International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR)
E-ISSN: 2582-2160 ● Website: www.ijfmr.com ● Email: editor@ijfmr.com

The Corporate Personality of a Brand: Who Owns the Digital Persona of an AI Influencer?

Vaishnavi

GD Goenka University Shona Road

Abstract

An AI influencer may seem to have a single, coherent identity. However, its legal frameworks may be divided among different designers, performers, agencies, advertisers and platforms. This article investigates whether Indian law can separate a person's identity from the AI influencer and control it, without regard to the legal personality of the synthetic character. This article relies on doctrinal analysis, combined with selected comparisons from the United States, to identify corporate personality, authorship in copyright, commercial reputation or goodwill and personality rights. Recent interim orders from the Indian judiciary in cases involving voice cloning and false endorsements and impersonation by a chatbot, balance in favor of protecting natural persons. They do not extend protection to completely fictitious influencers. The article recommends ownership of components, based on documented creative contributions, signed agreements and limited identity licenses. It outlines a pragmatic approach for determining the protected asset, establishing the claimant's title, and separating ownership from use or right. It proposes a range of remedies commensurate to the proven injury. Commercial investment justifies protecting synthetic personalities, particularly where existing legal requirements are satisfied; it, however, does not justify completely unrestrained monopolies over such personalities.

Keywords: AI influencers; corporate personality; copyright; publicity rights; digital identity; India.

I Introduction and research method

A cosmetics company commissions an agency to create "Mira," a fictional influencer. The agency engages a designer to create Mira's face, a performer to create voice recordings, an AI service to create social-media posts, and controls the account. The company terminates the agency. Both parties claim to own Mira. There are multiple objects of contestation: expression, recordings, a name, customer goodwill, and contract. Lumping all these together as a "digital persona" disguises the questions that govern ownership. The article poses three questions. Can synthetic persons be owned by corporations? If not, how do India's intellectual property laws resolve disputes? What contracts and legal remedies can protect legitimate interests, and how might they modify the legal framework? It is argued that ownership should be determined by right title and interest, and responsibility should follow the actions of the relevant person or corporation.

The method is doctrinal, and comparatively selective. The analysis relies on Indian statutes, reported cases and judicial orders, and scholarship published in 2024-2025 and more recent research published in 2026 and circulated or revised in 2026. This article is selective and does not cover the full range of litigation dealing with the regulation of AI, and does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the various laws, regulations and policies governing the use of synthetic influencers and other replicas.

II Literature review and the unresolved question

V. L. Schwartz's article considers whether publicity rights should be available for virtual and AI influencers. Her article notes differences between existing statutory protection and incentives, autonomy, and deception prevention.1 This distinction is important because an economically valuable identity doesn't necessarily fulfill a legal rule based on human identity. The present article adopts her separation of descriptive and normative questions, but argues that India should first examine the existing, narrower rights, before creating a proprietary right in a synthetic persona. This is a jurisdiction specific argument, and not an argument that the broader question has not been considered. Daniel J. Gervais's 2025 article on Artificial Intellectual Property raises cultural consequences of machine generated expression, and the dangers of abandoning cultural filters.2 Its relevance comes in the need to justify protection of IP law as opposed to technology's sophistication. Applying this to the case, we cannot say that every single post generated requires exclusivity. In the same vein, uncertainty of a machine's output cannot eliminate a designer's independently protectable contribution. Therefore, the policy question is less of a case of either protecting everything or nothing.

Zheng Shen's 33 Instagram virtual influencers study finds that engagement is higher among non-branded, vs. branded, influencers.3 This provides useful context. Audience relationships can't be reduced to advertisers spend. Observational marketing has aided in litigating IP, but finding herein isn't the only evidence needed to strengthen IP claims and assert that expanded IP creates a competitive edge. Findings herein illustrate the importance of account access and continuity even when copyright title is in dispute.

J. M. Paterson's 2025 analysis of AI mimicking humans emphasizes transparency and the ethical difficulty of systems that simulate human interaction.4

This shifts the focus from the producer's investment to the audience's understanding. A valid license for the use of a digital character doesn't resolve the misleading of consumers by promotional interactions. Consequently, the proposed framework for ownership defines an operator and disclosure obligations, and keeps them conceptually separate from title obligations.

The United States Copyright Office's 2025 report differentiates between protectable human expressions and machine-generated works, including editing and arranging human expressions.5

This is an institutional analysis, not peer-reviewed scholarship or Indian law. When read together, these sources reflect a problem with allocations: theories of publicity, human creativity and consumer trust illuminate different interests, but no single theory determines which participant owns what part of an Indian AI-influencer business. The goal of this article is to structure and identify the relevant rights and evidence to allocate these interests.

---

[1] Victoria L. Schwartz, "AI Influencers and a Right of Publicity" 49 *Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts* 355 (2025), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6227522 (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026). SSRN version revised May 6, 2026; journal year retained.

[2] Daniel J. Gervais, "Artificial Intellectual Property" 100 *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 265 (2025), available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1700/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

[3] Zheng Shen, "Shall brands create their own virtual influencers? A comprehensive study of 33 virtual influencers on Instagram" 11 *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, art. 177 (2024), doi:10.1057/s41599-024-02698-y.

[4] J. M. Paterson, "AI Mimicking and Interpreting Humans: Legal and Ethical Reflections" 22 *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry* 539–550 (2025), doi:10.1007/s11673-025-10424-9.

[5] U.S. Copyright Office, *Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability* 11–27 (January 2025), available at: https://www.copyright.gov/ai/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

These theories must be read with regard to their categories. A manually animated fictional character, a human influencer using cosmetic filters and a chatbot that generates unscripted responses are not legally the same. Schwartz's technology spectrum assists in structuring this. For this article, an "AI influencer" is a commercial persona that is, in whole or in part, made or operated by generative systems; this definition does not mean that the persona is technologically autonomous. This definition of the term for this article prevents the term itself from determining the outcome. Relevant creative and legal contributions must be assessed before defining the outcome.

III Corporate personality does not personify the brand

Section 9 of the Companies Act, 2013 enables an incorporated company to hold property, contract, and sue or be sued.6

The company operating Mira may acquire intellectual property rights. That Mira elicits a particular interaction with users is not enough to give her the status of a person. Being a brand does not necessarily denote that it is a separate legal person. A legal person is a rights-holder. Personality of a brand depicts how a product is commercialised. Doctrinal support for this distinction is available. In ICC Development (International) Ltd. v. Arvee Enterprises, the Delhi High Court dismissed the argument to vest a person's publicity right in an event or its organiser.7

The case was more about the court's decision not to recognize AI, but the reasoning is still interesting. A corporation can enforce copyrights and trademarks without needing to claim a human personality. An opposing view is that expensive, recognizable, synthetic characters (e.g. Barbie) should also be afforded the same protection as celebrities. Commercial concerns are real. Systematic imitation of characters may lead to customers being diverted, and a loss of licensing revenues. While the character may represent valuable economic interests, there is no legal value in similarities that reflect copied expressions. Where the interest is falsely connected to the copied synthetic character, the law affords no protection for the character's humiliation or loss of bodily integrity. Injunctive relief is granted only when the interest is not expression and there is a misleading association. Any new legal rights created for fictional characters must also be clearly delineated, and defined to avoid suppressing lawful and creative reuse.

IV Allocating the components under Indian law

Authorship and original expression

The Copyright Act identifies the author of specified computer-generated works as the person who causes the work to be created.8

Section 2(d)(vi) therefore is of central importance, and to state that India has no provision for computer-generated works would not be accurate. Applying Section 2(d)(vi) to contemporary systems raises the question of who produced the work, who commissioned the work, who prompted the user to create the work and who edited the work. Merely purchasing a subscription or owning the copyright of the software does not determine the answer to the who produced the work question.

Meaningful skill and judgment in originality must also be distinguished from the subsistence of the copyright. Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak also rejects the protection based on mechanical

[6] The Companies Act, 2013 (Act 18 of 2013), s. 9.

[7] 2003 (26) PTC 245 (Del), para 14.

[8] The Copyright Act, 1957 (Act 14 of 1957), ss. 2(d)(vi), 13(1)(a).

labor.9 Although that case concerned edited judgments, the court's rationale cautions against equating volume of prompts or expense incurred with protectable creativity. Being witty or environmentally conscious does not mean drawing in that way, or writing scripts or audiovisual works in that way. Protectable creativity must be assessed on the basis of the expression itself and not by reference to a generalized, unspecific, attributable temperament.

For Mira, in determining whether the designer's original illustrations and the editor's original script merit separate protection, automatically generated variations would be irrelevant. Production records should identify which of the expressive choices made by the designer or the editor survive in the asserted work. This is a proposed approach to determine Indian courts' authorship test with respect to Generative AIs. This avoids a developer owning every output where the system was causally necessary.

First ownership and assignments

Section 17 generally begins with the author as first owner, subject to its specified exceptions. Employment under a contract of service and particular commissioned categories require distinct treatment; commissioning does not automatically transfer every kind of work. 10 Thus, a brand's payment to an independent scriptwriter should not be treated as equivalent to ownership arising from a qualifying employment relationship. The character's components may initially belong to different persons.

Written assignments should identify the work and specify the rights, duration and territorial extent in accordance with sections 18 and 19.11 Mira believes that the commercial contract should distinguish character artwork, scripts and recordings, as well as later adaptations. It should also clarify whether the company gets editable files and whether the agency can reuse background tools. The company owning "all AI" is too vague to address these issues. Assignment cannot create statutory protection in material that does not qualify for it.

Names, marks and goodwill

A character's name or visual sign may function as a trademark. Infringement depends on statutory conditions, while section 27(2) preserves passing-off claims.12 Neither route makes every portrayal of the same personality illegal. The claimant must show the mark or goodwill and satisfy the legal requirements concerning the challenged conduct. For example, a competitor showing a different account is the official Mira account is a different situation from an unrelated fictional influencer who shares a similar broad visual style.

This same situation draws a line between character ownership and character sponsorship. An influencer may sponsor a client's product without owning the character that endorses the product. Alternatively, an advertiser may own a registered mark and the company may own the production assets. The legal relationship should determine the scope of ownership rather than assuming that one business relationship creates an all-encompassing ownership interest.

[9] (2008) 1 SCC 1. Judgment delivered Dec. 12, 2007.

[10] The Copyright Act, 1957 (Act 14 of 1957), s. 17, particularly provisos (b) and (c).

[11] Id., ss. 18–19. Section 19(5)–(6) supplies defaults where duration or territorial extent is omitted.

[12] The Trade Marks Act, 1999 (Act 47 of 1999), ss. 27(2), 28–30.

Human likeness and operational access

Where an avatar reproduces an identifiable human, rights in the recording and permission to exploit the identity must be considered separately. Performer rights and moral rights may also remain relevant.13 A voice recording should not be considered a license to create new endorsments, personal or political statements in that recording. Permitted uses, editability, duration and treatment of the output after the license has terminated should be addressed in the license.

Account credentials and generation tools add an operational layer. A claimant may be the owner of the artwork, but lack the contractual ability to assign an account or continue to use a hosted model. Because of differences in service terms, platform control cannot be inferred from copyright ownership. Asset transfer agreements should require an inventory of service terms and workable arrangements to continue the agreed to service. They should not describe followers as property. Commercial access to an audience does not grant ownership of the audience.

Three types of transactions illustrate the above. In a commissioned character transaction, the company needs the assignments to grant it long term right in the identity. In an endorsement transaction the company purchases the right to promote an existing character. In a human replica transaction, the company needs the right to promote the identified character as well as the right to use the materials in which the character is embodied. A broad ownership clause is not appropriate and gives too little for continuity and claims too much over the individual.

V Recent Indian decisions and their limits

Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India illustrates judicial concern over unauthorized commercial and technologically manipulated uses of celebrity identity.14 September 2023 order recognizes the rights of legitimate expression such as satire and criticism. Its importance here is the coexistence of commercial and expressive interests. It does not hold that a company-created face would automatically possess the same rights as an actor.

In *Arijit Singh v. Codible Ventures LLP*, the Bombay High Court granted ad-interim protection against unauthorized exploitation including AI voice replication.15 Paragraphs 17-21 connect identifiability, commercial use and control over a performer's persona. The case illustrates that, at least in certain respects, a synthetic recording may itself give rise to an impression of human identity, even in the absence of a direct copy of a particular recording. The case does not determine the ownership of an imaginary voice or character and should not be relied upon as the final determination of liability of all Defendants.

The Delhi High Court's September 2025 order in *Karan Johar v. Ashok Kumar* addresses alleged misuse involving merchandise, impersonation and AI manipulation. 16 The connection between identity exploitation and misleading commercial association is furthered by the section on reputation and confusion. Nonetheless, language that is overly broad concerning personal attributes must be assessed in the light of the factual context and the interim context. A blanket prohibition on all unapproved

[13] The Copyright Act, 1957 (Act 14 of 1957), ss. 38, 38A, 38B and 57; *Arijit Singh v. Codible Ventures LLP*, Interim Application (L) 23560/2024 in Commercial IP Suit (L) 23443/2024 (Bom HC, July 26, 2024), paras 17–21.

[14] 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914, paras 38–40 (order dated Sept. 20, 2023).

[15] Interim Application (L) 23560/2024 in Commercial IP Suit (L) 23443/2024 (Bom HC, July 26, 2024), paras 17–21, available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/103091928/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

[16] 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6108, paras 32–38 (order dated Sept. 17, 2025).

depictions would extend beyond the specific harms that warrant the relief. The two 2026 orders bring the analysis to nearer the realm of the current commercial deployment. In Manish Grover v. John Doe, the Delhi High Court issued ex parte ad-interim relief and orders relating to online content that posted health product endorsements using AI to alter the images to speak false endorsements. Its order was dated 5 June 2026.17 This is most pertinent to influencer marketing: the plaintiff details fabricated authorization and exploitation of public trust. It invites analysis of the human endorsement being faked, not assuming generation technology determines entitlement.

The case Samantha Ruth Prabhu v. John Doe (Ashok Kumar) is from a different jurisdiction and landmark judgment of the 1st of October 2026 of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay that dealt with deepfakes, morphed content, unauthorized merchandise, chatbot impersonation and other related issues. In addition to granting interim ad-interim relief, on a prima facie basis, the Court focused on the dignity, personality rights and performer's interests.18 It's significant because, in this case, identity exploitation occurs through an interactive service as opposed to one copying a picture. Nevertheless, preventing a living actor from such appropriation does not create dignity interests in an entirely fictional chatbot.

The strongest common proposition in the cases is that the presence of synthetic media does not remove the rights of the identifiable people. The cases do not provide a comprehensive code of property regarding AI Influencers. Also, they show that order for an injunction in relation to deceptive endorsements should be narrowly construed. Such an order should not create a broad censorship power over research, criticism, and other fictional expression.

That said, the cases do create an important legal and normative disparity. For instance, when the court states that the plaintiff has a right to personality, that broad statement encompasses multiple things including the right to one's reputation, right to privacy, and right to economic interests. Not all of those have to be raised in any given case to provide a solid basis to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. For example, a deceptive advertisement primarily raises a commercial association interest, and, in a case of deepfake technology that effects a person's dignity, that could provide a solid legal basis for a court to grant relief to the plaintiff. Further, a fictional character dispute may not involve human dignity interests at all. Courts should clarify which legal interest supports a given part of the order instead of relying on broad, catch all statements.

VI Comparative guidance without automatic transplantation

In *Thaler v. Perlmutter*, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed refusal of registration where a machine was identified as the sole author. 19 It relied on human authorship under U.S. copyright law and did not accept the suggested work-for-hire route in those circumstances. The decision does not mean that all AI-assisted expression lacks protection. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 2 March 2026; denial left the appellate result undisturbed without constituting a Supreme Court merits endorsement.20

[17] CS(COMM) 659/2026 (Del HC, June 5, 2026), paras 29–36, available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/154102410/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

[18] Interim Application (L) 29905/2026 in Commercial IP Suit 346/2026 (Bom HC, Oct. 1, 2026), paras 14–19, available at: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/45677221/ (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

[19] No. 23-5233 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 18, 2025), slip op. at 9–19, 23–24.

[20] *Thaler v. Perlmutter*, No. 25-449 (U.S. Supreme Court), docket entry dated Mar. 2, 2026, available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-449.html (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

India can't import that result as section 2(d)(vi) addresses computer-generated works. The methodological comparative lesson is to determine whether a work qualifies for protection and who could own it. The United States Copyright Office evaluates human expressive contributions and does not consider every use of AI as a disqualifier.21 For a cross-border campaign, a contract should therefore avoid promising identical copyright coverage in every territory.

Disclosure provides another independent safeguard. ASCI's influencer guidelines require virtual influencers to disclose that audiences are not interacting with a real human and require appropriate advertising disclosures. 22 These are self-regulatory standards, not a statute creating ownership. Nevertheless, they expose the weakness of treating title as the only legal question. A company may have permission to use every production asset while presenting the resulting endorsement deceptively.

VII A framework for ownership and accountable control

The first step is to determine the claimed asset exactly. A claimant making a claim of ownership of a persona should say whether the dispute is concerning artwork, scripts, recordings, a trademark, goodwill or access. The second step is to trace title through the applicable statute and the relevant transactions. The third step is to identify whether any permissions are needed from persons whose identity has been reproduced. The fourth step is to select appropriate relief for the harm caused by the proven copying, deceit or identity theft. These are analytical steps to help evaluate a claim and are not to create a new legal standard.

Mira offers many examples. The company could have the artwork, trademark and other associated intellectual property while the performer has the voice and personality outside the licence. The agency could have the production software while owing the delivery of the campaign files. A platform could have the procedures for account transfer while not owning the character. These divided interests are workable as long as the parties so agree, and calling the company the "owner of Mira" is a workable commercial simplification.

Contracts should define production records and legitimate synthetic uses of a persona. They should provide for complaints and their correction and differentiate restraint of a harmful impersonation from other payment disputes. Such clauses should not be read to bind third parties and should not be read to provide for contracts in restraint of trade.

The strongest criticism of this proposal concerns transaction costs. A greater burden may fall on smaller creators, who may find it difficult to manage multiple rights and licenses. Simplifying administration through a consolidated business contract and standard asset schedule may not amount to a monopoly in this case. If additional evidence shows a protection gap, any future law should be crafted narrowly to address a demonstrated competitive injury and preserve exceptions for fair use. The existence of a profitable synthetic identity does not necessarily show that the current protections fail.

Let us consider a different variation. A competitor creates a similar looking character, uses a different name, and disclaims any connection to the character. While it may appear that the competitor is engaging in unfair competition, commercial disappointment does not establish a legal claim. There must be evidence that the competitor copied the character, or otherwise committed trademark infringement,

[21] U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 5 at 11–27.

[22] Advertising Standards Council of India, Guidelines for Influencer Advertising in Digital Media, disclosure provisions, available at: https://www.ascionline.in/social/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/ASCI-Influencer-Guidelines.pdf (last visited on Nov. 4, 2026).

and/or misrepresentation. If evidence if presented to support any of these claims, the framework would not allow the competing activity.

The opposite case is an unauthorized ‘official Mira’ account using original images rather than copied images. In cases of copyright, a more indirect route could be where the expression has not been reproduced. A trademark or passing off claim might be more suited to address the situation. Moreover, if the account mimics a realworld performer's identifiable voice, a separate claim might be warranted. The correct remedy should focus on those specific acts, and should not vest the successful claimant with every right associated to that character.

For a sale of an influencer business, due diligence should assess both legal ownership and continuity. Evidence of assignments, the limits of human-identity permissions, and agency obligations should be checked as well as the potential for account transfers. Continuity of access is not assured by title to the most critical means, and the best evidence of title is not a guarantee of continued access. The value transferred is a set of rights, titles and interests in property and operating arrangements integrated to provide access to a digital person.

VIII Conclusion and Recommendations

This article demonstrates that ownership of an AI influencer can’t be settled by reducing its digital persona to a single asset. Indian law offers a framework for such situations using copyright, trademark, passing off, contract, performer protection, personality rights etc. Rights under the above laws, if any, are to works, marks, goodwill, sound recordings or identities. The aforesaid rights do not render a character, fictional or otherwise, a legal person. More recent orders of the Indian judiciary concerning the use of AI to impersonate and commit false endorsement protect identifiable individuals. But, such orders do not acknowledge a proprietary right to wholly synthetic influencers. Consequently, ownership will have to be determined by considering the asset, creative contribution, legal rules and agreements. It’s true that investment merits some protection, but that doesn’t give a market player an absolute monopoly over a character or the audience thereof.

IX Recommendations

First, agreements should be executed identifying each asset, its creator and owner, its permitted uses, assignments and licenses, duration, territory, and post-production obligations. Second, production records should identify the contributors to the production and include information regarding AI content creation and editing and approvals. Third, licenses should, where human content is used, synthetically transformed and/or endorsed, put limitations on further uses. Fourth, businesses should maintain a register of content, scripts and recordings, as well as of intellectual property, goodwill, software, user account contracts, and other content. Fifth, operators of virtual influencers should disclose the status of endorsed persons and establish procedures for handling complaints and corrections. Sixth, courts should tailor their remedies to proven infringement, deception and identity misuse, while retaining the protections for legitimate satire, criticisms and other legitimate expressions. Evidence of a protection gap should be the sole basis for the enactment of new laws and the new laws should be narrow and include gaps.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Books and Research Articles

1. Victoria L. Schwartz, "AI Influencers and a Right of Publicity", 49(2) *Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts* 355–407 (2026).
2. Daniel J. Gervais, "Artificial Intellectual Property", 100(1) *Chicago-Kent Law Review* 265 (2025).
3. J.M. Paterson, "AI Mimicking and Interpreting Humans: Legal and Ethical Reflections", 22(3) *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry* 539–550 (2025).
4. Zheng Shen, "Shall Brands Create Their Own Virtual Influencers? A Comprehensive Study of 33 Virtual Influencers on Instagram", 11 *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications*, Article 177 (2024).

II. Statutes and Legislative Materials

1. The Constitution of India, 1950.
2. The Companies Act, 2013 (Act No. 18 of 2013).
3. The Copyright Act, 1957 (Act No. 14 of 1957).
4. The Trade Marks Act, 1999 (Act No. 47 of 1999).
5. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (United States).

III. Judicial Decisions

A. Indian Cases

1. *ICC Development (International) Ltd. v. Arvee Enterprises & Anr.*, 2003 SCC OnLine Del 2; 2003 (26) PTC 245 (Del).
2. *Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak*, (2008) 1 SCC 1.
3. *Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India & Ors.*, CS(COMM) 652/2023, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914 (Delhi High Court, 20 September 2023).
4. *Arijit Singh v. Codible Ventures LLP & Ors.*, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 2445 (Bombay High Court, 26 July 2024).
5. *Karan Johar v. Ashok Kumar/John Doe & Ors.*, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6108 (Delhi High Court, 17 September 2025).
6. *Manish Grover & Anr. v. John Doe & Anr.*, CS(COMM) 659/2026 (Delhi High Court, 5 June 2026).
7. *Samantha Ruth Prabhu v. John Doe (Ashok Kumar) & Ors.*, Interim Application (L) No. 29905/2026 in Commercial IP Suit No. 346/2026 (Bombay High Court, 1 October 2026).

B. United States Cases

1. *Thaler v. Perlmutter*, 130 F.4th 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-449 (U.S. 2 March 2026).

IV. Reports and Regulatory Guidelines

1. United States Copyright Office, *Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability* (January 2025).
2. Advertising Standards Council of India (ASCI), *Guidelines for Influencer Advertising in Digital Media* (2021, as subsequently updated).