Observer Research Foundation', there are 236 operational lines totalling around US$24.8 billion spread over about 60 nations. These lines are characterized as demand-driven and devoid of the conditions that come with typical donor-recipient connections (Chakrabaty, 2019). According to empirical research on East Africa, LoCs operationalize a development-partnership model that provides an alternative to Western

conditional aid, with the help of capacity-building under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program (Bairwa & Meena, 2025).

India has an institutional anchor in a field that is crucial to southern states because it co-founded and is home to the International Solar Alliance (Sajjanahar, n.d). The country's goal of 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 and its demands for World Bank and IMF reform to enhance developing-country participation are also highlighted in Indian discourse (Drishti IAS, 2025). Sahu (2024) recognizes the 'Vaccine Maitri' initiative and India's request to suspend intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines in the face of opposition from the West as early instances of Global South diplomacy in the health sector. When combined, these tools give India a toolkit that combines modest material supply (loans, training, immunizations, solar cooperation) with normative advocacy (reform, representation, equity).

5. Strategic Aspirations: Autonomy, Bridging and Status:

India invests on this role, but why? The literature reveals three motivations.

Strategic autonomy is the first. India's claim to independence from any one bloc is supported by its leadership role among emerging nations. According to the 'Bjor Foundation research', the South's leadership enables India to strengthen its strategic independence and transcend the status of a mere 'swing state' in great-power competition (Bava, 2026). Zakharov (2024) makes a similar point: although he warns that partners may dislike the opportunistic nature of some Indian approaches, the multi-alignment policy and the positioning as 'Vishwa mitra', friend of the world, are meant to help India secure a new status in the system of global governance.

The bridging position comes in second. India positions itself as a bridge between the developed and developing worlds. India is positioned as a bridge by its non-alignment, which is currently expressed as strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, according to a Japanese policy brief. However, in order for India to be an effective voice, it must establish a minilateral coalition with other southern nations rather than acting alone (Jain, 2025). India's experience on the UN Security Council follows the same reasoning. Although scholars analysing India's 2011-12 and 2021–22 terms note that southern interests are becoming more dispersed, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has stated that India attempted to express the concerns and interests of the Global South and to bridge divisions in the Council (Being the Voice of the Global South, 2025).

Status and institutional transformation come in third. It is commonly acknowledged that India's focus on multilateral institution reform is partly motivated by its desire for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. By changing the focus of the argument from national ambition to collective representation, presenting that demand as a Global South demand enhances its legitimacy. Kumar (2025) situates this within a broader theory that, in a multipolar world, India is establishing a foreign policy to support the goals of emerging nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Although they are not the same, these drives reinforce one another. While bridging and transformation need ongoing, expensive participation, autonomy involves avoiding obligations. Many of the difficulties listed below stem from the conflict between the two.

6. Challenges:

6.1 The China Factor:

China is the biggest obstacle. Beijing provides southern governments with vast markets, infrastructure finance at scale, and influence in the multilateral system things that India is currently unable to match. The

'Bjor Foundation report' compares China's infrastructure-led strategy with India's concentration on capacity-building, pointing out that while being the fifth-largest economy in the world, India has not been able to compete with China in the utilization of material resources (Bava, 2026). China's advantages in the UN system and in organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank are also highlighted in commentary on the competition (Bajpal, 2026).

The issue is made worse by the bilateral economic tie. With bilateral trade of US$151.1 billion and a record trade deficit of almost US$112 billion in 2025–2026, China surpassed the US as India's biggest commercial partner (Press Trust of India, 2026). China accounted for over US$131.6 billion of India's imports and US$19.5 billion of its exports (India Shipping News, 2026). It will be difficult for a nation that relies so much on China for industrial inputs to position itself as a rival to China in the Global South. Additionally, the reliance restricts India's ability to take action in situations where southern states are intricately linked to Chinese supply chains. This does not imply that India's involvement is pointless. India's competitive advantage must therefore be found in other areas, such as democratic legitimacy, non-threatening diplomacy, services and digital public goods, and the capacity to communicate with all parties. Similar points are made by the Tran and Tran study summarized in India's World, which emphasizes that India's power depends on portraying itself as a trustworthy, non-threatening entity (Tran & Tran, 2026).

6.2 The Delivery Gap:

Credibility is a second issue. Declaratory leadership is inexpensive, and governments in the South evaluate leaders based on their real contributions. In the context of the agricultural collaboration between India and Africa, Vazquez and Kottam report that distribution issues on both the Indian and African sides are to blame for the growing discrepancy between the credit India commits and the amounts actually paid out (Vazquez and Kottam, 2021). The LoC program functions as a stand-alone diplomatic tool that is out of step with India's broader economic goals, according to the ORF investigation, which also notes low disbursement rates and poor project-completion records (Chakrabaty, 2019). An analysis of India's concessional funding for Rwanda's Nyabarongo Dam adds a conceptual point: in the twenty-first century, South-South cooperation is frequently separated from the political critique of global power that initially accompanied technical assistance (Dye, 2022). If this is the case, India's rhetoric of solidarity might be at odds with a strategy that is similar to traditional business diplomacy.

6.3 Competing Claimants Within the South:

There are other aspirants besides India. Each country claimed leadership, if not for the entire South, as the G20 presidency shifted from India to Brazil and finally to South Africa (Bava, 2026). India's position is further complicated by the emergence of Brazil, South Africa, and China, according to the IDE-JETRO brief. Leadership is relational in a system where no one has official authority over the South; it only lasts as long as followers decide to follow. As a result, several leaders vie for the same followers, and smaller states are in a good position to negotiate with them.

6.4 Gaps in Regional Reach

Geographically, India's mobilization has been inconsistent. India was placed ninth among ASEAN's dialog partners in the ISEAS State of Southeast Asia survey, according to a Lowy Institute analysis, which also claims that India's choice to focus its G20 outreach on Africa essentially left Southeast Asia out of its Global South narrative (Mishra & Louis, 2024). A leadership claim that is robust in Africa but weak in a 680 million-person Indo-Pacific region is insufficient.

6.5 Cross-Pressure from the Great Powers

Multi-alignment gives India flexibility, but it also exposes the nation to pressure from other sources. The

US remains an important economic partner; bilateral trade reached a record US$140.8 billion in 2025-2026, but since then, trade talks have reached what the finance minister called a 'plateau' (Deb, 2026). The US tariff on Indian exports would reportedly be reduced from 50% to 18% under a draft agreement, but finalization is still waiting (India Shipping News, 2026). Such uncertainty is crucial for the Global South role because a state under intense tariff pressure has less diplomatic space and because its southern partners are watching to see if India can protect its own interests while pretending to advocate for theirs.

6.6 The Problem of Representation

The legitimacy problem is the final one. Who authorized India to speak on behalf of the South? As evidenced by the 2023 incident where the word 'Global South' was missing from the G20 statement, an advocacy label can abruptly disappear when consensus necessitates compromise (Sinharay, 2023). Members of the coalition of grievances known as the South have conflicting interests about debt, trade restrictions, energy prices, and carbon pricing. This is the more serious issue, which is discussed in Section 2. When it comes to issues like agricultural subsidies and the move away from fossil fuels, India's position does not necessarily align with those of the poorest states. A leader runs the risk of speaking effectively for no one if they try to speak for everyone.

7. Assessment: Convening, Bridging and Agenda-Setting

The data backs up a measured judgment. India has shown a strong ability to bring people together. It brought together more than a hundred developing nations around a common goal, won institutional reform at the G20, and led the politically divided BRICS to a unified proclamation. These are not insignificant accomplishments that set India apart from the majority of other contenders. India has had far less success in the more difficult aspects of leadership, such as building a stable following, maintaining institutional continuity, and providing consistent material support. Secretariats and oversight systems are absent from the summits. Delivery of the credit lines is delayed. Dependency rather than balance characterizes the relationship with China, the biggest rival. In terms of international relations, India acts more as a broker and agenda-setter than as a hegemon or an alliance leader; this is not necessary in the context of the Global South because no state can rule over a group this diverse.

This implies that entrepreneurship the capacity to identify issues, develop solutions, form alliances, and then give credit to others is the appropriate framework rather than 'leadership' in the conventional sense. This is indicated by the IDE-JETRO brief, which favours minilateral cooperation over unilateral claims among southern powers. India's future position will depend on its capacity to strike a balance between strategic autonomy, domestic development priorities, and geopolitical competition while continuing to push for global governance reform, according to the Tran and Tran report (Choudhury, 2026).

8. Policy Implications

The research leads to a number of consequences, which are presented here as theories rather than recommendations.

Institutionalize the meeting that has been held. If the Voice of the Global South initiative produced a tiny secretariat, a permanent follow-up mechanism, yearly reporting on pledges, and a clear connection to G20 and BRICS work programs, it would gain greater credibility. Summits run the risk of becoming routine without follow-up.

Shut off the delivery gap. Faster clearances, more transparent project pipelines, and coordination between ministries that affect development cooperation are administrative impediments that are under Indian

control, according to the ORF and Vazquez and Kottam findings. Additionally, the program would be more sustainable domestically if loan lines were aligned with investment and trade strategy, as suggested by the ORF analysis.

Extend the base geographically. Africa deserves the same attention as Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Pacific. For both strategic and financial considerations, Lowy makes a strong case for making Southeast Asia a top priority.

Handle competition with China in a practical manner. India should avoid portraying the Global South as a zero-sum game and instead set itself apart in sectors where it has a true competitive advantage, such as digital public infrastructure, health, climate cooperation, and technical training, since it cannot match Chinese funding. One essential domestic complement is lowering structural reliance on Chinese inputs. Treat the label with discipline. Only when India adopts stances that southern states acknowledge as their own will using the term 'Global South' as a brand be beneficial. Honesty regarding the differences between southern and Indian interests will maintain greater credibility than rhetorical cohesion.

9. Conclusion

The evolving global order is a diffusion of agency among numerous players rather than the replacement of one hegemon by another, and the Global South is the region where this diffusion is most apparent and contentious. India's attempt to take the lead is based on a legitimate historical legacy, a track record of creative gatherings, and a diplomatic approach that unnerves few. Its limitations are also evident: it has few material resources, is very dependent on its main competitor economically, has a poor track record of fulfilling commitments, and the population it seeks to represent is quite diverse. As a result, this article's conclusion is neither sceptical nor triumphalist. India is not the indisputable leader of the Global South, but it is a major entrepreneur of its causes, and it is unlikely to become the latter in any traditional sense. The more fruitful question is whether India can improve the effectiveness of the South's agenda, including whether the coalitions it forms endure beyond the summits where they are announced, whether the reforms it advocates are accomplished, and whether the funding it offers arrives. By that measure, the following ten years will be more significant than the major proclamations of the previous three years. India won't have to assert its leadership if it can combine rhetoric and delivery; others will do it for it.

Note about currency and sources: When available, journal papers and book chapters are used. Official broadcasters, think-tank research, and credible news and data sources are mentioned for changes in 2025-2026 that have not yet been included in the peer-reviewed literature (such as the BRICS chair ship, current trade figures), and they should be considered urgent.

Reference:

1. Akashvani News. (2026, September 14). Global leaders praise BRICS summit under India's chairmanship. https://newsonair.gov.in/global-leaders-praise-brics-summit-under-indias-chairmanship/
2. Bairwa, H. L., & Meena, T. K. (2025). From aid conditionality to development partnership: India's lines of credit in East Africa and the politics of South-South cooperation. Indian Journal of African Studies, 27(1-2), 205-226. https://dup.du.ac.in/index.php/IJAS/article/view/441
3. Bajpai, K. (2026, February 10). How India can lead the Global South. Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/blueprint-defence-magazine/opinion/how-india-can-lead-the-global-south-126020201258_1.html

4. Bajpai, K. (2026, February 10). How India can lead the Global South. Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/blueprint-defence-magazine/opinion/how-india-can-lead-the-global-south-126020201258_1.html
5. Bajpai, K. (2026, February 10). How India can lead the Global South. Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/blueprint-defence-magazine/opinion/how-india-can-lead-the-global-south-126020201258_1.html
6. Bava, U. S. (2026, January 20). India and its quest for leadership of the Global South. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://in.boell.org/en/2025/10/06/india-and-its-quest-leadership-global-south
7. Bava, U. S. (2026, January 20). India and its quest for leadership of the Global South. Heinrich Böll Stiftung. https://in.boell.org/en/2025/10/06/india-and-its-quest-leadership-global-south
8. Being the voice of the Global South: An assessment of India's recent Security Council terms. (2025, June 19). In BISA 2025 Conference. British International Studies Association. https://indico.bisa.ac.uk/event/474/contributions/1833/subcontributions/5471
9. Bhatia, R. (2023, January 19). Voice of Global South Summit@G20. Gateway House. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/voice-of-global-south-summitg20/
10. BRICS Summit 2026: From Delhi to G20 in Florida, is India emerging as the voice of the Global South? (2026). WION. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/brics-summit-2026-from-delhi-to-g20-in-florida-is-india-emerging-as-the-voice-of-the-global-south-1788848244799
11. Chakrabarty, M. (2019, November 22). India's development cooperation – Are we getting it right? Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-development-cooperation-are-we-getting-it-right-58066
12. Chakrabarty, M. (2019, November 22). India's development cooperation – Are we getting it right? Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-development-cooperation-are-we-getting-it-right-58066
13. Choudhury, D. (2026, May 12). India's role in Global South: From concepts to practical implementation. India's World. https://indiasworld.in/indias-role-in-global-south-from-concepts-to-practical-implementation/
14. Choudhury, D. (2026, May 19). The Delhi meeting: BRICS at the limits of consensus. India's World. https://indiasworld.in/the-delhi-meeting-brics-at-the-limits-of-consensus/
15. Dados, N., & Connell, R. (2012). The global south. Contexts, 11(1), 12-13. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504212436479
16. Deb, K. (2026, October 5). India-US trade deal talks hit 'plateau', Nirmala Sitharaman says. WION. https://www.wionews.com/india-news/india-us-trade-deal-talks-plateau-nirmala-sitharaman-1791220982006
17. Drishti IAS. (2025, July 8). India's strategic balance between Global South and West. https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/india-s-strategic-balance-between-global-south-and-west
18. Dye, B. (2022). India's infrastructure building in Africa: South-South cooperation and the abstraction of responsibility. African Affairs, 121(483), 221-249. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adac013
19. Gupta, A. (2026, September 14). BRICS 2026: India's chair year delivers consensus, cooperation and Global South leadership. BowerGroupAsia. https://bowergroupasia.com/brics-2026-indias-chair-year-delivers-consensus-cooperation-and-global-south-leadership/

20. IANS. (2023, September 9). G20 Delhi Declaration welcomes inclusion of African Union as a permanent member. DT Next. https://www.dtnext.in/news/national/g20-delhi-declaration-welcomes-inclusion-of-african-union-as-a-permanent-member-735274
21. India Shipping News. (2026, October 17). India selling more to US despite tariffs, but China trade gap keeps rising. https://indiashippingnews.com/export/india-selling-more-to-us-despite-tariffs-but-china-trade-gap-keeps-rising
22. Jain, P. (2025, February 19). The Global South and India: Opportunities and challenges (IDE Policy Brief No. 209). Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO). https://www.ide.go.jp/library/Japanese/Publish/Reports/AjikenPolicyBrief/pdf/209.pdf
23. Jütten, M. (2023, September 14). Outcome of the 2023 G20 Summit in New Delhi, India. European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2023)751474
24. Kumar, A. (2025). India's leadership in the Global South: Redefining foreign policy in a multipolar world. RJPSSs, 51(2), 431-437. https://doi.org/10.31995/rjpsss.2025v51i02.49
25. Mahler, A. G. (2017, November 11). What/Where is the Global South? Global South Studies. https://www.globalsouthstudies.org/what-is-the-global-south/
26. Mishra, R., & Louis, Y. M. (2024, April 29). Why India's Global South ambitions must turn to Southeast Asia. Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-india-s-global-south-ambitions-must-turn-southeast-asia
27. Press Trust of India. (2026, April 15). China becomes India's top trade partner in FY26; deficit widens to $112 bn. Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/amp/economy/news/china-becomes-india-s-top-trade-partner-in-fy26-deficit-widens-to-usd-112-bn-126041501317_1.html
28. Sahu, D. (2024). India's quest for leadership of the Global South. In H. Adam & R. Rena (Eds.), Polycrisis and economic development in the Global South (pp. 246-260). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032694337-24
29. Sajjanhar, A. (n.d.). India and the Global South. Embassy of India, Bern. https://www.indembassybern.gov.in/docs/1755516242India-and-the-Global-South-by-Amb-Ashok-Sajjanahar.pdf
30. Sinharay, P. (2023, September 19). Why the G20 declaration is far from the triumph it's being hailed to be. Scroll.in. https://scroll.in/article/1056048/why-the-g20-declaration-is-far-from-the-triumph-its-being-hailed-to-be
31. Tran, T. T., & Tran, M. H. L. (2026). India's role in Global South: From concepts to practical implementation. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 13(2), 209-230. https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970261446130
32. Tran, T. T., & Tran, M. H. L. (2026, May 12). India's role in Global South: From concepts to practical implementation. India's World. https://indiasworld.in/indias-role-in-global-south-from-concepts-to-practical-implementation
33. Vazquez, K. C., & Kottam, V. (2021). The impact of India's lines of credit on the future of India-Africa partnership in agriculture. In India-Africa partnerships for food security and capacity building: South-South cooperation (pp. 311-337). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54112-5_15
34. Zakharov, A. (2024). Multilateral approach in India's foreign policy: The case of relations with Latin America. International Organisations Research Journal, 19(3), 91-104. https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2024-03-05