International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research

E-ISSN: 2582-2160   •   Impact Factor: 9.24

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Constitutional Rules and Political Incentives: Buchanan and the Limits of Democratic Discretion

Author(s) Dr. Clayton H. Hawkins
Country United States
Abstract Modern democratic governments increasingly rely on discretionary decision-making to address complex social and economic problems. Although discretion can improve administrative flexibility, it also raises concerns about accountability, predictability, and the concentration of political authority.
Drawing on the work of James M. Buchanan, this article suggests that political and administrative behavior is shaped by the incentives embedded within institutional structures. When the constraints that regulate behavior are weak or poorly defined, discretionary authority tends to expand.
Placing Buchanan within the broader tradition of classical political economy, particularly the contributions of Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, the analysis highlights how rule-based governing supports economic and social coordination while maintaining democratic legitimacy. It also examines contemporary regulatory systems, where increased administrative discretion is subject to political influence and the pursuit of economic advantage.
Effective democratic governance, the article argues, depends not only on policy outcomes but on stable constitutional rules that limit discretion and support long-term institutional stability.
Keywords Discretion, decision-making, incentives, administrative behavior, embedded
Field Sociology > Economics
Published In Volume 8, Issue 2, March-April 2026
Published On 2026-04-19
DOI https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i02.72744
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E-ISSN 2582-2160
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CrossRef DOI prefix of IJFMR is 10.36948/ijfmr

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