International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research

E-ISSN: 2582-2160   •   Impact Factor: 9.24

A Widely Indexed Open Access Peer Reviewed Multidisciplinary Bi-monthly Scholarly International Journal

Call for Paper Volume 8, Issue 5 (September-October 2026) Submit your research before last 3 days of October to publish your research paper in the issue of September-October.
Submit Research Paper Join as a Reviewer

Plagiarism is checked by the leading plagiarism checker TurnItIn

Call for Paper

Volume 8 Issue 5
September-October 2026

Submit your research paper

Indexing Partners
Academia Advanced Sciences Index Bielefeld Academic Search Engine CiteSeer DRJI Google Scholar Independent Search Engine & Directory Network ISI (International Scientific Indexing) Issuu Mendeley Research Networks
RefSeek ResearcherId - Thomson Reuters ResearchGate Scirus Scribd Semantic Scholar UTeM - Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka Wiki for Call for Papers WorldCat Zenodo

Constitutional Bodies and Political Accountability: Strengthening Democratic Institutions in India

Author(s) Dr. Kyasaram Kishtaiah
Country India
Abstract Independent constitutional bodies were created by the framers of the Indian Constitution to secure the conditions on which representative government can be trusted: fair elections, honest public finances, merit-based recruitment and equitable fiscal federalism. This paper examines how far these bodies still perform that role and how they are themselves held to account. Using a doctrinal reading of constitutional provisions and Supreme Court judgments, together with secondary data from the Election Commission of India, the Comptroller and Auditor General, PRS Legislative Research, the Association for Democratic Reforms and the Finance Commissions, it develops a five-dimension framework of horizontal accountability covering appointment, tenure, resources, transparency and follow-up. The framework is applied to the Election Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General, the Union Public Service Commission and the Finance Commission, with comparative reference to statutory watchdogs such as the information commissions and the Lokpal. The analysis shows that constitutional safeguards on tenure and removal are strong, but that appointment procedures, resourcing and weak parliamentary follow-up leave key institutions exposed to executive influence. The paper argues that the credibility of constitutional bodies depends less on their textual independence than on transparent appointments, adequate resources and effective legislative and judicial scrutiny, and it proposes a reform agenda accordingly.
Keywords constitutional bodies; political accountability; Election Commission of India; Comptroller and Auditor General; horizontal accountability; democratic institutions; India
Published In Volume 5, Issue 6, November-December 2023
Published On 2023-11-01
DOI https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2023.v05i06.88391
View / Download PDF File

Share this



E-ISSN 2582-2160
CrossRef

CrossRef DOI prefix of IJFMR is 10.36948/ijfmr

Downloads
Research Paper Format Copyright Permission Form and Undertaking Form

All research papers published on this website are licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License, and all rights belong to their respective authors/researchers.

CC-BY-SA Open Access

About IJFMR
Fees & Payment
Current Issue
Publication Archive 		Submit Research Paper
Track Submission Status
Publication Guidelines
Publication Ethics
Peer Review & Plagiarism 		Join as a Reviewer
Editors & Reviewers
Reviewer Referral Program
Get Reviewer Membership Certi. 		Website/Journal Policies
Usage Policy
Content Policies
Privacy Policy
Contact Us +91-9687-828-838 editor@ijfmr.com
Powered by Sky Research Publication and Journals