International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR)
E-ISSN: 2582-2160 ● Website: www.ijfmr.com ● Email: editor@ijfmr.com

Paralysis of Power: Role of the United Nations Veto in Ongoing Wars

Nisha Singh[1], Prof. Anugya Rani[2]

[1]LL.M. Student (Criminal Law), Amity Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, Amity University, Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India
[2]Asst. Prof., Delhi Metropolitan Education, IP University, Noida

Abstract
The veto from the five permanent members on the security council make it hard for that group to handle current wars in a really good way, even if they want to. The charter set it up so the big powers would stay united under collective security but that does not seem to happen much anymore because of national interests in this connected world.
It stops any joint moves and that hurts the councils standing overall. This can affect humanitarian law and how safe civilians are. Comparisons between conflicts like the one in ukraine and what is happening in gaza point to these problems. India also has a view on reforming the council tied to article 51. The veto has sort of made the Security Council into something that just gets stuck all the time.
Changes are needed to keep the un looking like it can help with peace. Widening permanent spots equally might be one step along with cutting back on veto use when there are big violations happening. The council should probably answer more to the General Assembly as well. I am not totally sure how easy that would be to get done.

Keywords: The United Nations Security Council, Veto Power, Collective Security, Globalisation, International Humanitarian Law, UNSC Reform, India

I. Introduction

The United Nations was created back in 1945, so future generations could maybe stay safer from war.[1] The UN Charter gave the Security Council the main task of keeping peace and security across the world.[2] Any choices the Council makes are supposed to be carried out by every single member country, no real exceptions there.[3] One big side of how the Council decides things is that the five permanent members get a kind of "veto" power , which can block action. These countries are China, France, the Russian Federation,the United Kingdom, and the United States.[4] According to Article 27(3) important decisions need at least nine votes in favor, and the permanent members must agree.[5]

[1] Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Preamble.
[2] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art 24(1).
[3] Ibid., art 25.
[4] Ibid., art 23(1).
[5] Ibid., art 27(3).

This setup was based on the politics of 1945.[6] It was meant to keep the major powers involved in a system that protects everyone. International relationships have changed a lot. Globalization has made countries connected through trade, technology and communication. Modern wars often have effects that go beyond one country. Even though things have changed the Security Council still works with a system that was made for a different time. Because of this the veto has started to stop group actions from happening. Recent fighting in Ukraine and Gaza has shown how one of the members can stop important decisions from being made even when many other countries support action.[7]

The Security Council was made to be the protector of peace with the power to make decisions that everyone must follow and to enforce them under Chapter VII.[8] When the veto is used often—especially to protect the interests of a permanent member or an ally—it limits the Council's ability to do its job. Politics often comes before helping people, which weakens the protection of civilians and makes people less confident in the legal system.[9]

Looking at all of this the current research looks at the Security Council veto in terms of law, fairness and globalization. It looks at the reasons for the veto how it affects responses to modern conflicts India's point of view and big ideas for change. The main question is whether the current system can still help keep everyone safe in a world that is changing quickly or if real changes are needed to make the Council better, at its job, fair and more responsible while still following the basic rules of the Charter.

II. Research Problem

The basic institutional issue is that the P5 veto kind of blocks the Security Council from actually fulfilling its obligations under the UN Charter when armed conflict is still ongoing. Additionally, the paper investigates the implications of this paralysis for international law, global justice, and India's constitutional mandate to champion international peace.[10]

III. Research Objectives

The study aims to achieve the following four objectives:

1. To examine the legal basis of the veto power under the UN Charter and understand how it affects the principles of collective security and sovereign equality among states.
2. To analyse the use of the veto through selected case studies, particularly the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts, while also examining relevant historical examples to understand how the veto has influenced the Security Council's response to international conflicts.
3. To examine India's constitutional perspective under Article 51 of the Indian Constitution and its official position on Security Council reform, with particular attention to the question of veto power.

[6] See generally Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate and Kelly-Kate Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 6th edn., 2009); Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma, *International Relations (Since World War II)* (Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1997).
[7] See Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead", *Monthly Forecast* (January 2026), available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-01/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2025-and-the-year-ahead.php.
[8] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, arts 39–42.
[9] See generally Michael J. Glennon, "Why the Security Council Failed" 82(3) *Foreign Affairs* 16 (2003).
[10] Constitution of India 1950, art 51.

4. To study the major proposals for reforming the Security Council and assess how these reforms could address institutional deadlock while preserving the role and credibility of the United Nations in an increasingly interconnected world.

IV. Research Questions

The research is guided by the following three questions:

RQ1: How does Article 27 of the UN Charter provide permanent members with the power to block collective decisions, even when international peace and security are under threat?

RQ2: How has the use of the veto in the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts affected the implementation of international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians? How has globalisation further increased the consequences of such inaction?

RQ3: What reforms are necessary to make the Security Council more effective, more representative and legitimate, particularly in light of comparative international experience and India's position on Security Council reform?

V. Research Methodology

This research uses a comparative and analytical approach, to look at the legal structure and the real world running of the United Nations Security Council veto system. The study relies on both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, sort of, include the UN Charter, Chapters V, VI and VII , key Security Council resolutions, official remarks from permanent and non-permanent members, and Article 51 of the Constitution of India. It also considers India's formal submissions, and the interventions made during debates on Security Council reform.[11]

Trying to understand how the veto works in practice, research is focused mainly on two current flashpoints : Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts. These conflicts were picked because of their importance, like the involvement or support of permanent members and the pretty frequent use of the veto to stop what the Council was trying to do. The study also checks out events such, as the Gulf War of 1990–91, the Bosnian conflict and the Darfur crisis, just to trace how the veto use has shifted over time. Sometimes it feels like the pattern is uneven, but still it changes.

VI. Main Analysis

A. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

I think collective security under the UN Charter sort of gets built on this notion that a threat, or an act of aggression against one state is a concern for the whole world community, not just the victim.[12] It kind of assumes that states will cooperate, almost like in a joint effort, to preserve peace and security. Yet the veto power, it creates a snag , because any permanent member can block key Security Council decisions even when collective action is plainly needed. So there's this ongoing tension between the aim of security and the special privileges those five permanent members get , and it's basically a contradiction that stays a major subject for debate among scholars of international law.[13]

[11] Statement by Ambassador Harish Parvathaneni, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform (26 October 2026).
[12] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art 1(1).
[13] See generally V.N. Khanna, *International Relations* (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi); Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (eds.), *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority* (Routledge, London, 2008).

I notice that the idea of legitimacy offers another useful way to see the effects of the veto. The credibility of an organisation mainly depends on whether its actions match the principles and values that created it.[14] When the Security Council does not answer threats to international peace because of the veto power questions naturally arise about the Security Councils ability to meet its duties under the Charter. These situations slowly erode the trust of Member States and the wider international community. From a view that focuses on consequences the problem gets even worse: failing to act can cause suffering, forced displacement, economic instability and a growing sense that international justice is applied unevenly based on the political interests of powerful states.[15]

I am bit worried that the principle of equality, recognised in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter also brings important anxieties.[16] Even if all Member States are formally equal under law, the veto gives five permanent members a decisive edge , and that is not really a small detail. This whole arrangement was accepted back in 1945 mainly, so that the major powers would join and keep cooperating in the collective security system.[17]

Now, with the shift in international relations and the rise of a more diverse world, there is renewed attention on whether those unequal decision powers are still justified today, or if they look a bit out of date.

B. Indian Legal Framework

The Constitution of India has a part called Article 51. It is a Directive Principle of State Policy.[18] This part tells the State to work for peace and security. It wants the State to keep respectful relationships with other countries. It also wants the State to respect law and agreements. It encourages solving problems between countries through arbitration. This part is not something that can be taken to court like the rights.[19] However courts have seen it as an idea for how India works with international law and organizations.[20] It shows how the people who created the Constitution wanted an rule-based way for countries to work together. It also gives India a reason to push for an more fair Security Council, based on its own Constitution.

India's foreign policy has always connected this part of the Constitution to a call for changes. As a member of the G4 and following the Common African Position India says that any new permanent members should have the same rights as the current ones, including the right to veto as long as the veto is still in the Charter.[21] If new permanent members do not have the veto India believes that would make them second-class members. It would not change how the P5 make decisions.

India also says that the veto is a responsibility that should be used carefully especially when it comes to peace and security. It should never be used for political reasons.[22] This view comes from what the Charter says and from knowing that using the veto much makes the Council less trustworthy. India has an interest

[14] See generally David Armstrong and Theo Farrell, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction" 31 *Review of International Studies* (Supplement S1) 3 (2005).
[15] See generally Glennon, supra note 9.
[16] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art 2(1).
[17] Weiss, Forsythe, Coate and Pease, supra note 6.
[18] Constitution of India, supra note 10, art 51(a)–(d).
[19] Ibid., art 37.
[20] See e.g. *Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan*, (1997) 6 SCC 241; *Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey*, (1984) 2 SCC 534.
[21] Parvathaneni statement, supra note 11; African Union, *Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration (Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council)* (2005).
[22] Parvathaneni statement, supra note 11.

in a working and trusted Council because it has been a non-permanent member and has helped in UN peacekeeping missions.

C. International Legal Framework and the Operation of the Veto

Chapter VII of the Charter lets the Security Council decide, if there really is a threat to peace or if there is a breach of peace. It also lets the Council decide what actions to take, including using force.[23] Because of the veto none of these decisions or actions can happen if a permanent member does not agree.[24] In reality, the Council's main job ends up being controlled by the wants of the P5.

Under Article 25 all countries agree to follow the Councils decisions.[25] So when the Council makes a decision under Chapter VII it is legally required to follow it. When a veto stops a decision the system for working is still there on paper but it cannot be used. This difference between the rules, on paper and the real world is the issue that this paper is looking at.

The examples show the pattern. In the Gulf War of 1990–91 the Council allowed force through Resolution 678[26] because no permanent member used a veto In the conflict the Council created again the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia through Resolution 827,[27] without any veto. The Russia–Ukraine situation is different. Many draft resolutions that criticized the invasion or wanted more accountability were stopped by Russia's veto.[28] On Israel–Palestine the United States has used its veto to stop resolutions that asked for a ceasefire or more accountability even when most of the Council wanted them.[29]

D. Comparative Case Analysis

1. Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Since Russia started its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United Nations Security Council has run into some serious issues when trying to craft an effective reply. Russia, being a permanent member , has repeatedly used its veto to block resolutions that would condemn its military actions, call for troop withdrawal, or set up some kind of accountability measures.[30] And because of that, it often feels like the Council just can't move forward in any steady way , even when the wording is pretty clear. Consequently, a permanent member that is directly tangled in an armed conflict has been able, to basically block collective action. The lack of a solid mechanism meant to limit the veto in those moments, shows a rather critical weakness inside the United Nations Charter. This whole setup, brings real worries about fairness, how effective things are, and also how credible the Security Council's decision making process feels . Furthermore, the repeated exercising of the veto, by a party to the conflict, really erodes the shared safety arrangement that the United Nations was set up to keep in place. Civil society organizations and some international legal scholars have been pushing for adjustments to the veto system more and more, they say that allowing a state to block action where it has a direct stake, goes against ideas of justice and

[23] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, arts 39, 41 and 42.
[24] Ibid., art 27(3).
[25] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art 25; see generally Stefan Talmon, "The Security Council as World Legislature" 99 *American Journal of International Law* 175 (2005).
[26] UNSC Res 678 (29 November 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678.
[27] UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827.
[28] UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2022/155 (25 February 2022) (not adopted: 11 in favour, 1 against, 3 abstentions, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member); UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2022/720 (30 September 2022) (not adopted: 10 in favour, 1 against, 4 abstentions, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member).
[29] See e.g. UN Press Release SC/16174, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Gaza Ceasefire" (18 September 2025) (draft resolution not adopted: 14 in favour, 1 against (United States)).
[30] See supra note 28; Bahlouli Aboulfadhel Mohamed, "The Paralysis of the United Nations Security Council" (University of Mascara, Algeria)

accountability.[31] The ongoing standstill of the Security Council when these situations show up has caused rising irritation , among member states and the wider public too, since people expect the UN to take charge and come forward with practical solutions that help preserve international peace and security.

This issue continued throughout 2025 and 2026.[32] On 24 February 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2774, which called for an end to the conflict.[33] However, the resolution did not explicitly reaffirm Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, or territorial integrity. Russia exercised its veto to block amendments addressing these principles, resulting in criticism from several European members.[34] This episode kind of showed how the national interests of a permanent member can stop, sort of, the collective decision making in the Council . You keep seeing this same story where they can't move forward on troop withdrawal, on accountability, and also on enforcing international legal obligations, which points to the problems with the present veto system. And the Ukraine conflict is a clear example of an institutional snag: when a permanent member is directly involved then the veto can block the Council from doing its main job , that is maintaining international peace and security. As the conflict continues, the humanitarian consequences have intensified, with millions displaced and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure. The Security Council's failure to reach consensus on substantive measures has prompted alternative responses, including the General Assembly adopting non-binding resolutions and individual states imposing unilateral sanctions.[35] These developments underscore the urgent need for reform to enable the Council to act decisively when a permanent member is a party to the dispute. Ultimately, this situation necessitates reconsideration of whether unrestricted veto use is consistent with the principles of security, sovereign equality, and accountability enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

2. Israel–Palestine Conflict

The situation in Gaza is another example of how the veto limits what the Security Council can do in an emergency. The United States has often used its veto to stop plans that ask for breaks in fighting a stop to the violence or more responsibility.[36] These choices have caused a lot of criticism with many countries and people saying that politics is affecting how international law is used.

In September 2025 the United States used its veto against a plan that was proposed by the ten members who are not permanent. The plan called for a full and lasting end to the fighting and more help to reach people in need. The text got 14 votes in favor. Failed because of the one veto.[37] At that time Gaza was already in a bad situation with many people hurt parts of the area facing hunger and essential services not working. The Council's repeated failure to take action made people worry more about the United Nations' ability to protect people who're in war.

[31] See generally Narender Kumar Bishnoi, "Unveiling the Weight of Veto Power: Exploring the Legal Domain of the UNSC Amidst War" Vol. VIII, Issue III *NUJS Journal of Regulatory Studies* 60 (2023).
[32] Security Council Report, supra note 7; Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2026: Mid-Year Scorecard and Looking Ahead", *Monthly Forecast* (August 2026), available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-08/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2026-mid-year-scorecard-and-looking-ahead.php.
[33] UNSC Res 2774 (24 February 2025) UN Doc S/RES/2774 (adopted by 10 votes to none, with 5 abstentions).
[34] UNSC Verbatim Record, 9866th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.9866 (24 February 2025) (two amendments to draft resolution S/2025/112 not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member).
[35] See e.g. UN Meetings Coverage GA/12677, "General Assembly Debates Russian Federation's Security Council Veto of European Amendments Seeking 'Just' Peace in Ukraine" (6 March 2025).
[36] See supra note 29.
[37] UN Press Release SC/16174, supra note 29 (draft resolution submitted by the ten elected members of the Council; 14 votes in favour, 1 against).

A major change came in November 2025 when the Council passed Resolution 2803 with 13 votes in favor while China and Russia did not vote either way.[38] The resolution agreed with a plan to stop the fighting in Gaza welcomed the proposed group for peace as a way to manage things temporarily and allowed an international group to help keep things stable. The passing of the resolution showed that the Council can still act when the permanent members agree and no one uses the veto. However people who are watching including the UN expert on rights in the occupied area warned that the plan might make outside control over Gaza stronger without really helping the people there or solving the bigger problem of being under occupation.[39]

The times when the veto was used in Gaza have made the General Assembly more important as a place where more members can speak. Even though the Assembly has passed resolutions that show what most people want these do not have the same power as the ones made under Chapter VII.[40] General Assembly Resolution 76/262, which says that the Assembly must meet after any veto from the Security Council has made things more open by letting people talk about why the veto was used.[41] It still cannot fix the basic problems that the veto system creates.

3. Historical Contrast: Gulf War and Bosnia

The approval for the Gulf War and the creation of the ICTY, during the Bosnia situation show that the Council can act quickly when the permanent members agree.[42] When compared with what happened in Ukraine and Gaza these examples show that the veto is most powerful when a permanent member is directly involved or when a close ally is involved.[43] This kind of choice does not fit well with the idea of all countries being equal.

E. Critical Analysis: Globalisation, Legitimacy and Selective Justice

The Council's repeated inaction has also made people think that international law is used when it suits them. When the permanent members can stop accountability steps while using the law against other countries the Charter's power is weakened. This damage is worse in a world where civil society, the media and non-permanent members can easily show the difference between what the law says and what happens.[44]

From India's point of view this lack of legitimacy has strengthened India's long-time call for reform. India wants new permanent members to have the rights. It is not about status. India believes that a Council that still shows the 1945 power balance cannot earn the trust of a world with powers. The Common African Position, which asks for two seats with veto for Africa uses the same idea: past exclusion must be fixed so that the Council can regain legitimacy.[45]

[38] UNSC Res 2803 (17 November 2025) UN Doc S/RES/2803 (adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China and the Russian Federation)); see also UNSC Verbatim Record, 10046th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.10046 (17 November 2025).
[39] Francesca Albanese, UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, "UN Security Council resolution a violation of the Palestinian right of self-determination and UN Charter, UN expert warns", OHCHR Press Release (19 November 2025), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/un-security-council-resolution-violation-palestinian-right-self.
[40] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, arts 10–14.
[41] UNGA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/262, "Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council".
[42] See supra notes 26 and 27.
[43] See generally Frederick Rawski and Nathan Miller, "The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian Bargain?" in David M. Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Viva Books, New Delhi, 2006) 357.
[44] See generally Bahram Soltani, "Law, Power, and Paralysis..." (2026)
[45] Parvathaneni statement, supra note 11; African Union, supra note 21.

The main point is that as it stands the veto has changed the Security Council from a tool for security into a tool for selective security. In a world this is not workable. The legal structure must be changed to limit the veto and to enlarge membership on terms. Otherwise the Council's power—and the trust in the UN—will keep falling.

VII. Research Findings

The study yields the following findings:

First Article 27 of the UN Charter gives each member the power to block major Security Council decisions , like those about ending hostilities , safeguarding civilians and helping restore peace. The situation gets much worse when one of the permanent members is actually involved in the conflict, or when that state quietly backs one side. In that kind of case , the veto can end up preventing the Council from doing its job, for real.

Second the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts show how the repeated use of the veto has stopped the Council from reacting to threats to world peace. Even though many people worry strong binding actions have rarely happened. This trend kept going into 2025 and 2026. Globalisation has made the effects of this stalemate for people in need for economies and for faith in international law.

Third India's constitutional rules in Article 51 and its diplomatic position on reform show that the veto must be used carefully and that the Council should be more equal. India has always pushed for a representative body. It has warned against adding permanent seats that do not have veto rights because that would make inequality worse.

Fourth past cases like the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict prove that the veto does not always stop the Council. How much it stops the Council depends on how much the permanent members agree. The main issue happens when their strategic interests are different. Because of this the problem is political well as legal. The current legal rules let political differences become a long-term deadlock**.**

VIII. Suggestions and Recommendations

Based on the analysis the following actions are suggested:

1. Limit the use of the veto in cases of atrocities. Permanent members should be more careful especially when there is genocide, crimes against humanity or serious war crimes. Ideas like the French-Mexican proposal and General Assembly Resolution 76/262 can help.[46] If members voluntarily promise not to use the veto when there is humanitarian suffering it will not change the Charter but it could create political pressure and over time make the rules stronger.

2. Make Security Council membership more representative. The Council must show the economic changes that have happened since 1945. Membership should grow for both non-permanent seats to give better representation to regions that are currently under-represented, such as India, Africa, Latin America and other developing areas. If the veto stays new permanent members must have the rights and duties. Seats that have no powers will only make inequality worse.[47]

3. Improve accountability and transparency. The connection between the Security Council and the General Assembly should be a bit stronger, not just symbolic. The reporting duties in Article 24 should actually

[46] France and Mexico, Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (2015); UNGA Res 76/262, supra note 41.

[47] See Parvathaneni statement, supra note 11; African Union, supra note 21.

become more useful, more practical, if you will.[48] The "Uniting for Peace" mechanism, Resolution 377(V),[49] ought to be used more often when the Council cannot reach agreement, even if it feels a little awkward at first. As for the working methods, like the penholder system should be spelled out clearer, so that every Member State has a real chance to participate, not only a few folks.

4. Work toward long-term reform of Article 27.

Lasting improvement means we must revisit the veto rules themselves. Member States should consider changes that would stop one member from blocking action when situations are clear—perhaps by using a qualified-majority override or by placing temporary limits on cases of mass atrocities.[50] Even though changing the Charter needs political agreement, these talks are still necessary.[51] I believe that voluntary limits alone will not stop repeated deadlock.

IX. CONCLUSION

The United Nations was created with the hope that future generations would never have to live through the horrors of another war. The veto power was added to keep the worlds leading powers working together and to stop divisions that could endanger peace. The continuing Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts bring up a hard but unavoidable question: What is the purpose of a Security Council that cannot act when international peace and human lives are at stake?

The repeated use of veto power in these conflicts has shown a weakness in the United Nations system. Of allowing joint action the veto has more and more become a tool that lets national interests overrule international duties. When a permanent member is directly involved in a conflict or backs one side politically the Security Council often cannot act together. As a result resolutions stay blocked it is hard to hold people accountable. Civilian protection keeps facing big problems. This situation has not weakened the Security Council but also made people doubt the trustworthiness of international law and the idea that every state should be treated the same.

The Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Palestine conflicts show that the failure of the veto system is not a procedural glitch; it is a deeper crisis of international responsibility. A system meant to stop war should not lose power right when it is most needed. The ongoing lack of action by the Security Council also suggests that international law is applied differently when powerful states are involved.

Indias view, which is built on coexistence, sovereign equality, multilateral cooperation and the need for a more representative Security Council gives an important perspective on reform. The results of this study suggest that reform should go beyond simply adding members. It must also tackle the use of veto power promote restraint when many civilians are suffering strengthen accountability and make sure the Security Council can meet its main job of keeping international peace and security.

Ultimately the question isn't simply whether the veto should exist. It is more about if it should keep working, without real limits, when the lives of millions are actually at risk . The authority of the Security Council ought to come not from the sheer power held by the five permanent members, but from the trust of the international community and its capacity to safeguard people who cannot safeguard themselves. If the United Nations can not act while the world is watching war, pain, and breaches of the rules then the

[48] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, art 24(3).
[49] UNGA Res 377 (V) (Uniting for Peace) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V).
[50] See generally Richard Ponzio, "Is Reforming the UNSC Realistic?" (Stimson Center, 2026)
[51] Charter of the United Nations, supra note 1, arts 108 and 109.

failure is not only of the Security Council but also of the promise on which the United Nations was founded.

A meaningful reform of the veto system is therefore essential to keep the United Nations as an institution that protects security, not one held back by the political interests of a few powerful states. International law must stay a standard of justice for all, not a rule that can be changed when powerful states are involved.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

1. Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI.
2. Constitution of India 1950, arts 37 and 51.
3. France and Mexico, Political Declaration on Suspension of Veto Powers in Cases of Mass Atrocities (2015).
4. UNGA Res 377 (V) (Uniting for Peace) (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V).
5. UNGA Res 76/262 (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/RES/76/262.
6. UNSC Res 678 (29 November 1990) UN Doc S/RES/678.
7. UNSC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/RES/827.
8. UNSC Res 2774 (24 February 2025) UN Doc S/RES/2774.
9. UNSC Res 2803 (17 November 2025) UN Doc S/RES/2803.
10. UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2022/155 (25 February 2022).
11. UNSC, Draft Resolution S/2022/720 (30 September 2022).
12. UNSC Verbatim Record, 9866th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.9866 (24 February 2025).
13. UNSC Verbatim Record, 10046th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.10046 (17 November 2025).
14. UN Press Release SC/16174, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Gaza Ceasefire" (18 September 2025).
15. UN Meetings Coverage GA/12677, "General Assembly Debates Russian Federation's Security Council Veto of European Amendments Seeking 'Just' Peace in Ukraine" (6 March 2025).
16. African Union, *Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration (Common African Position on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council)* (2005).
17. Statement by Ambassador Harish Parvathaneni, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform (26 October 2026).
18. *Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)*, Judgment of 30 March 2023, ICJ Reports 2023.
19. *Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey*, (1984) 2 SCC 534.
20. *Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan*, (1997) 6 SCC 241.

Secondary Sources

1. Albanese, Francesca, "UN Security Council resolution a violation of the Palestinian right of self-determination and UN Charter, UN expert warns", OHCHR Press Release (19 November 2025), available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/un-security-council-resolution-violation-palestinian-right-self.
2. Armstrong, David and Theo Farrell, "Force and Legitimacy in World Politics: Introduction" 31 *Review of International Studies* (Supplement S1) 3 (2005).

3. Bahlouli Aboulfadhel Mohamed, "The Paralysis of the United Nations Security Council" (University of Mascara, Algeria)
4. Bishnoi, Narender Kumar, "Unveiling the Weight of Veto Power: Exploring the Legal Domain of the UNSC Amidst War" Vol. VIII, Issue III *NUJS Journal of Regulatory Studies* 60 (2023).
5. Cronin, Bruce and Ian Hurd (eds.), *The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority* (Routledge, London, 2008).
6. Glennon, Michael J., "Why the Security Council Failed" 82(3) *Foreign Affairs* 16 (2003).
7. Khanna, V.N., *International Relations* (Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi)
8. Ponzio, Richard, "Is Reforming the UNSC Realistic?" (Stimson Center, 2026)
9. Rawski, Frederick and Nathan Miller, "The United States in the Security Council: A Faustian Bargain?" in David M. Malone (ed.), *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Viva Books, New Delhi, 2006) 357.
10. Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2025 and the Year Ahead", *Monthly Forecast* (January 2026), available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-01/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2025-and-the-year-ahead.php.
11. Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2026: Mid-Year Scorecard and Looking Ahead", *Monthly Forecast* (August 2026), available at https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-08/in-hindsight-the-security-council-in-2026-mid-year-scorecard-and-looking-ahead.php.
12. Sharma, Urmila and S.K. Sharma, *International Relations (Since World War II)* (Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 1997).
13. Soltani, Bahram, "Law, Power, and Paralysis..." (2026)
14. Talmon, Stefan, "The Security Council as World Legislature" 99 *American Journal of International Law* 175 (2005).
15. Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate and Kelly-Kate Pease, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 6th edn., 2009).