Geopolitical Coercion, Commitment, and Reputation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of  US Strategy toward Venezuela

Author(s)	Dr. Bipul De
Country	India
Abstract	This paper develops a stylized game-theoretic framework to analyze geopolitical coercion as a problem of commitment, credibility, and reputation in repeated strategic interaction. Motivated by recent tensions between the United States and Venezuela, the model conceptualizes coercive actions as commitment devices that alter beliefs, restructure payoffs, and generate spillovers across interconnected geopolitical arenas. By formalizing the interaction as a sequential and repeated game, the paper demonstrates how costly coercive strategies may remain rational for a dominant actor, while resistance can persist as an equilibrium outcome for a weaker state when future autonomy and reputation are sufficiently valued. The analysis contributes to the political economy of conflict by integrating economic coercion, reputation dynamics, and alliance responses within a unified strategic framework.
Keywords	Geopolitical coercion, Game Theory, Commitment, Reputation, Sanctions, Political Economy
Field	Sociology > Politics
Published In	Volume 8, Issue 1, January-February 2026
Published On	2026-01-31
DOI	https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i01.66967

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