On the Misuse of Language in the Traditional Introspective Model of Self-Knowledge: Revisiting Wittgenstein’s Critique

Author(s)	Mr. Mugees Ul Kaisar
Country	India
Abstract	This paper attempts to present Wittgenstein’s critique of the traditional psychological introspective model of self-knowledge, which, according to Wittgenstein, rests on a mistaken understanding and (ab)use of language. Building upon the example of “beetle in a box” and other related arguments in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, this paper attempts to show the redundancy of introspective self-knowledge statements, posited as “knowledge statements”. To support this argument, Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea of private language, clarification of the nature and genesis of meaning in language & a critique of phenomenalism are also provided. Following this, in review of the conventional understanding of Wittgenstein’s critique already presented, Edward Sankowski’s reception of Wittgenstein’s critique is discussed.
Keywords	self-knowledge, avowal, language game, doubt
Published In	Volume 8, Issue 1, January-February 2026
Published On	2026-01-07
DOI	https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i01.65847
Short DOI	https://doi.org/hbjmj4

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International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research