A brief analysis of Brentano’s definition of intentionality

Author(s)	Ms. Sulagna Chatterjee
Country	India
Abstract	Brentano's thesis of intentionality is a groundbreaking contribution, even though traces of it can be found in medieval philosophy of mind. However, it was Brentano who first introduced this concept to modern philosophers. Just as Husserl built the foundation of his phenomenology on Brentano's conception of intentionality, Brentano's influence remains significant in contemporary work on intentionality in modern cognitive science. According to Brentano’s thesis, every mental representation or state must point towards the object it represents, based on its content. In other words, every mental phenomenon involves an object that exists intentionally, with reference to content, and is directed at an object. Brentano never employed the term 'intentionality'; rather, he elucidated the concept of intentionality through the use of the term 'intentional inexistence.' Consequently, it appears that Brentano's concept of intentionality is highly susceptible to misinterpretation. For this very reason, an analysis of Brentano's concept of intentionality is warranted. In this connection, this article attempts to present a brief overview of how Brentano defined intentionality.
Keywords	Intentionality, Brentano’s Thesis Content, Object, Act, Intentional Inexistence.
Field	Sociology > Philosophy / Psychology / Religion
Published In	Volume 8, Issue 2, March-April 2026
Published On	2026-04-03

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