Rule-Based Order, Discretion, and Credible Commitment: Insights from Smith and Hayek

Author(s)	Dr. Clayton H. Hawkins
Country	United States
Abstract	This article examines the role of general rules in maintaining social and institutional order by integrating the moral and institutional insights of Adam Smith and Friedrich A. Hayek. It argues that stable, rule-based governance provides the foundation for coordination, credible commitment, and legitimacy, while reliance on discretionary authority introduces structural risks. Drawing on classical political economy and contemporary institutional analysis, the article shows that rules are not merely procedural constraints; they are foundational mechanisms that reduce uncertainty, limit opportunism, and enable coordination in complex social systems. The findings contribute to constitutional political economy by clarifying the relationship between general rules, institutional stability, and the limits of political authority.
Keywords	rule of law, discretionary authority, political economy, institutional order, credible commitment
Field	Sociology > Economics
Published In	Volume 8, Issue 3, May-June 2026
Published On	2026-06-02
DOI	https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i03.76989

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