Who Controls the Bench? Judicial Independence, the Collegium–NJAC Debate and the Quest for a Constitutional Model of Judicial Appointments in India

Author(s)	Mr. Gagan Gagan, Ms. Pooja Giri
Country	India
Abstract	The autonomy of the judiciary serves not only to safeguard the constitution but also to be a fundamental pillar of democracy. Questions about the judiciary's independence arise from the development of the collegium system and annulment of the National Judicial Appointment Commission. The history of India indicates that neither complete executive authority nor judicial supremacy provides a satisfactory model for appointments. This paper conducts a thorough analysis of the development of the collegium system for judge appointments, detailing each stage, and examines the judiciary's repeal of the Commission. Additionally, it investigates the criticisms associated with both the collegium system and the NJAC. Furthermore, it engages in an extensive comparative examination of the processes for appointing judges in the US and the UK. Based on this comparative analysis, critics offer recommendations to mitigate concerns about judicial appointments in India.
Keywords	Collegium System, Independence of Judiciary, National Judicial Appointment Commission.
Field	Sociology > Administration / Law / Management
Published In	Volume 8, Issue 4, July-August 2026
Published On	2026-08-19
DOI	https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2026.v08i04.86087

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